611.4131/1681: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)
387. My telegram no. 379 of July 22, 2 [6] p.m., and our telephone conversations of yesterday and today.44 When you see the Prime Minister, I hope that you will stress the fact, as I pointed out over [Page 40] the telephone yesterday, that we earnestly desire an agreement that is fair alike to both countries, and our whole policy and purpose has been to achieve such an agreement. This is illustrated by the attitude which we have taken since the efforts to negotiate a trade agreement began. In formulating our original offers we were all impressed with the tremendous importance of these negotiations and the paramount need of making the agreement a real one. Our offers reflected the atmosphere in which they were drawn up. We considered them comprehensive and valuable and fully expected that the British would be impressed with them. However, when the British expressed dissatisfaction with a considerable number of our proposals, we painstakingly reviewed every item in question with the determination to do everything we safely could to meet the British viewpoint. The result was that our negotiators agreed, conditionally upon our requests being substantially met, to recommend certain very material improvements in our already liberal offers.
This disposition on our part to contribute our full share toward a really satisfactory agreement has been, in our opinion at least, in marked contrast to the attitude thus far displayed by the British. Limited improvements here and there have been obtained after much argument and waiting. But as regards our main requests, such as those relating to the important agricultural items on our so-called “must list”, we have thus far argued and waited in vain. On none of the important items on that list has there been any improvement since the negotiations were announced, although at the time of that announcement we made it clear that the concessions indicated by the British up to that time, while sufficient for announcement, were not sufficient for an agreement, and that material improvement would have to be made. The British acquiesced in the announcement with the knowledge of, and what we regarded as tacit consent to, the condition above stated.
It is true that their negotiators have indicated that the question of improving their offers has been under consideration and, notwithstanding the obvious desirability of concluding these negotiations as soon as possible, we are not impatient merely because of the delay. We are ready to take as much time as may be necessary to get a really good agreement. What does concern us are certain indications from the British negotiators that only moderate improvements on a few items can be expected. This explains our desire that before the Cabinet commits itself to a position it be fully alive to the need of materially improving the British offers. It is necessary that the Cabinet realize that moderate improvements on a few items are not sufficient to balance the extended concessions which we on our side are prepared to make. It must be evident to the British [Page 41] that our whole program for international cooperation in the reduction of trade barriers could not survive an obviously one-sided agreement.
As I told you yesterday, I wish you would say to the Prime Minister that we seek this agreement, and we hope that the British seek this agreement, not primarily for the dollars and cents immediately involved, valuable as that is and without in the slightest degree minimizing that side of the trade agreement. We seek it primarily as a powerful initiative to help rectify the present unstable political and economic situation everywhere. In our judgment, no single act would contribute so much to quieting the threats to world political and economic stability, not only in Europe but in other parts of the world, as the announcement that these two great countries have come together with a broad, basic trade arrangement which might well be regarded as a foundation for a restored structure of world order. That is the big objective as we see it, and unless we can get Mr. Chamberlain and the British Government to accept this view and to approach this problem on a broader front, it might well be charged in Germany, Italy, Japan, and other countries that our two countries are utterly incapable of sitting down and making simple, mutually profitable trade arrangements with each other. I have not the slightest doubt that these negotiations are being watched by those countries to see whether we are capable of working out an agreement that is really worth while, and I think that it would greatly harm not only our two countries but also the whole outlook for peace and economic improvement if we, after months of haggling, should turn out a little, narrow, picayunish trade agreement.
We have in this country, and I assume that the British Government faces a similar problem, vested and other interests which for selfish reasons are opposing this effort to conclude a broad and comprehensive trade agreement. We are convinced that this petty, one-sided, selfish attitude is wholly wrong, not only from the broader standpoint, but also because we are certain that a broad comprehensive agreement would actually benefit these interests which seem most to fear it. In the face of this unprecedented opportunity which our two Governments now have to make a real and lasting contribution to world peace and economic stability, it would be tragic indeed if either of our Governments allowed itself to be diverted from this broad objective by selfish, local objections. Should this opportunity be lost, I am convinced that despite all some of us could do to prevent it, it would result in the American people turning this country in the other direction and moving definitely toward political and economic isolation.
I was glad to learn from our telephone conversation today of Stanley’s statement to you that the British Government will make its [Page 42] offers to us at an early date. I was likewise pleased to learn that Stanley has made arrangements to prevent a suspension of the discussions after the British ministers leave London at the end of this week.
- Memoranda of trans-Atlantic telephone conversations not printed.↩