811.0141 Phoenix Group/31½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)

Participants: The President,
Judge Moore,72
Dr. Gruening,73
Mr. Pierrepont Moffat.

The President said that he had sent for us in order to discuss ways and means of getting the use of a number of Islands in the Pacific. It was clear to him that the approach we had made last summer through Sir Ronald Lindsay74 was not producing any results. He thought that the time had come when we must bring Ambassador Kennedy75 into the picture. He had accordingly discussed the matter with Mr. Kennedy the night before last and had instructed him to take up very shortly after his arrival the whole subject with Mr. Neville Chamberlain76 personally. He was to point out that there were in the Pacific several hundreds, if not thousands, of islands; that both Britain and the United States had conflicting claims to many of these islands; that we saw nothing to be gained by entering into legalistic discussions as to the sovereignty of individual islands; that this would be a long drawn out process and possibly acrimonious; that both Great Britain and the United States had a common interest in all of these islands, namely to keep a third party out of the area, namely Japan. Mr. Kennedy was to explain that the President was not only interested but felt that a decision one way or the other must be reached very shortly. This decision could either be an amicable settlement based on joint use of the islands and a postponement of a determination of their final sovereignty, or else it could mean a race between the two countries with each government sending out settlers.

The President then reviewed the whole question of title to lands, which he said had gone through many phases. First the Pope had tried to allocate to Spain and Portugal sovereignty of all the unknown [Page 78] world. Next had grown up a system of claim to title through discovery. It gradually became evident to the world that discovery alone did not perfect title and occupancy became the criterion to title. At first occupancy was a rather haphazard affair. A party would go ashore, spend a day or a week, or a month, and then sail away claiming that the land in question had been occupied. In the President’s opinion the only occupancy which had any validity was permanent occupancy and by that he meant bona fide occupancy and not merely the sending of “two men and a dog” to a given part of the world. But even permanent occupancy of one island when speaking of archipelagoes did not give a clear title to a whole group of islands.

With this background Mr. Kennedy was to inform Mr. Neville Chamberlain that unless we perceived a different attitude toward our perfectly reasonable suggestion for settlement of the status of islands under dispute, the President would sign an Executive Order placing under the jurisdiction of the United States Interior Department all islands not permanently occupied in the area generally situated between Samoa and Hawaii and he would furthermore send settlers to quantities of such unoccupied islands. He felt quite certain that the British would elect the former of the two courses.

Meanwhile, however, he said that we could not very well accept without counter move the action of the British in nullifying our standstill offer of last August 977 by sending settlers to Canton Island three weeks subsequently thereto and then declining to accept the proposal for a standstill as it affected the Phoenix group. He instructed Dr. Gruening to send settlers to Canton and Enderbury Islands by the next trip of the Government Cutter Itasca which sails from Hawaii on February 25. These settlers would reach the islands March 1st or 2nd, just about the time that Mr. Kennedy reaches London. Mr. Moffat pointed out that we would have to notify the British that our standstill offer no longer held good and that it was withdrawn. The President agreed but said that such a notice should be given Sir Ronald Lindsay only shortly before March 1st and at the same time we should tell him that settlers would reach Canton Island very shortly.

There ensued considerable discussion between the President and Dr. Gruening as to the type of men to be sent in the party, their attitude toward the British settlers already there, the question of radio communication, supplies, relief, et cetera.

The President next brought up the question of Palmyra Island which Dr. Gruening had recommended be made a national monument. Dr. Gruening explained the plans of the Navy to blast an approach through the corals and to make a large lagoon by joining together [Page 79] three existing smaller lagoons. The work would be exceedingly expensive and the results would be unsatisfactory for naval purposes. The president agreed to issue an Executive Order making Palmyra Island a national monument and instructed Dr. Gruening to placard the Island with signs large enough to be read four miles out at sea attesting to this fact. The destruction of either animal, bird, or plant life would be an offense. Dr. Gruening pointed out that as it was not public domain but belonged to people in Hawaii we should have to purchase the Island. The President pointed out that this would require legislation but Dr. Gruening thought that he might be able to find a donor.

The President then suggested that we study the status of certain French Islands between Samoa and the Galápagos to which we also had claim. The hop from the Galápagos Islands to these French islands was 2,800 miles or only 600 miles more than the present San Francisco–Honolulu hop.

It was agreed that Judge Moore, Dr. Gruening and Mr. Moffat would discuss the whole problem in greater detail with Ambassador Kennedy on Thursday, February 17.

Pierrepont Moffat
  1. R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the Department of State.
  2. Ernest H. Gruening, Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior.
  3. British Ambassador in the United States.
  4. Joseph P. Kennedy, appointed Ambassador to the United Kingdom, January 17, 1938.
  5. British Prime Minister.
  6. Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. ii, p. 129.