760F.62/332: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11 p.m.]
265. Weizsaecker58 asked me to call this evening and told me that he desired to talk with me about the anxious days we had passed in respect to Czechoslovakia.
He then went over some of the information which I have already telegraphed and which need not be repeated. He added that the fact that the Czechs had moved troops to the border and had called reserves to the colors had caused and still caused him grave concern. I inquired whether during this period the Czechoslovak and German Governments had been in direct contact. He replied that the Czechoslovak Minister had called on him on Friday last and that the German Minister had been in touch with Hodza on Saturday. I inquired whether an explanation had been given by the Czechs for calling their reserves to the colors. Weizsaecker hesitated and then sent for his book of telegrams and handed me a telegram from the German Military Attaché in Praha, sent late on the night of Saturday the 21st.
The telegram stated that the Attaché had made three inquiries of the military authorities in regard to the Czech movement of troops to the border and the calling of the reserves. The answer to the first inquiry had been that the reserves were to be called for practice. The answer to the second inquiry was that the reserves had been called and the troops moved for the maintenance of order among the Sudeten Deutsche. The third inquiry he made in person to the Chief of the General Staff who informed him that these military activities had two purposes: (a) the maintenance of order in the areas, and (b) to resist a threatened German attack based on the fact that “8 to 10 German divisions were preparing to march toward Czechoslovakia and were gathered in Saxony”. I inquired of Weizsaecker how he saw the future and mentioned the fact that Henlein and Hodza were apparently getting together. Weizsaecker replied that perhaps there was some reassurance to be had from this conversation nevertheless he preferred to see deeds rather than words. He felt that the situation could not remain as it was; the Czechs must recall their troops from the [Page 517] frontier, dissolve the class called to the colors and thus reestablish the previous situation. Also it would be infinitely preferable if regulations were issued granting a measure of autonomy and self government to the Sudeten Deutsche rather than the mere entering into negotiations which could be prolonged interminably. I inquired whether the German Government had made plain to the Czechoslovak Government its insistence for the reestablishment of the military statics quo ante. Weizsaecker replied that they had not but that he had informed Henderson and hoped that the British Government would take it up in Praha.
He reminded me that when we had talked before he had expressed apprehension as to the attitude of certain elements among the Czechs which seemed determined to provoke a crisis, relying on outside assistance. The fact that the Chief of General Staff who unquestionably was well informed should make an assertion that 8 or 10 divisions were concentrated in Saxony when he must have known the contrary, seemed to give justification for his apprehension. I said I knew little about internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and inquired whether the army played an important role in political decisions. He replied that unfortunately they played a predominant role and that while Krofta59 and Hodza might be willing to make concessions Beneš seemed to be siding with the intransigent army attitude.
Repeated to Praha, London, Paris.