760F.62/607: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 27—10:25 a.m.]
1355. I discussed the general situation with Bonnet this afternoon. He had been most impressed by the conversations of the German Ministers in Bucharest and Bled with the Rumanian and Yugoslav Governments (reported in my 1350, August 26, 4: p.m.) and said that they seemed to indicate that Germany really intended to use force against Czechoslovakia in the near future.
I asked him if he did not feel that a contrary interpretation was possible, to wit: that the German Government desired to convince the governments of Europe that they would use force against Czechoslovakia in order that they might get from Czechoslovakia all the concessions they desired without fighting. He said that this also was a possible interpretation but that he feared that if Germany should begin to take active measures which looked like preparations for immediate war against Czechoslovakia the Czechs would strike. He said that the Czechs were in a very excited state of mind and that it would not take great provocation from Germany to set Czech airplanes in motion.
He said that the Czech Government had informed the French Government that it intended to introduce at once 3 year military service. He added that he had advised the Czech Government not to do this; but merely to keep under arms the present class which would be released from the army normally in the month of September. He said that he believed the Czechs would follow his advice.
He read to me the report which he received today on Runciman’s latest negotiations in Praha. This dealt especially with Runciman’s conversation with Henlein. Runciman reported that Henlein had been amiable but adamant. Henlein had said that he was entirely prepared to accept a settlement of the Sudeten question within the bounds of the Czechoslovak State. But had insisted that unless the [Page 555] Czech Government should restore to Sudeten Germans at once all posts which have been taken away from Sudeten Germans and should withdraw the Czech gendarmerie from the Sudeten areas he would not be able to restrain the mounting anger and excitement of the Sudeten populations. Henlein added that a solution satisfactory to the Sudeten must be found before the cold weather set in. The economic misery of the Sudeten populations owing to unemployment was so great and would be so augmented by the onset of winter that a revolt of the Sudeten would be certain.
Bonnet added that he was continuing to say to the English that he considered that Runciman should not hurry his work. It was most valuable to have him in Praha for the purpose of information. It was most valuable to have him in Praha in order to negotiate between the Sudeten and the Czechoslovak Government. If he should be able to bring about a settlement by negotiation so much the better. If not, it was absolutely essential that he should declare publicly his opinion with regard to a just settlement of this dispute.
Bonnet said that if Runciman should declare his opinion the French Government would be guided in its actions by his opinion, whatever the opinion might be. If Runciman’s opinion should be rejected by the Czechoslovak Government the French and British Governments would refuse to support the Czechoslovak Government by force of arms. If on the other hand Runciman’s opinion should be rejected by the Sudeten the British and French Governments would support the Czechoslovak Government by force of arms. In case Runciman should express no opinion and simply go home with the statement that his mission had been a failure war could be expected almost at once.
Bonnet then said to me that he was much disturbed by the position which the Poles were taking at the present time. They were acting as if they desired nothing better than the disintegration of Czechoslovakia which would enable them to regain the Teschen District.
He said that he had tried to point out to the Polish Ambassador in Paris how dangerous the disintegration of Czechoslovakia would be for Poland but had been able to make no impression.
From the source, which when I was Ambassador in Moscow I always found to be the most accurate and the best informed, I received word a few days ago that the Soviet Government had prepared to the last detail a plan to march to the aid of Czechoslovakia across Poland. This source alleged that the Soviet Government had gone so far as to inquire officially of the French Government whether the French Government would be obliged to support the Polish Government in case the Russian Army should cross Polish soil to support Czechoslovakia.
[Page 556]I asked Bonnet if it were true that the Soviet Government had approached him with any such request for information. He replied that the Soviet Government had. I then said that the exact statement made to me was that the Russian Government had put the question in this way: that in case Germany should invade Czechoslovakia and France should then attack Germany and Polish troops should occupy the Teschen District, would France be obliged to support Poland? Bonnet replied that this was exactly the form in which the inquiry had come to him and he had replied that clearly the French Government would have no obligation whatsoever to support Poland.
Bonnet went further and said that recent conversations between the French and Russian Governments led him to believe that if Germany should enter Czechoslovakia the first additional war to start would be war between the Soviet Union and Poland.
He said that this of course filled him with immense disquiet. He was not at all sure that in such an eventuality Rumania would not support Poland and declare war on the Soviet Union. The result would be that France’s three allies would be fighting each other and France and England would be left alone to face the attack of Germany and Italy.
I said that under these circumstances it seemed to me that a certain hesitation on the part of the Poles was comprehensible.
I then asked Bonnet if he had any information with regard to the situation in Hungary. He said that he had much information as to the development of the Nazi movement in Hungary but none indicating any danger of an immediate installation of a Nazi Government in Hungary. It was possible of course that if Hitler felt certain he would soon have Hungary in the Nazi camp he would not attack Czechoslovakia in September.
The crisis which he expected for September might therefore be averted temporarily but if Hitler’s hopes with regard to Hungary should prove to be true the position of Czechoslovakia would become totally impossible in the latter months of this year.
Bonnet said that the French and British Governments had decided to treat Franco’s reply calmly and to attempt to continue negotiations with him. It was obvious that Hitler wanted the conflict of the powers over Spain to be at fever heat during the month of September. The Soviet Government had informed the British and French Governments that it desired to break off all contact with Franco and end the work of the Committee of Nonintervention. The British and the French felt that it was wiser to temporize until the Czech crisis should have reached one or another solution.
Bonnet added that there had been no improvement whatsoever in the relations between France and Italy.