793.94/8629
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 17.]
Sir: I have the honor to discuss the Japanese North China Garrison, with especial reference to its numerical strength and to the views of its officers with regard to Sino-Japanese relations.
It is impossible to obtain authentic information with regard to the numerical strength of the North China Garrison. At the time of the principal increase in its strength (May 1936), Japanese military officers indicated that the new total approximated 4,000. Since that time, Japanese officers have refused to make any statement in this regard, thereby strengthening the widespread opinion that the actual number is considerably in excess of 4,000.
As reported by the Embassy in its monthly report for May, 1936,79 two non-official and unrelated Japanese sources put the number at slightly more than 8,000. Other observers, including the American Naval Attaché80 and a Chinese Government official connected with intelligence affairs, subsequently gave similar estimates. Following the most recent replacement movement of the troops of the Japanese North China Garrison (March–April 1937), the American Naval Attaché arrived at the conclusion, after investigation, that the numerical strength of the North China Garrison had been increased to 9,200. Independently of his investigations, the above-mentioned Chinese official, who has association with a Chinese intelligence officer charged with discovering the strength of the Japanese Garrison, arrived at the conclusion that the numerical strength had reached slightly more than 9,000. A Japanese national, closely associated with the Japanese military, expressed the opinion a few days ago in private conversation that the number was probably at present above 8,000. The American Assistant Military Attaché,81 while stating that he had been unable to obtain satisfactory information on the subject, said that he thought the number might be somewhere between 8,000 and 9,000. It would seem not improbable, therefore, that the actual numerical strength is considerably greater than that admitted by Japanese officers.
It may be added that a secretary of the local Japanese Embassy stated in private conversation recently that the numerical strength was 5,000, a larger estimate than that given last May by the Japanese military. This secretary spoke, however, with such emphasis that it [Page 72] seemed to his listener that he was making an understatement with intent.
The Chinese official above-mentioned has recently informed a member of the Embassy that an increase in the numerical strength of the Japanese Garrison is expected before summer and that the Garrison will then consist of a full division of 12,000 men. This report appeared subsequently in a Chinese newspaper published at Shanghai. It will be impossible, however, to establish the authenticity of this report until the increase is made, if it can be established then.
The alleged impending increase of the North China Garrison may have some relation to the growing nationalism of General Sung Che-yuan’s 29th Army and to its alleged advance in equipment and in numerical strength. It seems possible that the 29th Army might not today be so easily intimidated by a show of Japanese strength into disspirited submission to unreasonable Japanese demands as it might have been by a lesser display of Japanese strength a year or more ago. Parenthetically it may be stated that the numerical strength of the 29th Army cannot be definitely learned. The American Military Attaché82 estimated that it numbered in January of this year 51,800 men (36,800 in Hopei Province and 15,000 in Chahar Province), an increase of 9,800 over his estimate of its strength in September, 1935, when General Sung was assuming control of Hopei Province. This may be, however, an underestimate as in September 1935, the British and Japanese Military Attachés believed that General Sung had 60,000 men, and practically all observers are convinced that General Sung has done considerable recruiting since that time. Some Chinese officials claim that General Sung has at present 100,000 men. Observers also agree that the equipment of the 29th Army is much better today than it was in 1935 and that the anti-Japanese feeling of the troops has not lessened during this time, if, in fact, it has not increased.
There is another factor which might be of importance in deciding the 29th Army to ignore or accept the challenge of an aggressive display of Japanese military strength. There is more reason to believe that actual military conflict in Hopei Province would now bring military assistance from the National Government. It sent troops to Suiyuan Province last autumn to assist the Suiyuan provincial forces against Japanese aggression there; and the temper of China has so changed during recent months that even some conservative intelligent Chinese believe that the National Government would fall if it did not dispatch military support in case of a conflict in Hopei. Presumably the 29th Army counts more today on support from the National Government than it did formerly.
[Page 73]It is not intended to give the impression in this despatch that a military conflict in Hopei Province is imminent. The possibility does, however, exist; and it seems increasingly probable that a serious incident in Hopei might bring on a major conflict. Such an incident might be precipitated by Japanese military discontented with the lack of progress in Sino-Japanese economic and/or political cooperation in North China or by Chinese military imbued with a growing belief in their own prowess.
It is difficult to state the exact intention of the Japanese military in increasing the strength of the North China Garrison. It cannot be known whether it is intended merely as a display of strength or as preparation for eventualities or as a part of an accepted plan in extension of Japanese influence. Perhaps, in connection with this last mentioned possibility, the increase is due in part to an intention to station some of the troops along the line of the proposed Shihkiach-wang-Tientsin railway when construction of that line eventually begins. The stationing of Japanese troops along that line would presumably assist in separating from the National Government that part of Hopei lying north of the proposed line.
It is not improbable that the intention of some of the officers of the Japanese North China Garrison differs from the intention of others. As in other units of the Japanese army, so in the North China Garrison the Japanese officers apparently hold differing views with regard to policy toward China. Information received by the Embassy indicates that the older officers of the Garrison are inclined to be less immoderate in their views with respect to China policy than are the younger officers. Some Japanese nationals resident in Peiping describe the younger officers as “rabid”, saying that they presumably want political control of the five northern provinces and are strongly opposed to the return to Chinese control of Yin Ju-keng’s bogus regime, the East Hopei Anti-communist Autonomous Government. Some of the older officers are understood to be content if they can achieve effective economic cooperation in North China and adequate protection of Japanese interests, a phrase which is not clearly understood by the Embassy. An evidence of the more reasonable attitude of the older officers was the recent admission in conversation by Lieutenant Colonel Gennosuke Matsui, head of the Special Military Organ at Peiping of the North China Garrison, to the effect that the formation of Yin Ju-keng’s bogus regime had proved to be a mistake.
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Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy