793.94/11714: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 19—7:23 a.m.]
82. 1. A responsible well-informed Chinese official states that all sections of China and several political factions are represented in continual [Page 818] discussions now in progress in Hankow and it would appear that, although there is unanimous acceptance of the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek and of continued resistance to Japan, there are differing views regarding methods, and that argument relates principally to the advisability of admitting the Chinese Communist Party on an open and equal basis into the Government as a means of inducing Russia to begin hostilities against Japan. It is admitted that Moscow feels reluctant to fight at present and that the new Ambassador and Military Attaché, while they are military men trusted by Stalin and Bluecher,38 have been sent to China mainly to serve Russian interests if Russia decides to fight and not because fighting has already been decided upon. Informant said the Ambassador will wait in West China until this question is decided at an important conference now being held or shortly to occur in Moscow.
2. Another informant, believed reliable, who belongs to the faction which advocates internal reorganization in such a way as to induce Russia to commence hostilities against Japan, admitted recently that the Russian flyers here have been deliberately shirking their duties and said they would undoubtedly refrain from real fighting until the Ambassador arrives with a decision from Moscow, that Russia intends to afford real assistance to China or to commence hostilities on Russia’s own part. Moscow was displeased by the possibility that the recent mediation by the German Ambassador might moderate the resistance policy and one condition of aid from Russia would be elimination from the Government of all advocates of submission or conciliation and the admission of the Chinese Communist Party into the Government not in the hope of communizing China but only to ensure the union of all political factions in determination to continue armed resistance to Japan. This informant, like the first one quoted, was confident that Russia believes war with Japan is inevitable in the near future but before committing itself irrevocably to war desires that conditions in China and in Europe shall be as favorable as possible. Russia wishes to feel positive that a united China will by unremitting resistance effectively engage an important part of the Japanese forces, thus weakening their combative strength and that no danger of attack threatens in Europe. Informant stated Russia had asked its ally France for promise of protection from Germany but France was unable to give any commitment unless assured of the position which Great Britain would take if Germany evidenced intention to attack Russia. (Note: The German Ambassador here recently stated confidentially he was informed that France had strongly advised Russia not to enter the Far Eastern hostilities.) [Page 819] Informant said Great Britain was unwilling to promise any action which would interfere with its present hope of estranging Germany from Italy and that Great Britain moreover would take no positive position in reference to Japan’s imperialist expansion unless given some assurance that the United States would intervene, if at all, on the side of China. Informant thought that Great Britain would be satisfied by a comparatively slight indication of American attitude, such as some action facilitating acquisition by China of military supplies in the United States. He thought, therefore, that the course taken by events would be vitally affected by the attitude of the United States as by inaction or by steps taken of whatever nature.
3. I can see no evidence here of any weakening in the determination to continue resistance to Japanese invasion. Indeed, Japanese cooperation with newly organized governments in North forces such a policy even though there is full realization of the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of reorganizing the forces, obtaining military supplies and conducting the Government in different places in the interior. In other words, while Japanese pressure is intended to produce a Rightist government in North China, Soviet pressure appears to us to be producing a movement to the Left elsewhere.
4. Interviews referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above were held by McHugh39—and he requests that substance of this message be communicated to the Navy Department.
Repeated to Tokyo.