793.94/8725
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 12.]
Sir: There has been much speculation in Japan as to what definite policy, if any, the new Konoye Cabinet will adopt toward China. Thus far, judging from the public statements made by the Premier and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would appear that only the general outlines of the policy to be pursued with respect to China have been considered. While Japan’s China program remains in a nebulous state, an appraisal of the lines which any future policy will be most likely to follow may perhaps be reached through an analysis of the former Hirota and Sato policies and of the divergent points of view held by the Japanese and the Chinese.
It will be remembered that the Hirota three-point policy called for the checking by the Chinese Government of anti-Japanese activities and propaganda, Sino-Japanese cooperation against communism, and the stabilizing of China’s factual relations with “Manchukuo”.* On the basis of these Japanese aims negotiations were opened between the Chinese and Japanese Governments in March 1936. Conscious of its increased strength the Nanking Government was able to reject these demands, labelled “requests” by the Japanese, and the negotiations came to a close in December 1936.
Thus the futility of pressing these demands without the use of armed force was fully realized before the resignation of the Hirota Government on January 23 and the formation of the Hayashi Cabinet on February 2, 1937. Hence, in the early part of the present year the Japanese began to see the necessity of adopting a more conciliatory and equitable policy toward China from the point of view of expediency if Japan’s economic aims in China were to be attained.† There was nothing surprising in the remarks made before the Diet by Mr. Sato, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hayashi Cabinet, who urged that negotiations with China be taken up on the basis of equality and that Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations be based on a harmony of feeling between the two nations.‡
It is well to remember that although Mr. Sato amplified these remarks on several occasions, his statements regarding the proposed new China policy were always vague and that not once did he intimate that Japan’s political and economic gains in North China would be [Page 119] relinquished in line with the new policy of “equality and equity.” In fact, under pressure from the Japanese military in the latter part of March, Mr. Sato asserted publicly in the Diet that the East Hopei and Hopei-Chahar administrations had been established because of special conditions existing in North China and hence were not a matter for discussion with Japan, and that the question of Japan’s “special trade” (smuggling) in the East Hopei region was a concern of East Hopei and should not be discussed with Japan, but that Japan would consider it in connection with Chinese tariffs.§ It is easy to understand, therefore, why Mr. Sato’s “new policy of conciliation” was received with skepticism by the Chinese, since it offered nothing to them in the way of concession.
To recapitulate, the old three-point program advocated by Hirota failed because the Chinese refused to accept it. The Sato policy gave little promise of success owing to the vagueness of its terms and its failure to pay attention to the concrete desires of the Chinese.
Since the advent of the Konoye Cabinet and the appointment of Mr. Hirota as Minister for Foreign Affairs, there has been a great deal of discussion concerning Japan’s future China policy. Will the new Government attempt to open negotiations with the Nanking Government on the basis of the Hirota “three-point policy”, will it carry over the Sato policy of conciliation, or will it adopt an entirely new policy?
In my first interview with the new Minister for Foreign Affairs on June 7, Mr. Hirota stated with regard to Sino-Japanese affairs that conditions had changed since he was last in office: that his former three points were too abstract for present circumstances, and that he therefore proposed to find concrete solutions of the various problems outstanding between Japan and China.║ The Minister for Foreign Affairs has made no statement as to whether he intends to follow Mr. Sato’s policy of equality and reciprocity, but there are indications that some sort of new departure is contemplated. On June 4 Mr. Hirota stated in a press interview, according to The Japan Times of June 5, that the diplomatic situation between Japan and China had now reached such a state that it would not permit of mere theoretical discussion but called for approaching concrete questions along practical lines. Mr. Hirota’s reference to “concrete questions” and “practical lines” may have been intended as a veiled criticism of Mr. Sato’s relatively vague policy. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of June 22 reported that Mr. Hirota in his new orders to Ambassador Kawagoe would lay special stress on the “positive and self-initialing” nature of his China [Page 120] policy in view of the fact that the Sato diplomacy had given the impression among the Chinese that Tokyo was adopting a defeatist policy in China. It was reported by the Yomiuri of June 18 that Mr. Hirota would endeavor to resolve the differences between the various elements in Japan and to enlist the united support of the nation for his policy before proceeding to put it into execution. This report, if true, would indicate that some time will be required for the formulation of a definite China policy.
Taking into account Mr. Hirota’s emphasis on the necessity of solving concrete problems one by one, it would seem only natural that the first questions to be dealt with will be those most easily susceptible of solution, such as the desire of the Japanese to establish an air service between Peiping and Tokyo legally recognized by the Nanking Government, and not only by the East Hopei-Chahar Political Council, and the ownership of land in North China by Japanese subjects. A member of the Chinese Embassy Staff in Tokyo admits that these two relatively minor questions should not be difficult of solution. Next would logically follow a discussion of Japan’s desire for economic concessions in North China, namely, for coal and iron mining, cotton development, and railway construction. The Chinese appear to be less amenable in these matters, having recently refused the Japanese permission to construct a railway between Tientsin and Shihchiachwang. Besides, the Nanking Government has maintained for several months that it will not consider the matter of economic concessions to Japan until political difficulties have been disposed of. Whether China will cling to this point of view in the face of possible Japanese pressure remains to be seen.
Thirdly, there are the following highly contentious issues which, if they should become the subject of negotiations, would offer immense difficulties: China’s desire for a reestablishment of sovereignty over the whole of North China, including the East Hopei and Hopei-Chahar régimes, and China’s insistence that Japan put a stop to smuggling by Japanese merchants in North China. Up to the present time the Japanese have given no indication whatsoever that they would be willing to relinquish their indirect but nevertheless effective control over the East Hopei and Hopei-Chahar regions. At the same time, Japan has consistently affirmed that the cause beneath the smuggling in North China has been the high Chinese import tariffs and that these tariffs must be lowered before Japan can undertake to cooperate with China in the suppression of the “special trade” or smuggling. These appear to the Embassy to be the two most difficult problems that will have to be ultimately faced in any negotiations that may ensue.
Believing that China will not resort to arms to reestablish sovereignty over North China, Japan feels itself in a strong position. On [Page 121] the other hand, China appears to be in the fortunate position of being able to refuse the granting of economic concessions which Japan urgently needs but for the attainment of which Japan is apparently not desirous of using armed force. These two factors must be included in a careful estimate of the question whether any future recession will be made by China to Japan.
There is enclosed a memorandum of a conversation34 between Dr. Mar, Second Secretary of the Chinese Embassy, and Mr. Andrews, Second Secretary of this Embassy. Dr. Mar’s assertions concerning China’s determination and ability to resist Japan in armed conflict should be taken with some reserve. It will be noted that his attitude is one of truculence and undue optimism, thus reflecting the enhanced sense of security that has been developed in a section of Chinese officialdom as a consequence of the developments of the past year.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s despatch No. 2209, January 1, 1937. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 2266, February 16, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 2317, March 18, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 2345, April 2, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s telegram No. 151, June 7, 1937. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Not printed.↩