760F.62/224: Telegram (part air)
The Ambassador in Germany ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 28—9:30 a.m.]
205. The German press has been building up day by day the Czechoslovak situation. Each day the facts and arguments used tend to show the unbearable plight of the Sudeten Germans, the justification of the demands of Henlein17 and that the only conceivable reason for the refusal of Henlein’s suggestions would be hostility to Germany. As a result the public mind is prepared for almost any eventuality, even perhaps for action similar to that which happened in Austria.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that such action is contemplated. The German press in its handling of the Czechoslovak question has characteristically operated in waves, no doubt inspired by a desire to exert each time some particular form of pressure. It is thus equally arguable that the attitude of the German press can be explained by a desire to put pressure on Beneš18 to acquiesce as far as possible in Henlein’s demands.
The Consul General at Cologne has reported unusual activity among the Rhineland units of the army and rumors have reached us of [Page 490] military activity in the neighborhood of Czechoslovakia. It is felt, however, that this, if it exists, may either be a further form of pressure or may be relatively normal troop movements which the anxieties of the time tend to construe as ominous.
Henlein’s speech of April 24 is popularly referred to here as an “ultimatum”. However, it is pointed out that the employment of somewhat ambiguous language and general terms in Henlein’s demands may have been intentional in order to leave the door open for negotiations. In this connection it is significant that Henlein did not mention the word “autonomy”.
There is also some talk here that Henlein went further than Berlin would have wished. The best opinion nevertheless concurs that in view of the nature of the long standing relationship between Hitler and Henlein the Chancellor was in full agreement with both the timing and the content of the speech.
The Czechoslovak Minister told me that he believed that what is under consideration is a development of the principle of the unity of the German race, wherever it may be found, under the direction of National Socialism. He advances the thesis that this so to speak spiritual preparation will be undertaken in various quarters and when the necessary state of mind has been brought about geographical rearrangements will follow. He thinks, however, that this is a long way off. Whether this may be as definitely true as the Minister states is, of course, an open question. It can be understood, however, that the Czechs would desire to spread such a concept in order to awaken sympathy for Czechoslovakia by reason of a common danger.
It is consistently stated from Praha that the Czechs would fight. Again, however, this is the tactically sound position for the Czechs to take in order to give Germany pause and to claim outside assistance. With all sympathy for the Czechs and their gallant impulse toward armed resistance, the vital question is whether such resistance would provoke a general war.
The Czechoslovak Minister stated that he felt the situation to be most serious. He said that he had urged Beneš for a long time to come immediately to an agreement with Henlein. Unfortunately it had been too long delayed; it should have been made before the Austrian affair at any price. He nevertheless hoped that an understanding could be reached now. No time was to be lost. He nevertheless feared very much that the Czechoslovak Government might look upon Henlein’s demands as a maximum while here in Germany they were obviously regarded as a minimum.
The Minister stated that he hoped strongly that the Chancellor’s visit to Rome would result in moderation in respect of Czechoslovakia. It would be to Italian interest regarding the Danubian basin to influence the Chancellor in this sense.
[Page 491]In respect of the immediacy of any German action concerning Czechoslovakia, Hitler’s proposed visit to Rome and his absence over a period of some days is reassuring.
The attitude of the British Ambassador and of the French Chargé d’Affaires as expressed to us is that an opportunity may yet be seized, and should be seized, to obviate the possibility of a general war. It is felt that the fundamental British policy is the prevention of such a war and if it is not so already that this is tending to become a French policy. Important developments in French policy are expected as a result of the current Franco-British conversations at London.19
As advanced by the two Embassies here the general thought is to reach such an understanding with Berlin, with the assistance of an understanding with Rome, that German desires or even German unshakable intentions may be so to speak “canalized” in a manner to maintain the general peace. The basic policy in accomplishing this is seen to rest (a) on Germany’s own desire to avoid war; (b) on the psychological factor of a deep seated German ambition to achieve the esteem of other states and peoples and especially (c) on the declared policy of friendship with Great Britain.
In its more immediate application this policy is described as (a) “capitalizing” Hitler’s public declarations that he is opposed in principle to minorities; thus it is hoped to avoid the complete breaking up of the Czechoslovak state through action by Hungary or Poland which might create new minorities; (b) that time is necessary in order that British and French public opinion may be informed respecting the true situation in Czechoslovakia, in particular that of the Sudeten Germans, and thus lessen the strain upon the French due to their alliance with Czechoslovakia in the event that something happens; (c) to avoid at all costs a clash either initiated by the Germans or by the Czechs.
The French Chargé d’Affaires was especially strong in asserting that public opinion should be brought to realize that in the same circumstances other strong countries would take a position similar to that being taken by Germany with respect to the Sudeten Germans and that the attitude of other governments should be predicated on this realistic concept.
I naturally do not know to what extent the foregoing reflects the attitude of London or Paris.
Unless some swift change should intervene any immediate developments in this affair will undoubtedly depend on three factors, (a) whether or not internal disturbance develops in Czechoslovakia; (b) on the degree of conciliation shown by Beneš; and (c) the decision of Hitler alone.
[Page 492]I expect to see Goering today and Ribbentrop20 tomorrow but I should be much surprised if I learn anything more definite than the foregoing.
Copies air mailed Praha, Paris, Rome, London, Brussels.