611.4731/322
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of European Affairs
| Participants: | For the Commonwealth of Australia: |
| Mr. Edward Abbott, Comptroller General of Customs, | |
| Mr. J. F. Murphy, Secretary of Commerce, | |
| Mr. Keith Officer, Australian Counselor of the British Embassy. | |
| For the State Department: | |
| Mr. Sayre, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Minter. |
The Australian gentlemen came by appointment to hold their long-sought exploratory conversations regarding the possibility of negotiating a trade agreement with the United States. Messrs. Abbott and Murphy are two of the four who are proceeding by way of this continent to London, where negotiations for the renewal of their Ottawa agreement30 will begin in May. They will sail for London next week.
Mr. Sayre opened the business end of the conversations by reciting the general aims of the trade agreements program. He discussed the degree of success which had been attained to date, and stated that he felt certain that this success could not have been attained if we had not [Page 146] proceeded cautiously. The success of any such large program was dependent upon the silencing of opposition by education regarding its benefits, and by gaining an irresistible momentum with each forward step. Realization of the possibility of a misguided public and legislative opinion of the program having fatal consequences has resulted in the exercise of just such precautions as we are now forced to use in dealing with the question of negotiating with Australia. Mr. Sayre said that we all earnestly desired to negotiate an agreement with Australia, and it had been a part of our plan from the very beginning to undertake this at about the same time as we were negotiating with the United Kingdom. He wanted them to know that late last year we were considering very seriously such a possibility, but that the greatest single factor militating against it was Australia’s own wilful contribution. Earlier change in Australia’s policy toward the United States might have had different results. We had fully understood Australia’s political difficulties with elections imminent, and with other uncertainties there. We had been patient with the Australian Government in its period of political difficulties and had come to hope that because of this they would now be patient with us when we are faced with such.
Mr. Sayre then outlined our own political difficulties, which need not be repeated here. He had stated these to the British Ambassador on the occasion of interviews last month, and Mr. Officer would without doubt have reported them to his Government. Mr. Sayre said, however, that he had grown more hopeful of the political complexion by reason of the opposition to the United Kingdom and the Canadian trade agreements31 having been less than was anticipated, and by the success which the Department had had in preventing the passage by Congress of amendments and resolutions contrary to the aims of the program. He hoped these successes were an indication of continually improved political complexion and, although he must repeat his former insistence made to the Ambassador that he could make no commitment on the question of a public announcement, he did not despair of developments which would be pleasing to both Governments.
Mr. Abbott said that they had been very interested in hearing Mr. Sayre’s remarks. He would summarize them by concluding that we desired to negotiate with Australia, but that we were unable to say when, if ever, we would begin negotiations. It seemed to him that if we did wait until after the elections, a change in personnel of the Congress might result in making it impossible ever to negotiate (Mr. Sayre and others reiterated their belief that the Trade Agreements Act would continue in force if we proceeded with caution). Mr. Abbott said that his Government had hoped that we would at least find it [Page 147] possible to announce contemplation before the terms of the United Kingdom agreement were made public. His Government had given assent to certain concessions which the United Kingdom might make, and the publication of these while Australia’s future position in this scheme of things was still indefinite, would leave his Government in a difficult position at home. They had rushed through their plans for abandonment of the licensing system in the hope of gaining a place in this scheme. Both he and Mr. Murphy expressed fear that their ability to go through at London with tentative promises of cooperation might be lessened if they were unable to report to their ministers more definite progress than had been made this morning. (Mr. Murphy dwelt a little on the personal side, implying that Abbott and he would be open to criticism for having failed in their mission.)
Mr. Sayre said, apropos of Australia’s cooperation in making the Anglo-American agreement successful, that he believed such cooperation would prove to be well worth while for Australia. Messrs. Abbott and Murphy went on to recite the complexity of the Empire economic scheme, and stated that they felt that Australia’s position in that exclusive scheme would henceforth be determined by its commercial and treaty relations with the United States.
After the foregoing general thoughts had been expressed and clarified by questions and answers, Mr. Sayre inquired of the Australian procedure in putting a trade agreement into effect. He asked this question because, in the event we should find it possible within the next few months to put our own procedure into operation, he would want to feel reasonably sure that Australian parliamentary procedure would not throw the date of publication of terms too near our Congressional election.
The Australian procedure requires the tabling in the House of an exact copy of an agreement, since such agreement must be ratified by the Parliament. The Australians were so willing to proceed and conclude at the earliest possible date that they would devise some method of having a copy ready in Australia on the date of signature here, so that we could publish it immediately. Parliament would be called in special session for such an eventuality. Moreover, they would not be averse to cabling the entire agreement.
They then inquired of our procedure particularly as to whether it could not be shortened. Mr. Sayre was then obliged to leave the room, and in the remaining half hour Mr. Hawkins and the other officers outlined our procedure and indicated where it could be shortened. The primary reason for ability to shorten the period lay in the brevity of the schedules.
Messrs. Abbott and Murphy stated that they would be prepared to return from London at any time we were ready to start negotiations, and that one or more ministers would proceed here for the later stages. [Page 148] They regretted the possibility of returning to Australia and then having at a later date to make the long trip again.
Whereas Messrs. Murphy and Abbott attributed their remarks to the Australian Government, Mr. Officer in a few remarks which he made attempted only to interpret the feelings of the British Ambassador.