851.248/49

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control (Green)

Baron Amaury de La Grange, a member of the French Senate and of the Commission des Finances and of the Commission de l’Air of that body, called on Mr. Norman Davis by appointment this afternoon. This appointment was made at the suggestion of the President with whom the Baron had recently discussed his mission in the United States. I was present during the conversation in Mr. Davis’s office in which the Baron explained briefly that he had come to this country for the purpose of purchasing bombing planes, attack planes, and pursuit planes, airplane engines, airplane parts, patent rights for the construction of airplanes and airplane engines, and machine tools for the construction of airplanes and airplane engines. At Mr. Davis’s [Page 298] suggestion, the Baron accompanied me to my office where he explained his mission at great length and in considerable detail.

He said that he had recently prepared a report for the Commission des Finances of the French Senate in which he had demonstrated that by the end of 1938 Germany would have at least 4,000 high speed military airplanes of the most modern types, whereas France at that time would have not more than 300 such planes. Furthermore, German industry was geared to produce modern high speed fighting planes in tremendous quantities, whereas it would require two years or more for French industry to produce such planes in comparable quantities. Moreover, in case of war, Germany could spare a large proportion of its man-power for work in factories, whereas France would require a much larger proportion of its man-power in the fighting forces. He explained that on the basis of this report, he had been commissioned by the Air Minister to visit the United States with a view to purchasing perhaps as many as 1,000 planes of types now in use in the American Army to be delivered as rapidly as possible, additional planes built according to French plans and specifications to be delivered later, modern high speed engines to replace worn engines now installed in French military planes, patent rights to various types of planes and engines so that French industry could begin to construct them in the near future, and large quantities of all the necessary machine tools for the construction of these planes and engines. He explained that in general what he had in mind was attempting to “harness American industry to the French war machine”. He said that he realized that the Neutrality Act43 to which the President had invited his particular attention would, if proclaimed to be in effect in respect to a war in which France was involved, prevent American industry from continuing to supply the French Army with the planes and engines which he hoped France could purchase in vast quantities in this country in case of war, but he said that he thought it probable that even in case an embargo were proclaimed the friendship of this Government for France would be sufficient to induce us to permit surreptitious indirect shipments via Canada.

I told the Baron something of the history of the recent Neutrality Act and of the weight of public opinion in support of it and stated emphatically that as long as that Act remained on the statute books unmodified, his Government must face the fact that in case of a war in which France was involved, the exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from this country to France would be prohibited, [Page 299] and that this Government would not connive at any violations of the embargo.

The Baron said that even in view of what I had just told him, he felt that his Government was justified in the present emergency in making a series of long-time contracts with American manufacturers in the hope that when France and England were attacked by Germany—as he expected they would be before 1940—the Neutrality Act would be repealed and American manufacturers would be permitted to supply the great democracies with arms.

I explained briefly the pertinent provisions of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917,44 and of the present policy in regard to the release of arms for export. The Baron seemed to be more or less familiar with the provisions of the law in question. He said that he felt sure that his Government could find planes and engines to suit its immediate purposes among the types already released.

I suggested to the Baron that the Military Attaché45 of the French Embassy could probably supply him with detailed information in regard to the types of planes and engines which had already been released, and in regard to the dates at which the release of other types might be expected.

The Baron said that his mission was very confidential and that he did not intend to explain its purpose to the French Embassy in Washington. His statement that he felt that he might have confidence in Colonel Champsaur46 and other remarks which he made, in regard to other members of the Embassy staff, indicated clearly that he had little confidence in anyone at the Embassy except Colonel Champsaur, and that he did not wish the others to know anything of his mission. He said that he did not intend to explain fully why he was in the United States to anyone but the President, Mr. Norman Davis, and me.

I asked the Baron whether he had as yet begun negotiations with any American manufacturer. He replied that he had spent most of yesterday afternoon with Mr. Martin and Mr. Hartson of the Glenn L. Martin Company from which he hoped to purchase a large number of bombing planes, and that he had made an appointment to see Mr. Guy Vaughan, President of the Curtiss Wright Export Corporation, next week. He said that he doubted whether he would wish to deal with any other companies. In speaking of manufacturers of American planes and engines, he showed great familiarity, not only with the planes and engines manufactured in this country, but also with [Page 300] the personalities of the important manufacturers. He said that he knew most of these men well. He added that he already had an agent visiting Cleveland, Dayton, and other cities making arrangements to purchase machine tools and that he expected to encounter no difficulties in that field.

As the Baron did not ask me to do anything for him, I came to the conclusion that the purpose of his call was merely to inform the Department of the purpose of his mission.

Joseph C. Green
  1. Joint Resolution of August 31, 1935; 49 Stat. 1081. Amended May 1, 1937; 50 Stat. 121.
  2. 40 Stat. 217, 223.
  3. Lt. Col. Emmanuel Lombard.
  4. Col. Norbert Champsaur, French Air Attaché in the United States.