760F.62/614: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 29—9 a.m.]
271. Referring to my telegram 270, August 27, 11 a.m.96 The Soviet press today carries a despatch from Praha to the effect that the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to journalists that the German Government had made a démarche in a series of European capitals namely, London, Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade and others, to the effect that further delay in the solution of the nationality problem might cause the German Government to give active support for the protection of Sudeten Germans.
The German Embassy states that no such démarche has been made in Moscow but that the German Ambassador has called on Litvinov in the last few days in respect to other matters and the Czechoslovak situation was also discussed. I understand that Litvinov stated to the German Ambassador that the chief interest of the Soviet Government in this question was directed towards opposing the extension or strengthening of National Socialist Germany and that if there were another form of government in Germany the Soviet attitude would be quite different. Litvinov, I am informed further, stated that he was convinced that the Czechs would offer no provocation to Germany and that therefore in any conflict which might arise between the two countries Germany would be the aggressor. In that case he was convinced that France would come to the aid of Czechoslovakia and that England would be forced in even against the wishes of Chamberlain and that in such an event the Soviet Government would remain faithful to its treaty obligations and would “hold to its word and do its best”. I also understand that the German Embassy here has reported to Berlin that it believes that even in the event of a general conflict the Soviet Government would limit its aid to some aircraft and war supplies and the possible use of submarines in the North and the Baltic Seas to threaten German communications with Scandinavian countries but that no extensive military participation on the part of the Soviet Union was to be expected.
In regard to immediate developments, I have received the impression from the German Embassy here that in their opinion the danger lies in the fact that apparently Hitler is not convinced that England and France would come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the event of a German-Czech conflict and that until that doubt is expelled or complete autonomy granted to the Sudeten Germans no relaxation in tension may be expected. In the light of the foregoing some step on [Page 558] the part of the British Government to make unequivocally known its position in the event of a German-Czech conflict would be regarded as salutary.
In my opinion even the Germans, with the possible exception of Hitler himself, realize that in the event of a general conflict in Europe the Soviet Union is in a position to derive the maximum profit with the minimum risk; for that matter, what alignments may take place or what the course of military operations may be, the internal strain on the various countries involved in war will prepare the way for a social upheaval within those countries which will manifest itself in various forms and in varying degrees of intensity. This country has declared that it would fight to defend its territories and it must be assumed that this limitation on its war policy is based on some realization that its main strength lies in the weight of its physical mass and not in any capacities as a powerfully organized state. It has bound itself by treaty to take positive action in the case of certain eventualities involving other countries, but those very agreements offer lines of escape from actual participation if so desired, and the general geographical factors themselves render dubious the efficacy of that participation. It is true that Soviet Russia has made itself the advocate of peace and has chosen to make public [profession?] of its alignment with the democracies of the world by [but?] the misguided policy of the Kremlin can be characterized on [as?] a championship, preferably passive of a war in which the Soviet Union would be sufficiently involved to reveal the weakness inherent in the ponderous structure of the Russian State, and its profession of democracy is an artifice invented for export purposes with a view to sustaining the sentimental support of a state order which is now Socialist, principally in name, and which for all practical purposes operates solely as an autocratic despotism. At the present moment the Soviet Government as a result of immediate circumstances is concentrating its animosity against Nazi Germany and in order to curtail the power of that state would welcome any measures to that end provided the costs would be borne principally by others. But concurrently the Soviet Government must still be recognized as the avowed enemy of what it chooses to call the capitalist system and as such would, in the attainment of its objective as regards Germany at least, be inclined to envisage with equanimity the precipitation of eventualities within other countries which might result in the substitution of social and economic orders more in harmony with its own.
- Not printed.↩