711.62/145
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Germany (Wilson)95
Dr. Goebbels received me in his office at the Reichs Propaganda Ministerium at 1:00 o’clock on March 22.
He began the conversation by stating that he was very glad to meet me, as he had wanted for a considerable period to talk over matters with an American representative, that he was not at all [Page 435] satisfied with the press relations between the two countries. He said that he thoroughly understood the limitations upon the activity of our Government in its relations with the free Press; that he had called in men from the Foreign Office who knew America, in order to learn about this, and that he thought he thoroughly understood. There was obviously little that the Government could do in the matter with our Press. Nevertheless it was lamentable that this campaign of hatred should be carried on. He did not in any way expect that Germany would escape criticism, that it would escape misunderstanding,—indeed, it was inconceivable to him that writers in America should be sympathetic with present-day Germany because of the complete contrast of method by which the Government was acting. What he did not expect and what he deeply deplored, were wilful misstatements of fact, and slander and libel against the persons of the Reich Chancelor and those immediately around him. He said that the person of the Führer was venerated by every German. Indeed, he was going to use a word that would astonish my foreign ears, and say that to the German there was something “heilig” about the Führer. Therefore the Germans deeply resented the personal attack upon him.
He continued by saying that he had kept out of the German press nearly all of these attacks because he did not wish to see bitterness grow on bitterness and attack upon attack. The result of such tactics could only be a reiterated embittering of the situation, which might even be a latent cause of war. In any case, it was inconceivable that there could be any improvement in our cultural or economic relations until the press hatred was abated. To bring about this abatement was part of the program for a better general world understanding. He had kept out of attack, in spite of the personal temptation to retaliate in kind, especially on the slanderous attacks upon the person of the Führer, his designation as “bandit” and “robber,” even when these attacks were directed against a man of the most unquestionable character and honesty of purpose. He said I was new in Germany, but he was sure that in the coming months I would have frequent opportunity to talk with and know the Führer, and I could not but be impressed with the singleness of purpose and the undeviating honesty of the man’s character.
He said again he was glad to have this opportunity to talk matters over with me, because many people in Germany felt that relations with America were so bad through the Press hatred that there was no use trying to do anything about it. But he was not one of those and such a point of view was to him a stultifying attitude. He thought there were possibilities of making it better and believed that if we [Page 436] could work with some measure of confidence we could bring about an improved relationship.
I replied that before leaving Washington I had talked to Dieckhoff96 and we had analyzed together those things which stood in the way of better relationships between the United States and Germany; that in respect to one of our difficulties I had been happy to see shortly after my arrival that orders had been given that German citizens should not enter organizations in America, such as the America-Deutsch Bund, and analogous institutions. I said that I had received a letter from the Secretary97 by which I was informed that the Secretary had expressed to Dieckhoff his satisfaction over this matter. I believed that this step the Germans had taken could not fail to have a good effect.
I then said there was no use in blinking difficulties and the Minister’s frankness encouraged me in responding with equal frankness. The most crucial thing that stood between any betterment of our Press relationship was the Jewish question.98 Thus if we were to work for better relationships we could not expect immediate results. Hatreds so deep as those which existed in my country on this question could not be mitigated in weeks or even months. It was a matter of years before such hatreds would lessen or be forgotten, and then only if new incidents did not give fresh fuel to the flames. I said that he was a politician and that I was a diplomat, and we were capable of saying, each one of us, that what took place within Germany was a matter for Germany and what took place within America was a matter for Americans. Indeed, I should be the first to contest that what took place within America concerned other people. Nevertheless it could not be expected that such objectivity would be felt by the mass of our population or by the writers.
Here Goebbels broke in and said that he had been a writer himself and he knew that every writer must show himself a better general than the commander-in-chief, a better painter than an artist, a better musician than an orchestra director, and, above all, a better politician than the chief of any country. This weakness on the part of writers was understandable and natural.
I replied that I had talked at considerable length with the American representatives here and that I felt that by and large they were a serious group of men trying to tell the truth as they saw it, but that after all the Minister must not forget that they were seeing it through American eyes and they were judging it from an American background.
[Page 437]Dr. Goebbels agreed with my estimate of the American correspondents and said that in respect to them he would never take stringent action against an American correspondent without talking over first with me what he intended to do and getting my views on the subject. I thanked him for this declaration and said that I felt, as he did, that the way to avoid difficulties was to discuss them frankly before action and that I welcomed therefore what he had just said.
I continued on the matter of general relationships by saying that I had been much struck by noticing that it was much harder for the American people to be indifferent to what took place within Germany than it was even for the citizen of France or England, nations which had borne the brunt of the War. I felt that this arose from that Freudian complex by which deep affection which is shattered turns inevitably to hatred and not to indifference, Americans of my age and generation had been accustomed to see the best intellectuals in our country go to Germany for education in medicine, technical matters, arts, and so on; that thousands of houses, among them mine, had had German girls as governesses for the children, that ten thousands of families had German relatives. Thus the bonds between the two lands went so deep that we could not regard what happened in Germany with indifference. I said, if Dr. Goebbels wished to prove these relationships to his own satisfaction, he had only to summon a dozen of his collaborators and ask them each of the relationship they had with America. He was almost certain to find in every case that each of them had a cousin, a brother, an uncle, or some branch of his family established in, our country in the past 100 years. The War had largely shattered this feeling of close contact and affection for Germany. In the years succeeding the War much advance had been made in rebuilding this relationship, but it had again been shattered, primarily—I regretted to have to raise it again—by the Jewish question.
The Minister said that this was an entirely new and interesting point of view. Nevertheless it was startling to him to find the lack of comprehension of what was going on in Germany on the part of American travellers; that over and over again Americans with whom he talked had been astonished and said so when they saw the economic conditions of Germany, the normal life of its people and their satisfaction. It [He?] was unhappy that there was so little understanding on the part of the Americans for what took place in this land. I replied that I agreed with him that there was a large measure of misunderstanding and that I myself, although I had tried to study about Germany before I came, had learned a great deal since my arrival. However, I wanted to emphasize that the understanding between the countries must be mutual if it is to be of any use, and that the misunderstanding and ignorance in respect of my land in Germany [Page 438] was just as striking to an American as the misunderstanding of my people when they came here about Germany. I knew how beset were all public men in this country, how busy they were, nevertheless I hoped that they would find time to try to see what my country was driving at and what my President and Secretary of State were trying to accomplish.
Dr. Goebbels said that he hoped it would some time become possible for responsible American Government officials to show at least their disapproval of the publication of lies. He pointed out that a question had been asked in the House of Commons at London about a report of 30,000 Germans landing to help Franco and the Prime Minister99 had replied that their reports were to the effect that there was not a word of truth in these rumors. Dr. Goebbels said that the German officials felt profoundly grateful for this statement of Chamberlain’s, as it was a real indication that he was trying to better relations between the two countries.
In conclusion Dr. Goebbels reiterated his statement about talking over with me in advance any radical action respecting our press representatives and begged me to come to him freely when I wanted to talk over any matter. In return I told him that I hoped these relations could be bettered, that unless I cherished this hope I would not have come here, but that I feared that we had a difficult road in front of us and one which would take long and patient labor, if it could be achieved at all.