Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/11020

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 2619

Tokyo, October 8, 1937.
[Received November 8.]

Sir: With reference to our telegram No. 449, October 5, 6 p.m., reporting a conversation with Mr. Kojiro Matsukata, the Embassy on October 6 had prepared a telegram to the Department by way of comment on Mr. Matsukata’s assertion that an offer of good offices by the United States with a view to terminating the present hostilities in China would now be timely. That telegram was held up for one day and the developments reported on October 7, namely the President’s speech in Chicago and the Department’s announced support of the action taken by the League of Nations in connection with the Sino-Japanese situation, seemed to us to render superfluous the despatch of the telegram at this date. For purposes of record however, I enclose herewith a copy of the draft of the telegram in question.

There are also enclosed copies of memoranda of the conversations⁷ which Mr. Matsukata had with me and Mr. Dooman on October 5.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

[Enclosure]

Draft Telegram From the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 6, 1937.

Our 449, October 5, 6 p.m.

1. On September 22, my British colleague gave me his impressions of the situation, which were as follows:

(a) Parallel action by the United States and Great Britain in the Far Eastern conflict has been and can be distinctly useful in specific issues and is likely to be much more effective than identical action would be. This presupposes the use sometimes of different forms and methods of approach to the Japanese Government as well as different choice of language.

(b) He found no resentment on the part of the Japanese Government to even the strongest representations on behalf of specific British interests. He felt that such attitude of the Japanese authorities could be preserved only so long as the British Government maintain the strictest neutrality in policy and procedure. He greatly feared the results of his Government’s repeating at Geneva or elsewhere the mistake it made in the Abyssinian crisis.

(c) He felt that the civil Government in Tokyo, particularly the Foreign Office, and the substantial elements of civilian life including the business world, are loath to see the Japanese military in complete future control of Japan’s affairs, and that any manifestations of partiality or lack of neutrality on the part of our respective Governments would incite Japanese public opinion against us and thus play directly into the hands of the military.

2. Since the date of that conversation, there has been a concerted mass attack by the Japanese press on British attitude and policy. Emphasis is being laid on British endeavor to create a common front of the Powers to intervene in the conflict. Great Britain is charged with instigating the discussions at Geneva of economic boycott of Japan, and the receptiveness of the British Government and people to “Chinese propaganda” is referred to in terms reflective of sharp resentment. The attendance of the Archbishop of Canterbury as Chairman at a mass meeting in London for the purpose of censuring Japan has especially aroused widespread indignation in this country, the Japanese inevitably regarding the Archbishop as an officer of the British Government and therefore interpreting his action as an unfriendly step by Great Britain.

3. There are daily being cited in the press alleged instances of British partiality towards China, the cases cited yesterday, for example, being assistance by the British in repairing the Kowloon–Canton Railway, which had been damaged by Japanese bombing, the use of Hong Kong for the assembling of Chinese military airplanes purchased in Great Britain, and the use of trucks belonging to the British marines in Shanghai to smuggle Chinese plain clothes troops behind the Japanese lines.

4. I had a further conversation with Craigie on October 4. He now feels that any representations he may make to the Japanese Government are looked at askance and do much more harm than good. He said that, although representations concerning individual interests or the general protection of the lives and property of our nationals in China are entirely proper and can sometimes be helpful, general censure of Japan’s course of action can only stir up irritation which defeats its own object. He thought that anything which injured British influence in Japan would automatically injure American influence and that, therefore, it was well for us to work step by step together. He believed that eventually we might be helpful in bringing the hostilities to a close and that we should try to maintain our influence if only for that purpose. He said that the influence of the moderate and liberal elements in Japan must stand or fall on the basis of American and British friendship. If that friendship is lost, the moderates will be equally lost; the Japanese military will then become permanently predominant and Japan will be thrown directly into the arms of Germany, Italy, and other fascist countries.

5. Although the American Government has established its position in the present situation and has amply recorded its views, the Japanese press and people are not reacting adversely to the American attitude. There prevails generally the feeling that the United States is concerned primarily with the protection of its nationals and of their interests in China and with maintaining its prestige as a great Power.

6. We cannot but feel that the sharp contrast between the sentiment of the Japanese Government and people towards the United States and towards Great Britain has grown out of the differences in method employed by these two countries respectively: notably, British effort to create a common front against Japan as compared with American independent action to protect rights and interests in China. Whether Matsukata had any authority to suggest that Japan would favorably entertain an American offer of good offices and would reject any such British offer, we do not know. Nevertheless the suggestion is, we are convinced, reflective of the present sentiments of the Japanese toward the United States on one hand and toward Great Britain on the other.

7. Our conclusions at the present moment with regard to the situation, and in the light of the statements made to me by Craigie and Matsukata are as follows:

(a) We find no evidence of there being any moderate element in Japan opposed to the carrying out of the Japanese military program in China.

(b) Notwithstanding their common opposition to Communism, we perceive no basis for any enduring close association between Japan and the Fascist Powers, evidences of trend of Japan toward Germany and Italy being reflective, we believe, of a policy of opportunism on both sides. It is our estimate that Japan will not link itself with the latter nations unless the United States should align itself with the democratic countries in any project contemplating action, whether positive or negative, with the democratic countries.

(c) We believe that the program of the Japanese military originally contemplated piecemeal and gradual expansion in China, and that the Japanese military were not prepared at this time for the present conflict, the successful liquidation of which will entail enormous expenditures in terms of both money and lives. Nevertheless, the Japanese military are apparently confident, in view of the rapid and favorable progress of military operations in North China, that Chinese military opposition can be crushed in the relatively near future. We have reason to believe that the Japanese military, although hopeful that disorganization of the Chinese army will lead to disruption of the Chinese Government as now constituted, are anxious to prevent there arising in China conditions of civil disorder. We believe that there is little likelihood that any offer of good offices, either by the United States or by the United States in association with Great Britain and other Powers, would be entertained by the Japanese Government until such time as Chinese military opposition has been eliminated and as foreign good offices could be expected effectively to contribute toward preserving of civil order in Cnina.

8. We understand from press despatches that the League of Nations will follow precedent of the 1933 Resolution on the Sino-Japanese conflict and will request the American Government for expression of views. We hope that this telegram will indicate to the Department the results, so far as they affect relations with Japan, of the course thus far pursued by our Government.

Grew

7. Neither printed.