760F.62/575: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 17—7:40 p.m.]
787. My 779, August 16, 8 p.m. In the view of the Soviet Ambassador with whom I had a talk this evening the key to the Czechoslovak situation lies entirely in London and in firm action by the British Government. Hitler is playing, as in the past, a game of 50 percent bluff which would be called by a strong stand at Berlin. The British and French are pressing Praha to the limit he says and talking in tones of persuasion to Hitler. This in Maisky’s view is a mistake. The situation is too critical to talk to the Germans in any language except the only one they understand, that of force and Hitler is not prepared to face a general war. The present immense mobilization in Germany and resultant excitement of the people will offer [Page 548] Hitler a temptation that may be too strong for him to withstand, if he thinks there is a gambling chance that Great Britain will not fight. Maisky astonished me by saying he was not sure if Hitler did attempt to attack Czechoslovakia that France would fight. If France lived up to her commitments, Russia would move at once (by inference, if France would not fight, Russia will do nothing) and Great Britain would of course eventually be drawn in. Maisky can see little hope of a successful outcome of the Runciman mission or of any real settlement of the Sudeten question in the present setup. He says that while he may be wrong and is no prophet, peace will depend on whether Hitler is willing to take the gamble in which he has succeeded so often before. Maisky minimizes the significance of reports, which he says according to their own information are accurate, of increasing dissatisfaction in Germany. This would completely disappear with the first military success against Czechoslovakia. The Ambassador agrees with other observers in putting the time of the Nazi Congress at Nuremburg as the danger point.
Subjugation of Czechoslovakia is the key to Hitler’s whole plan of expansion according to Maisky and he outlined his not altogether novel views on this subject at some length, which I will send in a subsequent telegram.89 The deduction is that Hitler cannot afford a setback over Czechoslovakia, once the situation has developed to the point where it would be defeat for him to accept a reasonable negotiated settlement. Hence the prime necessity for the Western Powers to call his bluff now.
Maisky gave the most curious impression of self confidence, that he feels that Great Britain and France are the ones in real danger; and that Russia can take care of herself.
Copies to Berlin and Praha.