760F.62/627: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 30—2:35 p.m.]
217. In a conversation which I had with Count Ciano4 this morning he gave me the impression that although Italy stood behind Germany in the matter of the Czechoslovak crisis it wished to have no direct connection with it. He did not appear to be unduly anxious but insisted that the responsibility for the future devolved entirely upon Beneš. If the latter was reasonable and prepared to make [Page 562] practical concessions, Ciano maintained there would be no danger but if on the other hand such concessions were denied the blame would rest entirely with the Czechoslovak Government.
Ciano did not believe that any decisive action would be taken by Germany until after the Nuremburg Congress early in September. Although he was confident that Germany did not wish for war he did, however, admit the possibility that some incident between Czechs and Sudetens might be a signal for a German move.
Ciano manifested considerable interest in the eventual position of the United States should hostilities break out. While I said that it would be impossible to predict the ultimate role that the United States might play it must be remembered that any European war might well be a long drawn out affair which might give rise to the same situation that had developed between 1914–1917. In concluding I expressed the hope that Italy would take advantage of its close relationship with Germany to exercise a restraining influence in the event of a real crisis.
- Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩