793.94 Conference/279: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 21—12:23 p.m.]
49. 1. Cadogan6 informed me Friday evening that Craigie was beginning to feel as a result of talks with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Japanese might now accept a British-American offer of mediation at Tokyo7 and inquired whether, in case Grew concurred in that view, we would be disposed to consider such a move with the British outside the Conference. I told him I did not think we could consider anything of the sort at least not until after the Conference recessed and that in any event it would be necessary for the Conference to request us to do so or to leave the participating governments free to act independently or in concert in a search for ways and means of bringing about negotiations for a settlement. Cadogan felt that if there was any chance whatsoever of the possible success of mediation we should close this phase of the Conference without in any way slamming the door. He said, however, that the British favored a declaration of policy as to nonrecognition and the withholding of loans and credits to avoid the impression of failure and that Spaak had said to them in London he would favor that. I told him this seemed to me to be premature and that as long as there is a reasonable chance for mediation it would seem inadvisable to take any stand that might diminish that chance.
2. In conversations yesterday we encountered a good deal of resistance to the suggestions which we have in conformity with your recent instructions put forward.
3. In our talks with MacDonald, Cranborne, and Cadogan they expressed themselves as thinking it inadvisable to make any further declaration of principles, as they could not think of anything further to say that had not already been said. Also they were anxious to have something done here now which would give clear evidence that the recess does not mean the end of the Conference, because otherwise China will insist on taking this up at the League again, and British public opinion will be very critical of the Government’s failure to persuade the Conference to do something effective. They did not suggest, however, any course other than that Britain and ourselves [Page 220] now might inform the Conference that we are ready and willing to tender our good offices and that this might give the Conference a reasonable basis for suspending its sessions. They also said that it was of the utmost importance to keep up the Chinese morale and not to take away hope that something might still be done. I told them it seemed to me unwise for the two of us to make a joint public tender of good offices now because it would be construed as taking upon ourselves a responsibility that belongs to all. I finally had to tell them that we thought the wisest course now would be to wind up this phase of our work here as soon as possible without any action or threat which would diminish the possibility of mediation in the near future but at the same time making it clear that the question is not being dropped; that a recess is being taken in order that the various governments may have more time to think the matter over and exchange views and then to reconvene when there is something more definite for the Conference to consider.
4. We then advanced the idea that the objection to repeating another declaration of principle might be obviated if it is put in the form of a report to the governments represented here which the Chairman might be requested also to transmit to all governments. This was a new idea to them; they did not at first take favorably to it; but wanted to think it over. We then discussed the possibility of adding a separate resolution making a strong appeal for an early cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement, practically calling on Japan and China to agree to do this, and indicating that the powers concerned might hold themselves in readiness to aid in this and that any of them might be free to act individually or jointly if they saw an opportunity to be helpful in bringing this about.
5. In the afternoon we all conferred with Spaak who has requested the British and ourselves to prepare a draft for a possible report by the Conference to the powers; then to consider this with the Belgians tomorrow afternoon. Spaak, however, took a defeatist attitude indicating that if the principal powers are unable to do something further to bring about a settlement either the matter would have to be taken up again in Geneva which would be in effect an admission of defeat and a burying of the question or else to suggest that Japan and China get together in direct negotiations, if possible with Britain and the United States sitting around the table, in order thus to protect China as much as possible but with the proviso that whatever settlement they might reach must be in accord with the Nine Power Treaty and that any other kind would not be recognized. MacDonald and I pointed out obvious objections to this.
6. After our meeting with Spaak three Chinese delegates called on us and the British delegation together and spent an hour making substantially [Page 221] the same representations which Dr. Koo had already made to us during the current week. Both MacDonald and I pointed out certain insuperable obstacles to doing most of what the Chinese suggested and I indicated to them the possibility that an attempt to do those things if made would put China in a worse position than if the attempt were not made. The Chinese expressed in strict confidence the view that it would be better for China to keep on fighting than to accept at this time a mediation which almost inevitably would call for the making of large concessions by China. They finally said in substance they would like a mediation with a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible moment but an increased supply of arms in order to be able to keep up duration of resistance in case it should prove not possible through mediation to get a settlement which they could accept and which they believe not possible until Japan is convinced that she cannot conquer China; and that as between mediation and a supply of arms China would greatly prefer the latter.
7. None of the French delegation returned today as promised and we are now informed that De Tessan will not be here until Monday.
8. There is one considerable difficulty which is that whereas it is important for us to make it clear that our purpose here has been to adhere strictly to the agenda of seeking a peaceful settlement by agreement and that since our joint efforts here in this respect have thus far failed we consider that this is neither the place nor the time to consider departure from that objective. The British and the French on the other hand who are embarrassed by their membership in the League are fearful of the political reaction in their own countries if they admit that they were not prepared to consider the application of some sort of pressure after the conciliatory efforts failed.
9. We and the British will continue to exchange views today when we shall try to find some way to meet our respective preoccupations. We are meeting together with Spaak again this afternoon.
- Sir Alexander M. G. Cadogan, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- See telegram No. 554, November 19, 9 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iii, p. 700.↩