611.4131/1855
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador, accompanied by his trade expert, Mr. Overton, came in and handed to me the British reply62 on our recent last trade proposals. (These papers are somewhat lengthy and will be placed in the files.)
The Ambassador, without in precise language saying so, undertook to make me believe that this was at least virtually the last word on the part of his Government. He indicated that they were granting our requests in two instances. I did not pursue the details further but said that I was deeply disappointed.
I then said that, without in any sense being critical, I did feel that although we entered upon our negotiations with the British more cordially perhaps than in any other instance, we had experienced four times the difficulty in the negotiations than we had had in negotiating the other eighteen trade agreements. Mr. Overton said they too had had unusual difficulties. I replied that of course Empire Preference was a chief complication. Both of them agreed, and then the Ambassador said, very emphatically, that I must be prepared to see Empire Preference maintained in all the future. I replied that if the Empire and especially Great Britain could stand it, the United States could well stand it; that if they desired to pursue a seclusionist policy which would obstruct and reduce the sum total of world trade, thereby from year to year causing Great Britain increasingly to experience the enormous drawbacks and incalculable injuries of such course, that was up to the British Empire. I said that naturally we are opposed to any customs union of such destructive nature; that Germany, in the course of her policy of autarchy, is reported to be planning a customs union for herself and the Baltic and Danubian countries; that this is correspondingly destructive of the sum total of world trade; that, in my judgment, the difference between a course of autarchy in the world by the important nations and a course of liberal commercial policy and trade restoration is the difference between 12 to 15 million unemployed wage earners and their families and their permanent employment; that Britain and America would contribute their share to such unemployment and to a like extent increase their relief rolls permanently. I then added I would give almost any price to see a suitable trade agreement between our two countries—something I had often said—founded upon the idea that they both would then go forward in active and earnest support everywhere of a liberal commercial policy.
I repeatedly expressed my great disappointment at the attitude of the British Government towards our requests for concessions and [Page 68] added that I could not possibly understand their viewpoint; that most of our concessions would cause opposition to this Government on the theory that they created some sort of competition to American industry, while most of the British concessions were more or less noncompetitive, and hence no political elements were materially involved. The Ambassador had little comment in reply. He, of course, is personally in harmony with liberal commercial policy.
After again expressing my strong disappointment, I said we would look over the British reports even though we could not possibly understand the viewpoint of the British Government as indicated by its reply; that we have had many rumors and reports to the effect the British Government really does not desire a trade agreement, and, of course, if it does not desire an agreement that explains all of our difficulties in attempting to carry on these negotiations; that if the British Government does not really desire an agreement it, of course, has a right to take that position. The Ambassador and Mr. Overton were quick to insist their Government did desire an agreement. The Ambassador took occasion to remark that he had devoted two years of work to this trade program, and I, referring to our difficulties with London, replied that it was a pity the Ambassador could not be two high officials at the same time. I said that if he could have been both here and in London in charge, our trade agreement would have been completed long since and the people of the two countries would ere this time have erected a monument in his honor. I then said that, of course, our only desire was to have an agreement we could to a fair extent defend in this country, and, much as we desired an agreement, we would not make any progress with our program of liberal commercial policy if in such desire we accepted proposals we could not defend successfully.
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