893.0146/607
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
In the course of one of my conversations with Sir Alexander Cadogan23 at London, I referred to an item which had appeared in the London press to the effect that the British were contemplating withdrawal of a part of their landed force at Shanghai. Cadogan said that they had this in contemplation. I inquired whether they were under pressure from any quarter in the British public. Cadogan replied that they are constantly under pressure from various elements in the public and also from the Army. He said that their Army authorities are constantly harping on the inadequacy of their forces in north China to perform any military function and advocating their withdrawal. I said that we have somewhat the same situation here. I went on to say that in the Department we frequently examine the question in the light of existing situations and we have thus far repeatedly felt that considerations in favor of continuing the presence of the forces in north China outweighed considerations against; and that we have regularly and consistently taken the position that, if at any time we come to the conclusion that the time is ripe for withdrawal, we should first confer with other governments, especially the British Government; in fact, I said, we have had an oral and informal understanding between the two foreign offices that we would consult each other and keep each other posted in regard to this question. From Cadogan’s reply, I inferred that he was not aware [Page 805] of that. He said that he thought that it was an excellent idea and that he would have it in mind. (I deduced that, Cadogan being somewhat new to the Foreign Office, this was something of which Orde24 had never expressly informed him.) We left this subject with a perfectly clear understanding that so far as Cadogan and I were concerned we would try to “play ball” together toward keeping the action of the two Governments parallel or at least toward their keeping each other informed of developments.