[Enclosure]
Message From the President to the Prime
Minister
I appreciate greatly the very frank and friendly spirit in which the
Prime Minister has replied to the confidential message I sent him with
regard to the proposal I contemplated making. The full and detailed
information which the Prime Minister has been good enough to send me as
to the steps already taken and at present contemplated by His Majesty’s
Government has been particularly helpful to me. The Prime Minister fears
that if the suggestions which I have had it in mind to make to the other
nations of the world are put forward at [Page 121] the present time, Germany and Italy may take advantage
of them both to delay consideration of specific points which must be
settled between Great Britain and France and Germany and Italy, if
appeasement is to be achieved, and to put forward demands over and above
what the latter powers would put forward if direct negotiations between
them and Great Britain and France were all that was in progress.
In view of the opinions and considerations advanced by the Prime
Minister, I readily agree to defer making the proposal I had intended to
make for a short while as he suggests in order that His Majesty’s
Government may see what progress they can make in beginning the direct
negotiations they are contemplating.
I must confess that I am concerned by the statement of the Prime Minister
that His Majesty’s Government under certain contingencies “would be
prepared for their part, if possible with authority of the League of
Nations, to recognize the de jure Italian
conquest of Abyssinia”. I take it, of course, for granted that the Prime
Minister has given due consideration to the harmful effect which this
step would have, especially at this time, upon the course of Japan in
the Far East13 and upon the nature of the peace terms
which Japan may demand of China. At a moment when respect for treaty
obligations would seem to be of such vital importance in international
relations, as proclaimed by our two Governments only recently at the
Brussels Conference,14 and at the time when our two Governments have
been giving consideration to measures of cooperation in support of
international law and order in the Far East, as well as of their
respective legitimate and legal rights in China, I cannot help but feel
that all of the repercussions of the step contemplated by His Majesty’s
Government should be most carefully considered. A surrender by His
Majesty’s Government of the principle of non-recognition at this time
would have a serious effect upon public opinion in this country. Public
opinion in the United States will only support this Government in
measures of pacific cooperation with the other peace-loving nations of
the world, provided these measures of cooperation are destined to
reestablish and maintain principles of international law and morality.
The recognition of the conquest of Ethiopia, which at some appropriate
time may have to be regarded as an accomplished fact, would seem to me
to be a matter which affects all nations which are committed to the
principles of non-recognition and which should consequently be dealt
with as an integral part of measures for world appeasement, in which all
the nations of the world have previously demonstrated [Page 122] their common interest and their
willingness to bear their individual responsibility.
Finally, in view of the statement which the Prime Minister was good
enough to make that he would be glad to consider any observations which
I might desire to make upon his message and to give immediate
consideration to them, I will express the hope that he may be good
enough to keep me advised of developments with regard to some aspects of
the direct negotiations with Germany and Italy which he now has in
prospect. With regard to the political features of these negotiations,
this Government of course has no connection. I feel, however, that it
would be most helpful to this Government to be apprised of those
features of the negotiations which would have a material effect upon the
maintenance of those international principles and upon the policies of
world appeasement which this Government endeavors to support, and in
particular of those questions which have to do with treaty rights and
economic and financial questions in which this Government, like other
governments, may be directly concerned.
