793.94 Conference/280: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 21—2:05 p.m.]
50. For the President and the Secretary of State. Your 76, November 20, 2 p.m. In order that you may have a clearer understanding of the press problem with which we have had to deal at this Conference, I give you a brief résumé of the various phases through which the thought of the American correspondents here has passed.
[Page 222]When we arrived the reasoning of the American newspapermen who despite the policies of the papers they represent virtually without exception have preconceived ideas about the necessity for firm action in opposition to the dictator governments was plain. The President in his Chicago speech had provided for leadership which had been lacking to the democratic group of powers; this apparently had been reenforced by the State Department; the Brussels Conference had as a consequence been called and we were going to take the lead in concrete action with regard to the conflict in the Pacific which would because the problems are interdependent have a strong wholesome effect on the dictator countries in Europe and deter them from a show of force in Central Europe which our men understood was contemplated.
With some difficulty we persuaded our men that our object in coming here was not to take the lead of a democratic group of powers but to seek with all the other powers at the Conference a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Far East.
There was then a concerted drive on the press from other delegations notably from the French to the effect that since evidently the American delegation was neither prepared to take the lead at the Conference for some sort of pressure action nor to furnish any guarantees of the status quo in the Far East, the Conference was of no value whatsoever and the sooner it was closed down on a basis of a face-saving resolution the better it will be for all parties concerned.
This we met by re-emphasizing that the Conference was at Brussels to seek a peaceful solution of the Far Eastern conflict, not to discuss guarantees or to take action which would require any one power to stand out in front or to lead in the direction of pressure action.
The enthusiasm of the American correspondents was by this time considerably dampened and a sour note was prevalent in their conversation and evidently in their despatches. Without exception they felt strongly and said as much that we had let down the democratic countries in Europe, that clearly recent speeches from Washington seemingly directed against the dictator powers had no substance and that American cooperation was meaningless and consisted exclusively of fine phrases.
By this time the Japanese had slammed the door to peaceful action in their reply to the Conference and Kurusu, the Japanese Ambassador here who made a point of cultivating our correspondents, made it plain to them that Japan had no interest in a peaceful solution of the conflicting accounts or in anything except in its good time a dictated peace in direct negotiation with China. As a consequence further discussion of the search for a peaceful solution of the conflict [Page 223] in the Pacific fell on deaf ears with our correspondents and we were obliged to divert their attention to the declaration which was then preparing and which held their interest and recaptured a part of their enthusiasm.
Thereupon, Kurusu again saw the American correspondents and showed them a telegram from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington indicating that our Government was not behind the delegation here and that Congressional leaders who had returned to Washington were outspoken in the criticism of American participation in the Conference and drawing the conclusion that we would be instructed to close down with some more resounding phrases and to go home as speedily as possible. The French supported this impression by saying that they had received similar word from Washington and indicated at the same time that they were to all intents and purposes leaving the Conference which was a failure owing to the American attitude and that they would henceforth take no active part in it.
These reports confirmed the worst impressions of our newspapermen which were further strengthened by Havas and other agency despatches out of Washington indicating a strong isolationist trend and no action whatsoever on the part of the Administration to combat it. Our men complained bitterly of what they described as the lack of fair play on the part of our Government in raising the hopes of the peace-loving peoples of Europe who whether with reason or not feel that the dictator powers are merely biding their time to attack and then failing to follow up our words with even a mild form of action. They frankly said to us that in good conscience they could not support our attitude and served notice that they would have to cable stories which undoubtedly would not be to our liking.
We then made every effort to persuade our correspondents, taking on each one separately in turn, that we were here to seek a peaceful settlement, not to consider pressure action, and that should pressure action have to be considered this was neither the time nor the place.
Simultaneously, our men were hearing from the British and the French that they were ready to consider cooperative pressure action but that they were estopped from acting upon this basis by our negative position.
On this note the Conference, due to the pre-occupation of the British, the Belgians and the French with other matters, was interrupted. Before leaving, the other delegations took pains to make it clear that any further step depended exclusively on American initiative, specifically on instructions we might receive from Washington, and that the measure of their participation in the winding up process would be determined by the indication they might receive from their [Page 224] Ambassadors in Washington regarding the state of mind prevailing there.
We are doing everything in our power to combat this impression but it has been heightened by the unfortunate inability of Eden to return and particularly by the pointed failure of the French to have any representation here at all until some time next Monday. Incidentally the French have informed their correspondents in Paris that it will not be worth their while to return to Brussels.
In spite of possible indications to the contrary, I really believe the British delegates have tried to play fairly on this question of responsibility or blame and this in spite of the fact that whereas our public opinion does not wish us to go beyond the search for a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Far East, the British public opinion is insistent upon pressure action if conciliation fails.
I have just had a very frank and satisfactory talk with MacDonald impressing upon him the importance of avoiding any appearance of any difference of opinion and of objective in order to avoid unfortunate repercussions and any feeling which would endanger fruitful cooperation. I impressed on him also that the situation now had become such that it is important that he instruct his press officer actively to combat the dissemination of any impression of any difference. This he assured me that he would do at once.