760F.62/215: Telegram
The Chargé in France ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 22—2:55 p.m.]
637. The Minister of Czechoslovakia, Osusky, informs me that a crucial stage will be reached by the first of next week in the negotiations between his Government and the Sudeten minority. He said that his Government was making far reaching proposals in an effort to satisfy this minority and to make it possible for Czechoslovakia to live at peace with Germany.14 The response to these proposals would prove whether the minority demands were made in good faith or whether they were merely a pretext behind which lies the aim of Germany to destroy Czechoslovakia. If the latter turns out to be the case Czechoslovakia is determined to resist with all her force any demands for further concessions which would only weaken her and ultimately bring about the collapse of the country.
I asked whether he believed that if Germany took aggressive action against Czechoslovakia France would march. Osusky said that the last 3 weeks had witnessed a “hellish” campaign of propaganda in France directed against Czechoslovakia by Germany, Italy and Poland.
French opinion had never realized until the German aggression against Austria exactly what France’s commitments to Czechoslovakia might some day entail. The realization of what these obligations meant had been a shock and paid propagandists had exploited the situation in every conceivable way. Osusky said, however, that he believed this campaign had failed in its effort to create a state of mind favoring the repudiation of France’s obligations towards Czechoslovakia. In any case the essence of the problem is that Czechoslovakia’s salvation rests with Czechoslovakia alone. If the Czechs are determined to fight—and they are in fact determined—rather than permit German encroachment, then France and England will be obliged to come to Czechoslovakia’s assistance. The Germans know this and knowledge of it will deter them from any direct attack on Czechoslovakia, but only so long as Czechoslovakia stands firm and refuses to give way to intimidation.
Osusky said that Czechoslovakia’s action in recognizing the conduct [sic] of conquest of Ethiopia was, of course, an abandonment of principle. Czechoslovakia, a small state in the most exposed position in Europe, had been prepared to stand up for principles as long as other states did likewise. When it became clear, however, that England [Page 489] and France had thrown principles overboard there was no other course for Czechoslovakia but to follow suit in an effort to defend her own interests. Osusky said that he only hoped that out of the evil which Czechoslovakia had been obliged to commit, some good might result.
Osusky said that he had suggested to Marchandeau15 in a recent conversation that if the Tripartite Monetary Agreement16 could now be reaffirmed publicly by the three parties to it, such action coming at this time after the formation of the new French Government and the relaxation of European tension, would be of tremendous psychological value in broadening the base of confidence in Europe. He had also suggested to Marchandeau that if the Tripartite Agreement could be extended to Central Europe in some fashion or other (he did not know exactly how), it would be a vital element in promoting stability in that area. I asked what Marchandeau’s reaction had been. Osusky said that he had promised to study the matter.
- See “Memorandum on the Nationality Policy of the Czechoslovak Republic,” April 26, British Documents, 3d ser., vol. i, doc. No. 160, p. 188.↩
- Paul Marchandeau, French Minister for Finance.↩
- Signed by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, September 25, 1936; see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. i, pp. 535 ff.↩