500.A15A5 Construction/133: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy)
115. Your 207, March 12, 1 p.m.
1. Although our opinion is unchanged that the legal position would be less vulnerable if escalation were to take place under Article 26 of the Treaty instead of under Article 25, we do not insist upon this point of procedure and are willing to proceed under Article 25 if the other parties to the London Naval Treaty, 1936, are agreeable. However, we are not entirely satisfied with the last paragraph of the proposed draft of a note concerning escalation referred to in your numbered paragraph 3 and suggest in its place consideration of a text somewhat as follows:
“The reason for the above proposal consists in the refusal of the Japanese Government to furnish information with regard to its present naval construction or its plans for future construction, which leaves no alternative to the Governments parties to the London Naval Treaty, 1936, but to accept reports which have been received by these Governments to the effect that Japan is constructing or has authorized the construction of capital ships of a tonnage and armament not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions of the Treaty.”
2. With regard to the last paragraph of your numbered paragraph 2, you should emphasize to the British that (1) we intend that escalation shall apply now to the armament as well as the size of capital ships; (2) that we wish to be wholly free to take whatever action may appear to be necessary regarding the caliber of guns we may wish to mount on our capital ships as well as their size; (3) that we have no intention whatsoever of fixing an upper limit of size of capital ships and the caliber of guns which they may carry, either in the immediate present or at any time during the life of the Naval Treaty of 1936.
3. We call your attention once again to numbered paragraph 5 in our 96, March 5, 3 p.m. expressing our concern that discussions now taking place with the other signatories of the Naval Treaty be not protracted unduly. We would prefer to escalate simultaneously and concurrently with the other parties to the Naval Treaty, but should it appear that an effort was being made to drag out the negotiations we might feel the necessity of taking independent action with regard to escalation.
4. We also call your attention to numbered paragraph 5 of our 103, March 8, 8 p.m. It is desirable that the multilateral character of the present discussions be maintained.