793.94/10946: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State89

510. The following report to me from the Acting Military Attaché Major Creswell90 is in my opinion most timely and would be of interest to our delegation at the Brussels Conference.

  • “1. Information has been obtained in the course of the past few days which tends to corroborate reports which have been current for some 2 weeks to the effect that the strength of the Kwantung army has undergone a considerable increase. The size of the army including the troops under its control now operating in Suiyuan Province is estimated by this office as in the vicinity of 230,000 men.
  • 2. This force has been built up gradually and has reached its present size as a result of precautionary rather than preparatory considerations the elements entering into such precautionary measures being the fact that there is suspicion regarding Sino-Soviet understandings, that trouble is feared from the Outer Mongolian tribes as a result of Chinese and Russian instigation, that the disaffections in the Manchukuo army are greater than appear on the surface and finally the perennial apprehension that Russia may enter the struggle while the Japanese are embroiled with China.
  • 3. It is felt that the Kwantung army has been built up by troops formed in Japan in the course of the mobilization activities which have been taking place for the past few weeks as well as by a certain number of additions from the North China forces, although the extent to which the forces in North China have been increased [reduced?] in order to add to the Kwantung army is difficult to say. Such a decision to weaken the North China force in favor of the Kwantung army could mean only that the sum of the conditions mentioned in paragraph 2 are of sufficient import to warrant the diminishing of the momentum acquired by the operations in North China in proportion as the strength of that garrison is reduced.
  • 4. At present, however, the North China and Shanghai operations cannot be viewed as unrelated activities. The Yomiuri Shimbun of this morning carries an article covering a statement by General Matsui commanding at Shanghai to the effect that the objective of his force is Nanking. This opinion as to the direction of future operation in that sector was also voiced in other quarters and within the last week this office has secured identifications which indicate that some troops which have heretofore been engaged in North China operations are now operating at Shanghai. Identifications have also [Page 654] been made which indicate the presence of a certain amount of cavalry at Shanghai which points to expectation of a more open form of action than has characterized the operations in that sector prior to the recent advances.
  • 5. Viewed in their relation to the operations in North China the sum of the statements evidenced by indications mentioned in the preceding paragraph may well mean that with what the Japanese consider as a threat from the northwest and the fact that the operations in North China have thus far failed to pin down and definitely destroy the Chinese forces in that area a decision may have been made to temporarily suspend or limit the southward movement in North China and instead to deliver the decisive blow via Nanking. However, the Japanese army has a reserve of some 3,000,000 men and with the present army being variously estimated as between 900,000 and 1,250,000 men it is evident that if the decision be to draw further upon the man power of the nation there are ample resources in that respect for continuing operations on a large scale on all fronts.
  • 6. All classes of the people feel that the security and future existence of the nation are involved in the present situation and that there can be no turning back no matter what pressure be brought by other powers. Japanese opinion is firmly behind the armed services in this respect and they are spiritually prepared for any eventuality even though the entrance of Russia into the present struggle precipitates a world war through the spread of hostilities to the west. Reports have it that a survey of capital and bank deposits is being carried out with a view to the mobilization of capital in connection with preparations for such an eventuality as a war of 3 years’ duration.
  • 7. Regarding the political situation it is felt that while the people in general are warmly inclined toward the Konoe Cabinet there is a growing feeling that there is a lack of decision in that body which results in a loss of time and the introduction of an uncertain element into the conduct of national affairs in this crisis. This feeling in addition to the possibility that the health of the Premier may not be equal to the occasion has given rise to the thought that should the present Cabinet be replaced the next Government should be headed by such a man as General Araki91 or Admiral Suetsugu92 who would be depended upon to form governments of the type which would result in all the elements of the government, army, navy and civil components functioning harmoniously toward a common goal”.
Grew
  1. Repeated as Department’s No. 32, November 2, 7 p.m., to Norman H. Davis at Brussels.
  2. Maj. Harry I. T. Creswell, Assistant Military Attaché in Japan.
  3. Former Japanese Minister of War.
  4. Former Japanese Fleet Commander in Chief.