Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, General, Volume I
863.00/1698
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 13.]
Sir: I am transmitting herewith a memorandum entitled “Austrian Development—Information and Opinion” prepared by Mr. Gilbert, Counselor of Embassy. Mr. Gilbert has compiled this memorandum from a number of conversations which he, I and others in the Embassy have held and has endeavored, I think most successfully, to give a picture of opinion here.
I commend this memorandum to the Department’s attention and am sure that it will be found interesting.
Respectfully yours,
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Germany (Gilbert)
Austrian Development—Information and Opinion
I feel that expressions of view in diplomatic circles in Berlin regarding the Austrian development have now reached a state where [Page 467] they are susceptible of summarization in respect of fact and opinion. I submit the following derived from my diplomatic sources here. I have appropriately, I feel, accorded special weight to the views of representatives of states which, while vitally interested in the preservation of European peace, are not involved as partisans in European politics. It is scarcely necessary for me to say that I present these expressions entirely objectively.
1. The basic situations and the sequence of events leading to the incorporation of Austria into the Reich are seen to be substantially as follows:
(a) The position of Austria has long been felt by the majority of Austrians to be untenable in a political sense and even more definitely so in a fundamental, economic sense. Among numerous indications, the former was demonstrated in the 1919 plebiscite wherein, before it was halted by the Powers, the vote was approximately 95% for Anschluss with Germany; and the latter by the Austro-German Customs Union project of 1931,94 which received virtually unanimous support throughout Austria.
(b) The policy of a number of powers was, as explicit in Vienna, to prevent an Austro-German union and in effect to militate against mutually satisfactory Austro-German relationships.
This policy took the form of financial assistance to Austria by Great Britain and France being associated with at least tacit political engagements.
(c) A form of intervention in Austrian affairs furthermore existed through the adoption of an attitude by a number of powers including the Succession States against “restoration”.
(d) Aside from National Socialism, the people of Germany entertain the most intense feeling respecting “Germanism” and racial unity. This feeling has been stimulated to a point of action by the National Socialist régime.
(e) The Schuschnigg régime was obviously a minority dictatorship. In respect of purely internal Austrian questions its support was very limited. It operated not only against National Socialists and other elements favoring Anschluss, but also against other groups, particularly the Socialists. The consequent situation in Austria was such that a repetition of internal strife accompanied by bloodshed was always relatively imminent.
The restrictive measures of the Schuschnigg Government against National Socialists were notably harsh. This was a constant source of anger and irritation in Germany and to a man of Hitler’s temperament was provocative.
[Page 468](f) Such was the situation when Hitler summoned Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden, where he was peremptory in his demands on the Austrian Chancellor.
There is a belief, backed by certain collateral evidence, that at that time Hitler, while planning to place Austria definitely under complete German influence, which type of intervention he believed the majority of Austrians desired, neither planned or wished the complete suppression of Austrian sovereignty which the subsequent sequence of developments brought about.
Whether or not they are to be accepted entirely on their face value, a number of official German pronouncements would seem to indicate this, in particular Hitler’s exchanges with Mussolini. In any event, the Italians seemed to have had reason to believe that Austrian sovereignty would in some measure be preserved, although whether there was an Italo-German understanding to this effect is not clear.
(g) There seems to be little doubt, however, as later events showed, that plans had been formulated in advance to a degree in Germany and certainly in Austria, for rapid and thorough taking over of governmental control in Austria.
This does not, nevertheless, create a necessary presumption that annexation had been definitely contemplated. Advance measures taken in Germany can reasonably be construed as preparations for employment in emergencies arising either within Austria or from the outside; and measures in Austria can be regarded as prepared by Austrian National Socialists anticipatory to the assumption of at least a large degree of power.
(h) Such acquiescence as Schuschnigg accorded Hitler’s demands in Berchtesgaden was presumably under duress.
Upon his return to Vienna Schuschnigg took steps to invalidate his agreement. There is evidence that he was in contact with Otto, the two being drawn together by a common urge to defeat union at all costs. It is asserted that Otto persuaded Schuschnigg that his sole immediate enemy was the National Socialists and persuaded him to come to terms with the Socialists, and that Schuschnigg began arming the Socialists with a view to sending them out of Vienna, where they were normally in opposition to him, to the Austrian frontier where they could be counted upon to combat a German entrance.
The plebiscite projected by Schuschnigg was a device to indicate to the world that the majority of Austrians were against union with Germany. No one pretended, however, that it would have been, or indeed under the circumstances could have been, a fair ballot.
While no one ventures to state with any exactness how the figures would have run in an hypothetically free Austrian vote, the opinion [Page 469] of those to whom I have talked seems to be that a majority, albeit probably a small one, would have been for union. American press representatives in Vienna returning to Berlin have largely agreed that from 55% to 60% would have voted for union.
The situation in Austria was further complicated by the representatives of certain powers, if not their respective Governments, having urged Schuschnigg to resistance without, however, the prospect of according corresponding material support.
(i) The circumstances described above created an internal situation wherein active strife in Austria was certainly a possibility and many regarded it as a definite probability.
Hitler asserted that this was the reason for his ordering the entrance of German troops. The extent to which this was justified by the reason given, will presumably remain permanently a matter of opinion.
Another reason for military action is that elements of an emergency from a German point of view were undoubtedly present, such being, for example, the possible attitude of Italy in the event of civil conflict in Austria. It is noted here that the troop movements followed the lines of a German General Staff plan to be operative in an emergency.
A concomitant feature of the participation of the German Army in Austria, which may not have been absent from the minds of National Socialist leaders, is that common action in Austria has operated in a special way to unite the Army and the Party.
(j) A belief is prevalent here that the complete separation of Austria’s sovereignty came into being more through the rush of circumstances than by definite previous design. On the other hand, extreme German and Austrian National Socialists had consistently cherished the desire that annexation should at some time take place and they had unquestionably worked to that general end.
A circumstance impelling Hitler to decree annexation is said to be the British and French notes of protest. He felt that a continuing Austrian sovereignty in any form would occasion a continuous attempted outside intervention. This taken together with the internal Austrian situation is felt to have determined Hitler to settle the whole question once and for all.
2. Appraisals of the situation now created take the following lines:
(a) Despite any other solutions which may have been contemplated, the incorporation of Austria into the Reich is now a permanent accomplished fact.
(b) While admitting that there is no valid moral objection to the union from an internal German or Austrian standpoint, and admitting that it will presumably be of economic advantage to the majority [Page 470] of the Austrian population, the happening remains intensely disturbing in respect of both the manner and the fact of its accomplishment.
In regard to manner, the crossing of a frontier by armed forces, no matter what the reason, is disquieting per se. The precedent established is extremely distasteful from a juridical point of view and the action suggests the stimulation of similar action in other possible directions both by Germany and by other states.
In regard to fact, the augmentation of Germany’s size and strength is unwelcome as emphasizing a disequilibrium in the continental balance of power. There is not perceived to be a single state in Europe which sees a permanent political advantage for itself in the new situation with the possible exception of Hungary which may entertain hopes of its eventually working favorably for her territorial ambitions.
An important example of the immediate foregoing is Italy. Despite Italian public statements, Italy undoubtedly intensely dislikes and resents the presence of Germany at the Brenner. Being forced, however, to accept the new situation, Italy may make the most of it by seeking German support for compensatory advantages elsewhere. Therein undoubtedly lies a grave danger. It is felt, nevertheless, that nothing can fully compensate Italy for her fundamental loss of security and her susceptibility to unwelcome direct pressure from Berlin. From this point of view the hope is expressed that in the immediate European situation Italy might possibly now be more inclined to seek a Great Power general understanding.
There thus may conceivably have been set in motion that drawing together of Europe against the power of a single state which has at times been a European reaction under similar circumstances.
(c) Certain more immediate apprehensions are felt both over the new situation in Austria and over popular repercussions to this happening in Germany.
In respect of Austria, retaliatory measures are apparently being taken by those now in power against individuals and groups whom they look upon as their former oppressors. A question is as to how thorough in a German sense the Nazification of Austria will be and as to how “German” or how “Austrian” in agency and form. The racial complications in Vienna are very great. There are estimated to be three hundred thousand pure Jews in Vienna, together with an indeterminate but very large number of non-Aryans. These individuals have been most important in Austrian financial and economic life. Thus a complete application of the “Nurnberg” Aryan principles95 would create widespread dislocation. There is also a large Czech population and considerable numbers of various Balkan [Page 471] nationalities. It is suggested that for tactical reasons vis-à-vis world opinion complete National Socialist measures are in suspense pending the April 10th plebiscite, but that on the conclusion of the plebiscite thorough-going and probably harsh measures may be undertaken. If this should prove to be the case, it is possible that dissatisfaction and perhaps violence will be the order of the day in Austria over a protracted period and that international involvements are not excluded.
Should the elimination of Jews become an active project an ameliorating circumstance in respect of business dislocation is that for some time the Austrian Government has unostentatiously been carrying out measures productive of a gradual reduction in numbers of Jews in the banking, legal and medical professions, in which the Jews had exercised something of a personal monopoly, the long range plan being to reduce the total number of Jews in these professions to the approximate ratio of Jews in Austria to the total Austrian population.
In respect of Germany, the Austrian “success” has evoked a widespread popular self-satisfaction and a degree of arrogance which suggests a disquieting readiness to embark on adventures in other directions. Whether this will find expression in governmental action is of course unknown.
(d) There are current certain beliefs which cannot be substantiated that Czechoslovakia will be “next”. The press indicates that the Austrian development has created repercussions among the Sudeten Germans; and the course of the Austrian affair unhappily suggests an analogy of method as applied to Czechoslovakia.
(e) As an example of the widespread nature of the reactions to the Austrian happening in the international field, it is said that certain local occurrences are disquieting to Belgium in respect of Eupen and Malmédy. The representative of a neighboring state asserts, however, that the Belgians would be glad to be rid of these communes which it is alleged they accepted at the instance of the French at Versailles, and that Belgium desires to find a way for their return to Germany if such could be devised without loss of prestige.
(f) In association with the Polish-Lithuanian situation there are beliefs current that Germany and Poland have come to some kind of politico-territorial accord. One of the interpretations is that Memel will be given to Poland in return for a permanent adjustment of the Danzig and Corridor questions, involving the relinquishment of territory to Germany. This has of course been one of the “classical” solutions of the Corridor problem. A variant of this is that Poland and Germany are in accord that, in addition to the Danzig and Corridor adjustment, Germany will take Memel and that Poland will be supported in moving through Lithuania and Latvia and taking the port of Riga.
[Page 472]I can obtain no direct evidence here whatsoever that such German-Polish projects are on foot. This and the Belgian question are cited chiefly as examples of possible action which it is felt the Austrian development may have inspired and as an indication of the prevalent feeling of uncertainty regarding the future.
It is felt, however, that the enormous task of governmental and administrative consolidation in Austria will occupy Germany for some time to come and that thus under any circumstances no further external moves are imminent.
(g) It is perceived here to be entirely understandable that popular sentiments in Great Britain and France over the Austrian development will presumably for some time work against if not entirely prevent a British-German understanding, which was one of the aims of the Chamberlain Government. The representatives of the small European Powers here regard this with regret, inasmuch as they have felt that some such understanding would have a restraining influence on possible German external action.
To expand on this, the representatives of many small states, from a frankly self-interested and practical point of view, strongly express their feeling that mere protest and admonition, without seeking a deeper understanding, directed toward a people and a government which, however mistakenly, believes it is acting in line with morality and right, will, as human nature has repeatedly demonstrated, serve chiefly to impel a state in the position of Germany toward a greater intransigeance and thus perpetuate a threat to peace.