761.9312 Aggressor/12
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 8.]
Sir: With reference to my telegram No. 238 of August 31, 3 p.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, signed at Nanking on August 21, 1937.39 The [Page 538] enclosed version was published in the Moscow Daily News on August 30. As it was retranslated from the Russian (the original text having been drawn up in the English language) this text undoubtedly differs considerably from the original.
To complete the records of the Department, there are also enclosed full translations of the Pravda and Izvestiya editorials40 which accompanied the publication of the treaty. Full comment on these editorials was made in the telegram under reference and it is not deemed necessary to repeat such comments in this despatch.
With reference to the treaty itself, it may be stated that ostensibly it contains little more than the obligations of non-aggression and non-assistance to aggressors usually found in non-aggression pacts of this type. It should be borne in mind, however, that the pact was signed at a time when one of the signatories, namely China, was engaged in actual warfare with a third power, namely Japan, the relations of which with the other signatory, the Soviet Union, were far from satisfactory. The international situation, therefore, rather than the actual contents of the pact lends considerable importance to its conclusion. It may be said that to a certain extent at least the pact contributes to a clarification of the complicated situation in the Far East.
To Japan the conclusion of the pact appears to mean, (1) that the Japanese Government can no longer count so strongly as it has in the past upon the possibility of prevailing upon the present composition of the Nanking Government to join, in the role of a Japanese satellite, the front against the Comintern, (2) that if it really intends to enforce its demands upon China it can do so only by overthrowing the present Nanking Government, and (3) that it must count upon the Chinese Communists and the left wing sympathizers with the Soviet Union supporting the Nanking Government.
To the Nanking Government the conclusion of the pact appears to mean, (1) that in the conflict against Japan that Government has destroyed to an extent its own maneuvering ability in that in view of the atmosphere surrounding the treaty it will hardly be able to play the Soviet Union and Japan off against each other, (2) that it can depend upon the Chinese Comintern Communists (although not necessarily the left or so-called Trotskiist Communists or the Communists without international allegiance) and the left-wing pro-Soviet elements in China to support it so long as it does not discriminate against them and so long as it resolutely opposes Japan with force of arms, (3) that it will be compelled to reckon with the Chinese Comintern Communists as a factor not to be ignored in case the time [Page 539] should come when it desires to make peace with Japan, since during the course of the struggle these Communists will not fail to take advantage of the situation to strengthen their influence in China, (4) and that by giving the Soviet Union to understand that it has irrevocably decided not to concur in the demands of Japan it is in a better position to plead for Soviet assistance, at least in the form of war supplies.
To the Soviet Union the conclusion of the pact would seem to mean, (1) that the Soviet Government without destroying its own maneuvering ability—since an attack upon China could not possibly have entered into Soviet international plans for many years to come—has been successful in making sure that the Nanking Government is definitely in the anti-Japanese camp in the Far East, (2) that Comintern Communists and other pro-Soviet elements in China are restored to a comparatively favorable position and are free not only to join in the struggle against Japan, but also to take steps to strengthen their own influence in China, (3) that since the Chinese Nationalists are no longer in a position to play Japan and the Soviet Union off against each other they are now more dependent upon Moscow than they have been since 1927, and (4) that the Nanking Government having once taken the decision which the agreement represents will be more likely to continue to resist Japan with the result that Japan, regardless of the outcome of the conflict, will for some time to come be compelled to dissipate in China energies which the Soviet Government has feared might be turned against the Soviet Union.
My ideas as outlined above regarding the significance of the pact have been gained from conversations with the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors, with Soviet officials, and with other observers in Moscow of the international situation for whose opinions I have respect.
The rumors which have appeared in various sections of the foreign press to the effect that the pact is accompanied by a secret military agreement are discounted here. It is not believed that the Soviet Government, which is extremely realistic in matters of this kind, would obligate itself in advance to render active assistance to China. In case it finds that without any great amount of self-sacrifice or any great degree of danger to itself it can furnish arms to China, it will undoubtedly do so. If later it should appear that it might be in a position to turn the scales against Japan by lending direct military aid to China either in the guise of Mongolian troops or in any other form, it may decide to enter still more actively into the conflict. In any case, it is the consensus here that the Soviet Government has kept its hands free and that for the present at least it is determined to take [Page 540] no action which would be likely to embroil the Soviet Union in a conflict which promises to undermine the strength both of Japan and China.
It would be erroneous to assume that merely because of the conclusion of the agreement, the Soviet and Nanking Governments now have full confidence in each other. From remarks which have been made from time to time to me by various Soviet officials, I am inclined to believe that the Soviet Government is not prone to forget that the Nanking Government in the past has mercilessly ferreted out, tortured, and executed numerous agents of the Comintern and has brought to naught many well-laid plans for Soviet penetration into China. The Soviet Government also realizes that Chiang Kai-shek on previous occasions has had experiences of an unpleasant nature in cooperating with Moscow and that he fully understands the ultimate objectives of Soviet policies in the Far East. Neither signatory of the pact, therefore, in my opinion, has any illusions with respect to the other but each feels that the other may be of use to it in the solution of immediate and urgent problems.
As I have already informed the Department by telegram, the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow has told me that the conclusion of the pact shows that the Chinese Government has determined definitely to fight Japan and that it will look for assistance in any direction where the possibility of assistance may lie. He said that the plan of Nanking to break up the Communist armies in China had been abandoned and that at the present time these armies were fighting the Japanese as autonomous units in the northwest and were giving a good account of themselves. He made no secret of the fact that China was hoping in the near future to obtain military supplies from the Soviet Union and that it hoped eventually to receive assistance in other forms. The Ambassador stated that in his opinion Moscow was more interested at the present time in stirring up opposition to Japan in China than it was in spreading communism and that for the time being, therefore, Nanking and Moscow saw eye to eye. Of course, he added, Nanking was not oblivious to the communist danger and would endeavor to keep its communist allies under observation.
A member of the German Embassy has informed me in confidence that his Embassy has received a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which took place shortly after the conclusion of the pact between the German Ambassador to China and Chiang Kai-shek, in which the latter stated emphatically that the pact did not by any means signify that the Nanking Government would permit the growth of communism in China. Chiang Kai-shek added that Nanking could not fight the Japanese and Communists simultaneously and it [Page 541] therefore found it advantageous to convert the Communists from a negative into a positive factor by allowing them to join in the struggle against Japan.
Respectfully yours,