760F.62/476: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State
1107. Today I discussed with Bonnet, Daladier’s speech of yesterday, which unquestionably was reproduced in full by the American press, the conclusion of which however I am attaching to this telegram
[Page 531]Bonnet said that he had felt for some time that Daladier should express publicly the thoughts which the French Government had been expressing to the German Ambassador in Paris. It was his opinion and Daladier’s that the German Government had behaved with genuine restraint during the events of the period of May 20 and it was their hope that a solution of the question of Czechoslovakia might result in much better relations between France and Germany. Daladier had prepared this speech carefully and it was entirely sincere. Both he and Daladier believed that if a solution of the dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia could be reached efforts should be made at once to work out genuine reconciliation between France and Germany.
I asked Bonnet for his latest information from Praha and he replied that the German Ambassador daily kept informing him that Beneš intended to make proposals which would be ridiculously inadequate from the point of view of the Sudeten and Germany whereas the French parliamentarians including the Minister of Public Health, Rucart, who has just returned from Praha kept informing him that Beneš was attempting to do everything that he could to work out a reconciliation and that he was convinced of achieving success.
Bonnet said that his own mind was so confused by these contradictory reports that he had ordered the French Minister in Praha to come to Paris next Friday74 to report to him personally.
We discussed the possibility that Hitler might feel so sure of adding Hungary to the ranks of Fascist states during the next few months that he would act for the moment with restraint vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia. Bonnet said that the French Minister in Budapest had been in Paris recently and had been so optimistic with regard to the situation in Hungary that he, Bonnet, had sent to Budapest investigators to discover whether or not the French Minister had any real idea of the situation.
At the close of our conversation Bonnet asked me whether or not there might be a possibility that if the tension between Czechoslovakia and Germany should again become extremely dangerous President Roosevelt might be willing to act as arbitrator of the Czechoslovak-German Sudeten dispute. I replied that I could give nothing but a personal and unofficial opinion as I should have to consult my Government before making any reply; but that I considered that this was precisely the sort of European dispute in which the United States would desire to avoid involvement. To enter into the internal arrangements of a small state in the center of Europe would certainly not appear to the American people an appropriate portion of the duties of the President of the United States.
[Page 532]The text of the important portion of Daladier’s speech follows in section 2.
(Section 2.) “A few weeks ago events in Central Europe seemed bound to expose the maintenance of peace to a severe and dangerous test. Nevertheless the rupture of equilibrium which then threatened to drag the nations into an irreparable catastrophe has been avoided, thanks to the assistance of all the elements of good will, in which the peaceful determination of Great Britain and of France was matched by that of other nations and particularly, it is my duty to say, by that of Germany. I will add that in this circumstance the French Government wished to express confidence in the peaceful aspirations which the Chancellor of the Reich has always publicly avowed.
The French contribution to the work of conciliation which was imposed on both sides was all the more active, all the more sincere and steadfast, because the solemn engagements which bind us to Czechoslovakia are, for us, imperative and sacred. The French Government, like the entire French people, is, indeed, animated by two equally strong sentiments which, I am sure, are understood by men of all countries devoted to peace and honor: the desire not to have to put these sacred engagements into execution and the will never to go back on our word if, unhappily, this hope should be disappointed.
Today, when, thanks also to the self control and perfect loyalty of the Czechoslovak Government, it has been possible to arrange a friendly procedure which justifies all hopes of an equitable and lasting settlement, we can measure the path traversed towards the same goal by the three foreign governments most immediately interested in promoting this work of peace. I have never believed and I never will believe in the inevitability of war. This recent experience justifies us to have faith in the future. We do not want to regard as fortuitous the meeting of these good wills so freely and spontaneously manifested. What it has been possible to achieve once must remain capable of achievement until the final settlement of the problem in question.
Better use can henceforth be made of the forces of peoples who have learned to esteem one another on the field of battle in mutual understanding and the organization of peace.
By this method, and, I believe, by this method alone, may an end be put to the suffering and distress which, today, in so many countries have made human life so painful and so precarious.”