760F.62/628: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 30—3:15 p.m.]
838. I have just talked with the Prime Minister. He had just concluded a meeting with the Cabinet and is leaving for Balmoral to join the King and Queen for 4 days. He does not look well at all.
The gist of the conversation was that he is very much disturbed about the Czechoslovak situation. All the information that he gets with the exception of the report from Gwatkin, Runciman’s aide, is that Hitler has made up his mind to take Czechoslovakia peacefully if possible but with arms if necessary. The advice is that Hitler believes that France is not ready to fight and that England does not want to go in. Runciman feels that if the matter were one just to be decided between the Sudetens and the Czechs it could be settled amiably but unfortunately it rests with Hitler.
I asked him whether he thought Hitler was affected by the speeches from America or Sir John Simon’s2 the other night. He said he thought that psychologically the two speeches in America—the President’s and the Secretary’s—and Simon’s had had an excellent effect, but he is advised that very little of the proper information, so far as world peace is concerned, gets to Hitler any more; the ring around him is keeping him high up on a mountain peak, so to speak; the group that want to go to war which he thinks unfortunately includes Ribbentrop are advising him that, since France is not prepared to go and England will not come in, now is the time to add increased prestige to Germany’s cause.
I asked him if he had made up his mind yet whether he was disposed to go to war if France went. He said he was very much afraid that they might be forced into it but he definitely would not go until he was absolutely forced to. He also said that he had an agreement with the French that they would not declare war until they had consulted with the British. He said they had been very loath to give this commitment even though the choice was between breaking their treaty obligations or fighting a war they knew they would lose, but Chamberlain said that the British convinced them that they were to await this agreement if they were expected to go along.
He said Henderson had advised him that no more speeches should be made because instead of giving courage to the moderates to fight against a war in Germany, it was having the opposite effect and was urging them to get into it.
[Page 561]Chamberlain said that in spite of all this he is still hopeful that war will be averted. He thinks Hitler’s speech will come on Tuesday3 and until then the matter will remain as is. Beneš and Henlein were to meet today but up to 4 o’clock here Chamberlain had had no word. Chamberlain opposes those in his own Cabinet who believe that Hitler must be struck at now or else his prestige will increase so much it will be impossible to stop him at a later date. Chamberlain feels that this is not necessarily true; that the Anschluss lost Hitler a great deal of public opinion in the United States and he refuses to believe that the smaller countries—Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and others—are willing to have themselves regimented as the Austrians have been.
My own impression is that he regards war as about a 50–50 chance; that even if Hitler strikes my own belief is that his influence will be to keep France out; if France goes it will still be some time before he goes but his own opinion is that he will have to. He says he is advised that Hitler believes that the war will be over, if they march into Czechoslovakia, before you can say the word “knife”. Chamberlain does not agree with that at all, figuring the Czechs will give him a battle and that public opinion will be aroused and force France and England into the fray. Chamberlain says public opinion in England today is definitely against going to war for Czechoslovakia but what it will be if France declares war is another matter. He still has very definitely in his mind that it is easy enough to get into war but what have we proved after we are in and he is always hopeful that something may happen for the good of the world if he stays out. He still is the best bet in Europe today against war, but he is a very sick looking individual. He is worried but not jittery.
Code text by mail to Paris and Berlin.