500.A15A5 Construction/139: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 22—2:04 p.m.]
233. Department’s 115, March 16, 11 a.m.
1. By arrangement of the Foreign Office, Johnson and Captain Willson met informally yesterday afternoon with subordinate Admiralty and British Foreign Office officials, together with the Counselor and Naval Attaché of the French Embassy. M. Cambon stated at the outset that his Government regretted that the American and British Governments found it necessary to invoke escalation in the capital ship category. The French will not take this action unless as a result of the British and American action continental powers exceed limits based on the London Naval Treaty, 1936. The French therefore will send a note stating this position and reserving full right to escalate if the continental powers through their programmes make it necessary.
In regard to the question of choice between articles 25 and 26 for purposes of escalation, M. Cambon said that as the French did not intend to escalate the question of which of the clauses is invoked is of no material importance to them. He gave however as the opinion of the French Government that article 25 more nearly fitted the present case than article 26 and expressed the opinion that if article 25 is invoked it might be easier for the Japanese to be brought later to some sort of an agreement. In view of the instruction in the Department’s 115, March 16, 11 a.m. we signified our willingness to use article 25 instead of article 26.
2. The British proposed that the notes of intention to escalate should be similar and simultaneous but not necessarily identic and should be so worded as to avoid indicating whether the escalation was to be in tonnage, in guns, or in both. They accordingly proposed certain modifications in the draft note. Paragraph 1 of the note quoted in the Embassy’s 207, March 12, 1 p.m. numbered paragraph 3, remains the same. Paragraph 2 reads as follows: “The proposed departure relates to upper limits of capital ships of sub-category (a). The precise extent of the departure will depend on the result of the consultations provided for in paragraph (3) of article 25.” Paragraph 3 of the proposed note, which follows the suggestion in the Department’s 115, March 16, 11 a.m., reads as follows: “The reasons for the above proposed departures consist in the reports received by His Majesty’s Government to the effect that Japan is constructing or has authorized the construction of capital ships of a [Page 904] tonnage not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions of the treaty. In view of the refusal of the Japanese Government, on being formally approached, to give assurances that these reports are ill-founded, His Majesty’s Government have no alternative but to regard them as being substantially correct.” The British Admiralty representatives in particular expressed a desire to omit the last sentence of this third paragraph entirely as they feel it will cause unnecessary irritation in Japan.
As soon as the Department has signified its approval or other views regarding the proposed changes in this draft a further meeting will be called with a view to perfecting the final text and arranging for the issuance of the notes. The British propose that when the text is agreeable the American note would be sent by our Government directly to Great Britain, France and Canada, with copies to Great Britain for Australia, New Zealand and the Government of India. The United States Government in turn would receive notes from France and Great Britain. The general opinion was that full publicity would have to be given to these notes, if not of the actual text, at least their substance.
3. The British then brought up the question of the extent of escalation. They re-stated and emphasized their position that while it was neither necessary nor desirable to be specific as to limits in the notes announcing escalation, it was in their opinion required by paragraph 3 of article 25 of the treaty that further discussions take place during the 3-months’ period with a view to agreeing, if possible, on new upper limits involving a minimum departure from the treaty. The British desire no increase in armament limits and would like to limit tonnage to about 40,000 tons. They argue, however, that whatever the limit, any limit is better than no limit. Basically this would seem to be the old question of the British wishing to keep down the size of battleships. In their argument that [they?] visualize Germany, Russia and Italy building on a no limit basis and they do not like it. The Department’s views expressed in numbered paragraph 2 of your 115, March 16, 11 a.m., were of course conveyed. It was obvious to the British that this was a definite and clear-cut statement of the American position but they again referred to the obligations which they said were imposed by paragraph 3 of article 25. They said that in their view the provisions of this paragraph were supported by reference to the records of the Drafting Committee at the London Naval Conference, particularly for meeting number 5 (L. N. C. 35 L.).
Johnson saw Cadogan for a few minutes after the meeting and he also mentioned the earnest hope of the British that the United States would not refuse during the 3-months’ period to have technical discussions regarding new upper limits. The British feel that the establishment of a minimum departure from the present limits of the treaty [Page 905] is of the very essence of the agreement itself and if no minimum departure is fixed they are apprehensive of its effect on the other naval powers.
4. Embassy’s 207, March 12, 1 p.m., numbered paragraph 2. Ambassador Craigie16 has reported that the time is not now opportune for further discussion of the Japanese building programme.
- Sir Robert L. Craigie, British Ambassador in Japan.↩