611.4131/1844
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Hawkins)
| Participants: | The Honorable Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador; |
| Mr. A. E. Overton, British Trade Delegation; | |
| Mr. Francis B. Sayre; and | |
| Mr. Harry C. Hawkins. |
The Ambassador said that he was apprehensive lest the decision of his Government regarding our list of requests for concessions in [Page 63] the trade agreement should be unfavorable. In particular he was concerned with the formula on tobacco. He said that this formula in fact imposed a definite obligation on his Government to reduce the preference by one shilling in 1942; in other words, that there is in fact no material distinction between the moral commitment which we seek and the outright legal commitment of a future government. He also said that it would make it easier to accept the formula if we did not specify the amount by which the preference is to be reduced. Mr. Sayre replied that the problem was to go as far as possible in creating a presumption that the preference would be reduced in 1942 without actually imposing a legal commitment on a future government. He said that the proposed formula meets these requirements. However, we would be glad to consider any formula which accomplished the same object equally well. In regard to specifying the amount of the reduction, he said that this is a necessary element in the formula in that the amount specified could not be less than one shilling.
The Ambassador also made the point that some question exists as to how the British Government should be described. The reference to the Cabinet creates some difficulty because the Cabinet has no exact legal status.
Mr. Overton interjected the comment that the reason they were trying to find some way of making our proposals more acceptable is that the attitude in London toward our proposals, as indicated by advices they have received, is very discouraging indeed.
The Ambassador then outlined his conception of the time table as nearly as he can construct it on the basis of the information he has on hand. He said that a subcommittee of the Cabinet is to meet to consider our proposal tomorrow (October 12), and presumably formulate its recommendations. Our long memorandum and the draft agreement will arrive in London about the end of this week and will be distributed to the various ministries concerned where it will be carefully analyzed in preparation for the discussion of the subject in the meeting of the full Cabinet which will take place the following Wednesday (October 19). On this basis, we might expect the definitive reply of the British Government by the end of next week (October 22). The Ambassador emphasized that this was the very earliest date on which a reply can be expected unless, he said, the subcommittee of the Cabinet “goes off the deep end” and sends instructions to the delegation here without going to the full Cabinet.
The Ambassador then raised the question whether it would not be possible to go ahead and discuss the considerable number of technical details that have to be straightened out. He said he did not understand why we were unwilling to do so. It was explained to him that the reason was merely that the two delegations were so far [Page 64] apart on a number of important questions of substance that it hardly seemed worthwhile to be discussing technical details until the important questions of substance were settled. However, the Ambassador was informed that there was no compelling reason for not going ahead and clearing up technical details, and that if he so desired, we would be glad to go forward with this work. Whereupon, Mr. Overton said that they would give us a memorandum by about the end of this week indicating where their views on the technical points differed from the position taken by us in the draft recently submitted to them.