793.94/10284: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)
7. Department’s 2, September 24, 6 p.m., and 5, September 27, 9 p.m. In my reply of September 24 to your 6, September 23, 10 a.m., the subject immediately under consideration was that of a step then in contemplation by the League, namely, the setting up of a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee, together with the question whether the Chinese-Japanese situation should be considered as peculiarly a Far Eastern question or be considered as a question of general world interest and concern. I indicated to you our view and asked you discreetly to foster the view that the whole question should be dealt with on the broadest possible basis and from point of view of general world concern and interest.
In the same and in other telegrams, I have informed you that we feel that the League should chart its own course, that we will be prepared to consider concrete proposals which it may present to us, and that we do not desire to suggest either the direction of or limits to action which it might consider and decide upon.
Inasmuch, however, as we associate ourselves with its deliberations through authorizing you to sit with the Advisory Committee and the subcommittee, it is desirable that our thought be known to and be understood by you in connection with the contributions which you may be able to make toward enabling your associates to arrive at decisions which may have some practical beneficial effect in regard to objectives which are common to the members of the League and to this country.
When, in July, Japan embarked upon military activities in China, this Government, taking full account of evidence presented then and in the past indicative of Japan’s political objectives, made public on July 16 a statement of basic principles which in its opinion must underlie peaceful and normal international relationships.
On August 23, this Government more specifically, in a statement referring especially to the armed conflict between Japan and China, reiterated various of the principles comprised in its statement of July 16 and emphasized the view that they applied to the Pacific area as well as elsewhere. Inter alia, it called attention expressly to the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. By this we definitely took exception to the course which Japan was following.
[Page 43]In addition, in support of our general position, we have taken several definite steps: (1) we have directly appealed to Japan and China to refrain or desist from hostilities; (2) we have repeatedly stated to both parties that our good offices would be available to them in connection with any suggestions which they might make for resort to processes of conciliation; (3) we have repeatedly protested to the Japanese Government against bombing of non-combatants from the air and we have in one instance made public a note addressed by us to the Government of Japan64 objecting to and condemning such bombing and in another instance, today, made a public statement on that subject.
Certain other Governments have on several occasions approached us with suggestions for “joint action”. We have regularly indicated that, while we believe in and wish to practice cooperation, we are not prepared to engage in joint action but will consider the possibility of taking parallel action. In every case where we have regarded as intrinsically meritorious possible action also thought of by other governments we have taken action, several times in advance of and sometimes in the absence of parallel action by any other power. In general, we feel that spontaneous separate action, if and where two or more powers feel moved thereto, on parallel lines, is more strongly indicative of serious feeling in regard to matters under consideration and more likely to serve effectively toward attainment of the objectives sought than would be inspired joint action.
As the situation unfolds, the military operations of Japan have increased in extent and in intensity. The Chinese Government has amplified its charges that Japan is violating international law and treaty provisions. The Chinese have affirmed their willingness to resort to processes of conciliation. The Japanese, however, have announced that they intend to destroy China’s will and capacity to resist and even to overthrow the present Chinese Government. In refusing the invitation of the Advisory Committee they have declined even to confer with other powers with a view to composing the difficulties between Japan and China.
It is our feeling that this situation is definitely of universal world concern. The questions involved no longer relate merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and of peace, of international law and of principles of humanity. It is of course true that they involve violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security, and world humanity. I do not believe it possible on a basis of realism to confine consideration of them to any [Page 44] one forum or to bring them within the focus exclusively of any one existing agreement. Nor do I think it expedient to attempt to say what might be the limit of action which might be taken by the nations which desire peace toward expressing themselves in opposition to the activities which are being engaged in, in connection with the situation under reference, in breach of the peace and with jeopardy to the rights and the security of all nations.
We feel that, in action thus far taken, this Government has gone further in the field of efforts calculated to support the general principles of world peace and security and toward indicating disapprobation and disapproval of disregard thereof than has any other nation or group of nations. We therefore feel that efforts of other nations might well be directed now toward going as far as or farther than we have thus far gone along those lines.
You should, while making it clear that we do not desire to incite the League to action and that we decline to attempt to chart a course for the League members either individually or collectively, endeavor discreetly to cultivate within restricted circles where confidence will be respected thinking along these lines.
- Note dated September 22, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 504.↩