811.0141 Phoenix Group/70
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)
Sir Ronald Lindsay called this afternoon to present a further Aide-Mémoire on the subject of Canton and Enderbury Islands. This Aide-Mémoire made clear the following points:
- (1)
- that the British consider that their proposal for working out a British and an American noncompetitive trans-Pacific air service must definitely include Hawaii;
- (2)
- without actually making the request the note contained a strong expression of hope that Pan-American Airways meanwhile not make use of Canton Island under the license recently issued;
- (3)
- while discussions concerning Canton and Enderbury should be held between the United States and Great Britain alone, the discussions regarding trans-Pacific aviation should be participated in by the United States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand;
- (4)
- the British desire immediate publicity.
After reading the Aide-Mémoire, Sir Ronald Lindsay said that he was glad to see that many of the difficulties he had foreseen in our talk of last week had turned out to be “mere spooks”. He now thought that the situation was greatly simplified and that we could make rapid progress.
I told him that one or two of the points in his note merited some preliminary comment.
In the first place it was clear from the Aide-Mémoire that we were faced with long negotiations and that a suggestion that Pan-American make no use of the islands for the present might in effect postpone their use of it for a considerable period. I reiterated that such installations as they planned at present on the islands, or for that matter the granting of the license itself, would in no way prejudice an eventual settlement. Pan-American understood clearly that whatever money they might expend on the islands was a business risk. The New Zealand Government had the right under the terms of the contract to cancel the present Pan-American–Honolulu–Auckland service for a variety of causes and if the Company should go ahead now and make use of Canton Island it would not alter their status in any way vis-à-vis the New Zealand Government. Sir Ronald said he supposed so but that London, while not acutely perturbed, nonetheless felt that Pan-American was “jumping the gun”.
As far as the administration of the islands themselves was concerned I foresaw very little trouble in reaching an agreement, but as far as the aviation picture was concerned, the British were asking a very [Page 91] great deal. Sir Ronald replied that they were only asking equality of treatment and said “Look at the map. If Great Britain can’t use Hawaii it can’t fly the Pacific. I hope very much that you will not take refuge behind the fiction that Hawaii is part of your mainland projected out into the ocean. The bitterness that has been aroused by your extending your coastwise laws to Hawaii is very real and should you do the same with aviation the bitterness would increase. Further, when Judge Moore intimated the other day his fears that Japan might enter the picture, I think you need be under no apprehensions as the Japanese would never even consider letting you fly over the Marianna Islands.”
I told Sir Ronald that I was not sure that it was possible to separate the Pacific and talk about reciprocity in that area alone. Leaving aside the questions of defense, a concession to Great Britain in Hawaii would in effect be giving Great Britain the final link in a round-the-world service whereas in return Britain was offering us only a landing right in the Antipodes. In other words, treating the Pacific as an isolated area in which reciprocity would apply would enable them to touch all the territory on both Continents and merely give us a landing right in the Antipodes, with no place to go. Sir Ronald said he saw the point but thought it was entirely academic. Round-the-world services were a long, long way ahead. The British had not even completed the Australian-New Zealand link. They were certainly not yet ready to fly the Pacific. He hoped very much, however, that we would not prejudice the present for the sake of a distant future. I did not argue the matter further but added that in all fairness I should tell him that I thought the Hawaiian request was going to raise a problem which would be very difficult to solve.
I wondered, therefore, if it would not be better to discuss the two points, namely administration of the islands and trans-Pacific aviation separately.
All of this, however, was somewhat tentative as Judge Moore had not yet seen the President who took a strong personal interest in this matter. I apologized for our delay in answering to which he laughingly countered “it is not for the British to reproach you for any delay”.