760F.62/334: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 24—7:16 p.m.]
826. For the Under Secretary. Bonnet this afternoon read to me the instructions which he telegraphed last night to the French Minister in Praha.
He ordered the French Minister to say to the Czechoslovak Government that the conversations which had been started with Henlein must be carried to a successful conclusion which would settle the Sudeten question and give Europe a chance to live at peace.
The French Government desired to see the Czechoslovak Government demobilize at once the classes which have been mobilized. This mobilization was a useless provocation to Germany. The information of the French Government and the information of the British Military Attaché in Berlin indicated that there was no mobilization of German troops whatsoever on the Czech frontier.
[Page 518]The elections of last Sunday had shown that Henlein represented 82 percent of the Sudeten. It was being argued that this figure would be even larger if certain elections had not taken place in districts controlled by the Czechoslovak Army. It was being argued that the Czech mobilization was merely a method of preventing the Sudeten from expressing themselves freely. This accusation might have serious effects on the position of Czechoslovakia in the world especially in England.
The French Government must insist that the Czechoslovak Government in its dealings with the Sudeten now pass from words to acts and make concessions to the Sudeten which would insure a peaceful settlement of the dispute.
Bonnet added that the British Government was advising the Czechoslovak Government in a similar sense; but was permitting the French Government to take the lead in Praha since the French Government still had more influence in Praha than the British Government.
Bonnet said that his information from Praha indicates that Beneš was much more stiff necked about concessions to the Sudeten than either Hodza or Krofta. He expressed the opinion that Beneš had been more consistently wrong about foreign policy than any statesman in Europe. Bonnet added that he had stated today to Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris who is leaving for Praha this evening, that if Beneš should refuse to make sufficient concessions to quiet the Sudeten and guarantee peace in that portion of Europe at least for 2 or 3 years France would know who was attempting to set fire to Europe and would not be driven into war to please Beneš.
Bonnet communicated that he thought that Osusky who hates Beneš would counsel the giving of all necessary concessions to the Sudeten and predicted Osusky might emerge from the present situation as Foreign Minister or Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.
Incidentally, Osusky said to me today that Hodza had telephoned to him to say that he had found Henlein much more reasonable than he had expected and that he desired him (Osusky) to come to Praha to participate in the further conversation with Henlein.
Bonnet said that no one in Berlin had been able to get any information as to Hitler’s personal reaction to the events of the past weekend but both the British and French Governments were convinced that Germany would not strike now but would wait to see whether or not the Czechs would make real concessions to the Sudeten. Bonnet added that he had had a long talk with Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador in Paris, this afternoon and that the point of view of the British Government was precisely that of the French Government.
[Page 519]Bonnet was elated by the turn of events and said that he would labor day and night with the full support of Daladier and the other members of the French Government to make certain that the conversations now in progress between the Czechoslovak Government and Henlein should not be broken off.
In spite of the favorable turn in the situation I feel that the Czech-German conflict still contains so much danger of war that we must anticipate further crises.
When it becomes known in France that the Government is pressing the Czechs to make considerable concessions to the Sudeten and Hitler there will be an outburst of criticism. Public opinion has evolved so rapidly in France during the past 2 weeks that this country, sadly and tragically, but with a fatalistic resignation has accepted the idea that once more France will be obliged to go to war with Germany. And the Communists affected by Jews of all classes, who are unanimously eager for war against Hitler, will make full use of this mood.
I still fear that there may be disturbances in the Sudeten districts of Bohemia and that the Czechs may shoot a considerable number of Sudetens and that German troops will cross the border. Under such circumstances French mobilization would be almost inevitable and mobilization almost inevitably would be followed by war.
Bonnet said to me today that he hoped that I might be able, in some public speech in the near future, to express the hope of the United States that peace in Europe might be preserved, urging moderation on all concerned. As I shall have to make three public speeches this week, I feel that it might be appropriate for me to employ the ceremonies of memorial day (which we shall celebrate on Sunday, May 29 this year) at the American cemetery at Suresnes to say a few words in this sense. I shall submit any speech which I intend to make to the Department.