394.115 Panay/5½
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called upon me this morning and gave me first a copy of an urgent telegram he had just received from his Government which reads as follows:
“You will have seen that Japanese have not only fired on and hit a British man of war but have also actually sunk a United States man of war. They have also made a bombing attack on another British man of war. These acts appear to have been deliberate on the part of those firing and sustained fire can indeed hardly have been anything else though those in higher authority will presumably go through all procedure of diplomatic apology. I mention this to emphasize aggressive state of mind of those who indulge in these provocative acts. It seems clear that some action will have to be taken by both United States Government and His Majesty’s Government to curb this dangerous spirit before it goes to still more intolerable lengths. There is no doubt that this action should be taken jointly otherwise it will fail to achieve an end which will in any case be difficult to attain. But before considering this action in any detail I would like to have urgently views of United States Government.”
The Ambassador likewise communicated an expression of deep regret on the part of his Government on the sinking of the U. S. S. Panay.7
I expressed to the Ambassador my deep appreciation of this friendly message and replied to him that as his Government would doubtless understand, we had not as yet received official reports of the occurrence from the survivors which were necessary before this Government could have a clear and precise understanding of all of the elements involved. I said that of course we were assembling the facts as speedily as possible and hoped to have complete official reports by tonight or by the morning of December 14. I said that it might be even longer than that because of the fact that the survivors from the U. S. S. Panay were along the shores of the Yangtze River, a [Page 799] group of them on both aides I understood, and it might not be possible for them to get in touch with radio communication before some further time had elapsed. I said that at this moment this Government had already received from the Japanese Government, through the Foreign Minister8 at Tokyo, an expression of regret for the occurrence and assumption of responsibility and an expression of willingness to offer compensation.9 I said that in addition to these assurances, I believed it very probable that this Government would feel it imperative to demand complete and most satisfactory guarantees that no such occurrences would take place in the future and that we would desire information as to what steps the Japanese Government would take to make a recurrence of such occurrences impossible in the future. I said, furthermore, that there might well be other representations which we would desire to make to the Japanese Government but that until all of the necessary facts had been assembled, it would be premature to discuss these possibilities. I stated, however, that I should appreciate it if he would advise his Government that we should be very glad to communicate to the British Government before any formal representations are made to the Japanese Government what the nature of those representations might be. I made no statement with regard to the British Government’s request for joint action in this regard nor did the British Ambassador press the point at this time.
The Ambassador then passed to another matter and reminded me of a conversation which we had recently had in which he had requested clarification of my attitude with regard to possible good offices between Japan and China. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to leave a memorandum with me on that subject, which he did.10 I asked the Ambassador if he had any reason to believe that the possibility of Japan requesting the good offices of Great Britain and the United States was any more imminent now than it had been ten days ago. He said that he felt this matter had been taken up by Mr. Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador to London, with Mr. Eden11 on two occasions recently and he had informed the latter that the possibility was “in the air”. I said it seemed to me, if this were true, rather extraordinary that no such intimation had been made by the Foreign Minister in Tokyo to our own Ambassador, Mr. Grew, and that, as the Ambassador knew, Mr. Grew was very definitely of the opinion that no such possibility was now immediately before us. I [Page 800] further called the Ambassador’s attention to the fact that the Japanese special emissary, Viscount Ishii, was presumably now in London and in view of his importance and of his special mission, if there were anything in these reports, it would seem more likely that he would be making such representations to the Government than the Ambassador regularly accredited there. I also reminded the Ambassador that when the British Ambassador in Tokyo had clarified this possibility through the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,12 the latter had made it plain that no such possibility was now imminent. Sir Ronald Lindsay said that his Government had been advised that the Chinese Government had definitely refused to discuss peace offers emanating from Japanese sources, brought to the Chinese Government by the German Ambassador to China. He added, however, that his Government believed that General Chiang Kai-shek would very soon fall and that in that event the pro-Japanese who would succeed him in the Chinese Government would undoubtedly accept German mediation.
Finally, the British Ambassador said that he had a further instruction to communicate to me, which was that if this Government were prepared to discuss the possibility of secret and confidential staff discussions between Great Britain and the United States, he, the Ambassador, had instructions to arrange for such conversations immediately. The Ambassador added that it was because of his belief that such occurrences as the sinking of the U. S. S. Panay would occur that the British Government had made this suggestion. I told the Ambassador that I had taken careful note of this communication which he made to me, but that I had no response at this moment to make to him with regard thereto.
- See vol. iv, pp. 485 ff., and Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 517 ff.↩
- Koki Hirota.↩
- See telegram No. 622, December 13, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 521, and memorandum by the Secretary of State, December 13, ibid., p. 522.↩
- Infra.↩
- British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- K. Horinouchi.↩