793.94/10721
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 18.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a translation of an editorial75 which appeared on September 24 in the Kokumin Shimbun, contrasting the attitudes of the United States and of Great Britain toward the conflict between Japan and China.
On several recent occasions I have referred to the marked change during the past few years in the attitude of the Japanese people towards the United States. It is not the purpose of this despatch to examine in detail the causes of this change, but it is apparent that the principal factors have been the use of the present Administration of methods which would be expected to avoid unnecessary and useless aggravation of relations between Japan and China, the liberal attitude of the American Government in the solving of problems rising out of Japanese commercial competition and, somewhat paradoxically, the termination of the treaty for the limitation of naval armament to [Page 575] which the United States and Japan were party. Since the beginning of the present conflict in the Far East the changed attitude of the Japanese toward the United States has been apparent largely in a negative sense: there has been no display on the part of the press of animosity or invective toward the United States, notwithstanding the fact that, as pointed out in an editorial in the British-owned Japan Chronicle of which a copy is enclosed,76 “there is a remarkable similarity of opinion and attitude” between Great Britain and the United States and the other concerned Powers. This similarity is as evident to the Japanese as it is to the editor of the Chronicle, and the Japanese are aware that responsible officers of the American Government and American opinon have condemned Japanese actions in China quite as “trenchantly” as have the British Government and the British press. The fact remains that our Government has been able to manifest its views in the present crisis quite as clearly as has the British Government, without, however, stirring up among the Japanese passions which would effectually prevent the production of desired results through the public recording of American disapproval.
Although there has been much acrid comment in the local press on the British attitude, the press has thus far refrained from comment on the American attitude, with occasional exceptions, such as that which followed the Secretary’s statement on August 23, (See my despatch No. 2559 of August 27, 193777), when the tone of the comment was comparatively moderate. The first editorial discussion of American attitude which has been noticed since that time is that of the Kokumin. The thought may occur to officers in the Department who are familiar with this journal that it has been traditionally chauvinistic and that it is, therefore, one whose opinions have little weight in intelligent and intellectual Japanese circles. It must be emphasized, however, that, if the Kokumin is not an organ of Japanese military and nationalist elements, at least it voices with considerable confidence the views of these elements, whose influence is now dominant in Japan; and it is precisely for this reason that the editorial has significance. The gist of the editorial is compressed in the first paragraph thereof, in which emphasis is laid upon the difference in the respective methods of the United States and Great Britain, the methods of the United States being those designed to “avoid injury being done to its (United States) prestige as a great power”, whereas those of Great Britain are calculated to bring about concerted intervention by the Powers in the conflict. There is considerable force to a great deal of what the Chronicle (which erroneously translates as “sentiment” a word in the Kokumin editorial that should be more accurately [Page 576] translated as “passion”) has to say on Japanese objections to British policy in the Far East. Nevertheless, in putting forward as an extenuation of a “sharper” attitude of the British Government the relatively large British interests in China, the Chronicle—in line with British papers in China and elsewhere—moves the field of argument from the secure one of principle to the somewhat hazardous ground of expediency. It is in rejoinder to that point of view that the Kokumin addresses itself when it warns Great Britain of the dangers of the present British course.
As we at the Embassy analyze the courses pursued by the American Government and the British Government in the present crisis, it appears to us that the American Government has succeeded in making clear to the Japanese Government and to the Japanese people that Japanese policy and actions in China are quite as repugnant to the United States as they are to Great Britain; that by taking independent action, and simultaneously refraining from encouraging other Powers to take a stronger position vis-à-vis Japan than that which they would be disposed independently to take, our Government is at the present time in a better position than is any other Government to protect its interests in China and otherwise to exert influence in a beneficial direction. As time passes, there are discernible evidences, such as the editorial just discussed, which tend to support the views put forward to the Department in our telegram No. 321.78 It is to be remembered that that editorial appeared after the publication of our note to the Japanese Government on the bombing of Nanking, which, it might be added, has not been singled out from among the notes of other countries for special examination. In the various specific cases which we have taken up with the Foreign Office affecting the lives and property of Americans in China, we are finding eagerness—at times anxiety—to meet our wishes. We feel that this attitude has been manifested in connection with the evacuation of Americans from Hankow (see our 394, September 20, 7 p.m.79), the fact that immediately after our representations concerning the bombing of Nanking the Foreign Minister sought audience with the Emperor, apparently resulting in the despatch of envoys to talk directly with the Japanese admirals in command in Chinese waters (see our 421, September 27, 4 [5] p.m.), et cetera. Without stressing other manifestations of Japanese appreciation over the attitude thus far shown by our Government, we have thus far perceived no reason, despite constant and careful examination of day to day developments, to alter our view that the course which our Government has been following during the crisis places it in a position where it can best conserve American interests and also be of potential future service to the combatant nations.
[Page 577]Without for a moment condoning Japanese action in China, we must reluctantly but inevitably accept the patent fact that a nation at war, whether legally or illegally, will exert every effort to attain its military objectives. Non-combatant nations having interests in the theater of warfare will similarly exert every feasible effort to protect those interests. The extent to which a combatant is willing to listen to representations on behalf of such non-combatant interests depends largely if not exclusively upon the extent to which it feels there is something to be gained by such consideration. In the present situation whatever favorable results may accrue from our representations will not accrue from considerations of sentiment or principle or international law or ethics; they will accrue from a careful balancing by the Japanese Government of the advantages of maintaining and the disadvantages of losing the friendship of the United States. In our opinion, the balance in favor of maintaining the friendship of the United States will be preserved just so long as the United States is able to avoid arousing the antagonistic passions of the Japanese Government and people. Far from arousing such passions, the manner and methods of our Government’s approach to the Japanese Government in the present situation have tended to strengthen the desire of the Japanese Government and people to preserve and consolidate their friendship with the United States. And so far as the United States is concerned, we have sacrificed not an iota of our traditional position towards international law, principle and ethics. The thoughts brought out in this despatch argue that something is to be gained, and nothing lost, by continuing the methods heretofore followed by our Government.
In this connection I venture to refer to my letter to the Secretary of September 15, 1937, on the general subject of American relations with Japan and especially to paragraphs Nos. 4 and 6 therein.
Respectfully yours,