793.94/10305: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 28—10:40 p.m.]
14. Koo spoke to me at the meeting of the Advisory Committee yesterday and asked me to call this afternoon. In reply to his question as to our views respecting proposed subcommittee and our eventual participation I replied that if subcommittee were set up and I was invited I was authorized to sit on same terms as on full Committee. I emphasized that I could make no suggestions as to any line of action to be taken by the League. I explained that in general the question should be dealt with on the broadest possible basis from the point of view of world peace and general interests and I referred to your statements of July 16 and August 23. Koo said he had been reading your statements and had thought that some declaration or resolution might well be made along the lines of the comprehensive principles set forth therein. As regards the proposal to set up a subcommittee he had made it clear to the British and French that he had no objection provided the subcommittee were not used to replace the full committee. He understood his view had been accepted and that the subcommittee would be set up to facilitate discussion, expedite action and report to [Page 45] the full Committee. In this connection Koo explained that he wished to safeguard his appeal to the Council and he did not wish to have it canceled by having the matter brought before the Assembly under article 3 of the Covenant. As to the composition of the proposed subcommittee he said that he had to admit that if it were to be kept a small and effective body, there would be little room for representatives of governments with lesser interest.
Koo assured me that he did not seek the imposition of sanctions but that he did desire: first, that Japanese aggression be recognized; second, no assistance to Japan and, third, assistance for China. He then let me read a draft of a resolution in which he had set down his maxima desiderata. By what body it should be considered remained to be determined and was immaterial so long as the Chinese appeal to the Council was properly preserved. After reciting a number of “whereases” amongst which Koo had slipped in a virtual naming of Japan the aggressor, the draft resolution recommended (in spite of his disclaimer regarding sanctions) that that [the?] members of the League undertake: (1) to prohibit the export or permit the transshipment of arms, munitions of war and oil to Japan as well as a list of raw materials including iron, steel, rubber, cotton, wool, motors, and magnetos; (2), to refuse credits to Japan; and (3), facilitate the furnishing of such arms, materials and credits to China. It was also provided that the resolution was to be communicated to non-member states.
Koo explained that oil had been put in the first category as it enabled Japan to bombard undefended towns and noncombatants from the air. He also named Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Holland, and Belgium as the countries which he had had particularly in mind in connection with this proposed resolution.
Koo then asked me what would be our views. I replied that I could express no opinion whatsoever on that point and recalled the reference to “hypothetical inquiry” in my letter to Avenol. Koo observed that he supposed he would have to wait and see what others would agree to do. He said that he was to see Delbos this afternoon and would keep me informed of developments.
- 2.
- Later this afternoon I paid my first call upon my Japanese colleague from Berne. During the conversation Amau pointed out that China and Japan had not been invited to participate in Advisory Committee of 1932. He wondered [if] Germany had been invited this time. He expressed interest in a newspaper report to the effect that we would participate in a conference in London of the signatories of the Nine Power Pact emphasizing that in that event Russia would not participate. He said that he had urged his Government to reply to and not ignore the invitation to the Advisory Committee. Also [Page 46] that the League resolution against bombing would have an unfortunate effect on Japanese public opinion. He compared the British and American attitudes to our favor and expressed the view China was now looking to Great Britain for assistance. She was already being assisted by Russia and that any interference by the League would only serve to complicate the situation and delay a settlement which he thought might not be far off. A settlement would have to comprise Inner Mongolia, northern China and Shanghai. Lastly, he expressed the fear that any interference by the League, that is, virtually Britain, France and Russia, would force Japan into the other ideological camp—Germany and Italy.
- 3.
- If at tomorrow’s meeting the subcommittee is set up and I am invited to participate I propose to state that “I have been authorized to attend the meetings of the subcommittee within the terms and conditions under which I am attending the meetings of the Advisory Committee”.
- 4.
- From information now available, it would appear that while the British and French do not wish to name Japan as the aggressor, they will set up the proposed subcommittee and that they are even apparently prepared to discuss, if not restrictions against Japan, some form of assistance to China.