Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume IV

793.94 Conference/191: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, November 3, 1937—1 p.m.
[Received November 4—7:35 p.m.]

883. Tokyo’s 505, October 30, 7 p.m. I have no opportunities for satisfactory consultation with colleagues at present. The German is only Ambassador present. French and Italian colleagues remain in Shanghai where they have been for some time. Japanese Ambassador also in Shanghai where according to German colleague he lives in seclusion closely guarded by police of French Concession.

British Chargé d’Affaires left for Shanghai yesterday. Belgian, French, Italian, and Soviet Missions are represented by very junior officers.

I am unable to discover here any change in opinion which would justify an estimate differing from that expressed in my 825 of October 18, 5 p.m.⁶³

From sources which I consider well informed it is learned that until October 30 the Government had issued no instructions to guide its delegates at Brussels. Recently these same unofficial sources consisting of American educated Chinese working with an American in Mission educational circles have been consulting together over a tentative program framed for submission to responsible Government leaders for possible use of their delegates at Brussels. It is interesting that initiative in this matter has come from persons completely detached from real leadership in the Government. Government leadership is more interested in its chances of successfully resisting Japanese pressure than in what may be accomplished at Brussels in the way of mediation. It hopes that Japanese aggression will fail from exhaustion of Japan due to prolonged Chinese resistance or from some act of the powers or a power and that China will then recover from a weakened Japan all that it has lost in the past 6 years.

I summarize below the tentative program which above-mentioned sources have discussed. It has, I understand, been submitted to responsible leadership in the Government. It was the hope of its framers that it might serve as basis for instructions to Chinese delegates at Brussels and that it would persuade friendly powers of China’s conciliatory attitude in the face of aggression. I believe that the program would be approved by the more moderate section of Chinese Government leadership today but in communicating it to the Department I must emphasize that it is extremely confidential, has no official sanction and is bitterly opposed by some leaders on the ground that it yields too much and that China by putting forth a supreme effort has at this time at least a chance to throw off Japanese control completely. Summary follows:

(a) China should seek a solution upon the principles of the Nine Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris, the principles set forth in statement of Generalissimo of July (see Embassy’s telegram 305, July 20, 11 a.m.⁶⁴) and set forth in Foreign Office aide-mémoire of July 17 (see Embassy’s telegram 301, July 19, 7 p.m.⁶⁵) and a revision of Sino-Japanese commercial and other treaties.

(b) Proposals regarding specific problems:

(1) China should propose an appropriate withdrawal of Japanese forces to numbers and positions prevailing prior to July 7 lifting blockade, while Chinese troops are not to enter evacuated areas for a period of 9 months from date of armistice.

(2) With regard to Manchukuo, China to be willing to continue arrangements entered into prior to July 7 covering intercourse between China and Manchukuo. China will refrain from bringing up at this time for consideration the status of Manchukuo but to reserve the right of bringing up matter later undertaking to negotiate on principles approved and recommended by Lytton Commission and pertinent League resolution. China also to be agreeable to the establishment of a demilitarized zone of 10 kilometers along each side of the border between Liaoning and Jehol on the one side and Hopei and Chahar on the other.

(3) With reference to North China, Chinese will also receive authority to be reestablished under the control of Central Government at Nanking and all irregularities established by Japanese pressure during years 1932 to 1937 to be liquidated. Japanese troops to be limited to points specified in Boxer Protocol⁶⁶ and limited to numbers comparable to those of other powers.

(4) With reference to Shanghai, China to pledge that she will not introduce troops nor construct fortifications in area covered by the 1932 formula,⁶⁷ provided Japan will scale down military equipment to her proportionate share in defense forces of settlement.

(5) With reference to economic cooperation, China to undertake to make no discrimination against any Japanese economic enterprise by comparison with any similar foreign undertaking. China to be prepared to negotiate a general commercial treaty with Japan and to revise her tariffs with friendly consideration for Japan on basis of mutual benefit and fair treatment of Chinese and foreign interests other than Japanese. Chinese to encourage cotton growing in North China. China to invite Japanese experts to serve as consulting technicians in agriculture and industry. Air service between China and Japan and Manchukuo to be standard on basis of joint enterprise and reciprocal benefits. Japanese needs for minerals to be considered in a friendly manner and with due regard for China’s sovereign rights. Railway materials to be purchased from Japan wherever technical and financial conditions are favorable. China to guarantee large and regular supplies of salt received from Changlu fields.

(c) With reference to Communism, China hopes that Japan and Russia can enter into a non-aggression agreement similar to that in force between China and Russia. Communism internally is a domestic Chinese problem.

(d) Cultural relations. China to propose establishment of a Sino-Japanese joint commission to utilize Japanese share of Boxer funds.

(e) Claims for damages to be put before a Sino-Japanese mixed claims commission, neutrals participating.

I hope that the Department will appreciate that the program described above is merely a proposal of certain individuals and that it would be highly undesirable to betray knowledge of it as a complete program lest responsibility for it be ascribed to us.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Tokyo, Peiping.

Johnson

63. Vol. iii, p. 620.
64. Ibid., p. 216.
65. Vol. iii, p. 210.
66. Signed at Peking, September 7, 1901, Foreign Relations, 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.
67. Signed at Shanghai, May 5, 1932, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 217.