793.94/10758: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State

483. Our 475, October 15, 5 p.m.47

The following is quoted from a letter dated October 12 from the Japanese representative of Reuter’s agency to his principals in London.

“Just for your information and because I believe the company’s interests may be considerably affected I give below my ideas of what the Japanese rightists would demand if they are successful in ‘crushing China to her knees’. I propose to amend or add to these terms from time to time as I see occasion.

Recognition of Manchukuo.
An economic bloc consisting of Japan, Manchukuo, North China, and the Chinese Republic.
An autonomous anti-Communist North China under Japanese protection with control of all taxes and customs revenues.
An autonomous anti-Communist Inner-Mongolia under the protection of the ‘independent’ empire of Manchukuo or alternatively inclusion of Inner-Mongolia in Manchukuo.
A Japanese inspector-general of customs. Japanese advisers in all national departments and prefectural governments.
Revision of China’s tariffs to promote the exchange of Japan’s finished goods against China’s raw materials.
Chiang Kai-shek to be replaced by a pro-Japanese statesman.
China to join the anti-Communist bloc.
China to be demilitarized, her military forces being confined to peace preservation corps.
China will not be permitted to possess any commercial or military airplanes.
Air services in China will be operated cooperatively: China providing the aerodromes and ground staff and Japan the machines and pilots.
Japan may demand larger concessions at the coastal treaty ports: Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow and Canton with grounds for military aerodromes. She may also desire to retain certain islands along the coast already in her possession such as those lying off Haichow in the Yangtze estuary off Wenchow and the Pratas planning to use these as bases for bombing interior points which show any signs of anti-Japanism or refusal to implement the peace terms. This if carried through would mean that semi-hostilities would continue indefinitely in the Yangtze valley and trade would therefore be at a standstill.
I consider it likely that Japan will demand the right to ‘cooperate’ with the Chinese Government in the working of its official news agency and all China’s broadcasting stations and wireless emissions as it has become obvious that control of the dissemination of news and guidance of public opinion is vitally important if Japan’s policies in China are to be carried out successfully”.
With certain exceptions such as points 9 to 11 which seem to be speculative we believe that the foregoing is an intelligent and substantially accurate estimate of Hirota’s “three points” when translated into concrete terms.

Repeated to Nanking.