893.01 Manchuria/1486
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 27.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that, by way of implementing the recent adherence of Italy to the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact97 (Embassy’s despatch No. 2660, November 13, 193798), and as a logical consequence of this step, Italy extended formal recognition to “Manchukuo” on November 29.99 It is understood that this will be followed by the conclusion of a commercial treaty which will include “Manchukuo” in the scope of the commercial treaty which is being negotiated between Italy and Japan; furthermore “Manchukuo” is expected to make formal recognition of Italy’s sovereignty over Ethiopia. Thus the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis is beginning to revolve smoothly in the Far East with this application of a welcome lubricant on the part of Italy.
The next application of lubricant would naturally be made on the part of Germany through her formal recognition of “Manchukuo”; it seems, however, that Berlin is not prepared to act hastily in view of her desire to avoid unnecessary affront to China at the present moment. The impression is strong that Germany will take no action in this direction until the situation in China becomes more clarified; however, if, and when, the present régime of Chiang Kai-shek is eliminated and a Japanese controlled government is set up in its place, then it is reasonable to assume that Germany would be willing to recognize “Manchukuo”. However, the situation is still obscure, despite the approaching fall of Nanking, and Germany’s future interests, hopes, and prospects in China make it imperative for her to move with extreme caution in this part of the world. There can be [Page 789] noted a considerable difference in the manner in which Germany has conducted her policy in the Far East as compared with that of Italy. The former has consistently evinced a rather benevolent and compassionate attitude toward the Nanking régime ever since the outbreak of hostilities, despite the existence of the agreement with Japan, and only a week ago the German Ambassador to China, Mr. Trautmann, is reported, with probably considerable accuracy, to have attempted mediation in an effort to stave off complete Chinese collapse. Furthermore, the German military advisers to Chiang Kai-shek have not been withdrawn during the course of the present hostilities.
Italy, on the other hand, after preserving a strictly neutral attitude for the first few months after the outbreak, suddenly abandoned its previous policy and came out strongly in support of Japan, withdrew her aviation support from China, joined the anti-Comintern pact, and recognized “Manchukuo”. In other words, Mussolini has decided to sacrifice whatever benefits might have accrued by a negative policy toward China and has thrown in his lot unreservedly with the Japanese without awaiting the outcome of the Sino-Japanese struggle.
Probably as a quid pro quo of Italy’s action, Japan extended formal recognition on December 1 to the Italian supported Franco regime of Spain, and on the following day the Franco régime, in gratitude, recognized “Manchukuo”.1 Thus Salamanca joins the Rome–Berlin–Tokyo axis and it appears likely that in the event of a future Franco victory in Spain the Franco Government will join the tripartite anti-Comintern pact. A hint of this may be found in the statement given out by the Japanese Foreign Office on the occasion of the extension of recognition to the Franco Government, which said, in part: “It is a matter for sincere congratulation that through the present recognition, friendly relations have been established between our country and the Franco Government, with which we are in agreement regarding the policy to be pursued toward the Comintern”.
Again one cannot fail to note that the sum total of all these developments represents a serious threat to British security and interests. If Franco should establish a strong régime in Spain, closely allied with Italy, thus controlling the Mediterranean, and if Japan establishes complete hegemony over North and Central China, including Shanghai, and if, indeed, Japan stops there, the British position will be precarious, to say the least, and Hong Kong will become perhaps more of a liability than an asset.
Respectfully yours,
- See vol. i, pp. 605 ff.↩
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 160.↩
- See also telegram No. 493, November 29, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in Italy, p. 943.↩
- See telegram No. 591, December 3, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 945.↩