[Enclosure]
Message From the Prime
Minister to the President
I appreciate most highly the mark of confidence which the President has
shown in consulting me in regard to his plan.8 I am also greatly
encouraged to know that world affairs have been engaging his attention
so directly and that he is willing to take so courageous an initiative.
The objects which he has in view correspond of course to the aims and
hopes of His Majesty’s Government and I am most grateful to him for his
vigorous initiative which is designed to work as an action by the United
States Government parallel to the effort which His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom are making with the Central Powers.
He has been impelled to make this proposal by consideration of what he
has described as progress of deterioration in international relations
and consequent danger of general conflagration. No one who has followed
closely recent developments can fail to be impressed with the great
dangers that beset the world. On the other hand it may be permissible to
look forward to some improvement in immediate future. From my
correspondence with him last summer9 and from information which has since reached
him, President will be aware of the efforts which His Majesty’s
Government for their part are making to bring about a measure of
appeasement. He will be interested to know that recently His Majesty’s
Government received an enquiry from the Italian Government as to when
conversations could be re-opened with His Majesty’s Government and that
in the last few days I have agreed with the Secretary of State that the
latter should on January 16th discuss with the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs in Geneva the possibility of making a fresh approach
towards reconciliation with Italy that might bring appeasement to the
Mediterranean region at least.
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have realised that if such
appeasement is to be achieved it will not be upon the basis of
bargaining in which each side seeks to weigh up what it will get against
what it will be asked to give. Our plan (both as regards
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Germany and Italy) rests upon the view
that we and they are in a position each to make a contribution towards
the objective we both desire to obtain. There would be no need to
discuss whether our contribution were greater or less than theirs. What
is needed is to ensure that the contribution of each will, taken with
the contribution of the other, make up an agreement which will bring
appeasement. Thus in the case of Italy His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom would be prepared for their part, if possible with
authority of League of Nations, to recognise de
jure Italian conquest of Abyssinia10 (by which Signor
Mussolini sets great store) and to take certain other action if they
found that Italian Government on their side were ready to give evidence
of their desire to contribute to the restoration of confidence and
friendly relations. I am hopeful that French Government may be willing
to join us in this effort.
In another direction, and adopting the same basis, viz. that all parties
can and should make their contribution His Majesty’s Government are
about to embark on a study of the situation revealed by Lord Halifax’s
visit to Berlin with a view to seeing in what measure German aspirations
might be satisfied so that they too could make their contribution to a
general appeasement and although this is a very difficult and
complicated subject I trust that before long we may be able to begin our
conversations with Germany.
I mention these facts so that President may consider—what has occurred to
me—whether there is not a risk of his proposal cutting across our
efforts here. It is probable that the Italian and German Governments of
whom we should have to ask a contribution that they will be none too
ready [to] give, might excuse a refusal to continue negotiations on the
ground that the subjects under discussion—which for the most part will
be specific and concrete in character—seemed all merged in the wider
problems which the President contemplates tackling as a whole. It would
I feel be regrettable if what I am sure the President intends to be, as
he himself describes it, action taken by him parallel to the efforts
which we are making, were found to be capable of being used to block
progress in the directions which over recent months we have laboriously
worked out and for which we feel the stage has at last been set in not
too unfavourable a manner.
This leads me to ask the President to consider whether it would not be
wiser to consider holding his hand for a short while to see what
progress we can make in beginning to tackle some of the problems—see my
letter of May 23rd.11 This would not of course prejudice any larger effort
that President might be willing to make later.
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I venture to submit these considerations to the President, not because I
differ in any way from his objective, still less because I fail to
appreciate the motives which led him to put forward his proposals, but
solely in order to obtain the benefit of his opinion as to the
timeliness of his proposed action. My fear is that if the President’s
suggestions are put forward at the present time Germany and Italy may
feel constrained to take advantage of them both to delay consideration
of specific points which must be settled if appeasement is to be
achieved, and to put forward demands over and above what they would put
forward to us if we were in direct negotiations with them.
I hold myself in readiness to consider immediately any observations which
the President may make on the foregoing and I shall do my utmost to give
them consideration and to reply to him without delay.
