793.94/9753: Telegram
The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 28—8:45 a.m.]
202. In a talk with von Schmieden, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, he formally restated the German neutral position mentioned in the Embassy’s No. 180, July 29, 6 p.m.72
He said that Germany had remonstrated with both Japan and China over the continuance of the conflict, as had Great Britain and other powers but “along lines somewhat modified owing to their special relations with Japan”. He said that they were greatly concerned over the safety of their nationals and of their interests. They would not, however, send a war vessel or take any similar steps as, unlike other countries, they had no extraterritorial rights, were not parties to the Boxer protocols and that thus such action would be misconstrued. Moreover, they wished at this time to keep their naval units in European waters.
I may say that it appears rather evident here that Germany finds herself caught between her special relations with Japan under the Anti-Communist Treaty72a and her interests in China, and that, regarding the latter, she is thinking less of their present value than of a prospective increase. It will be recalled that the Anti-Communist Treaty was a project carried through by Ribbentrop73 and that it has been understood here that the Foreign Office has never been enthusiastic about it. Von Schmieden, in what he had to say, appeared to confirm this Foreign Office attitude. He said that the Japanese were making a great propaganda effort out of Russian aid to China but that this effort was aimed chiefly at influencing Germany and that as far as he could ascertain Russian material assistance was, if it existed at all, extremely limited. The maintenance of full military forces along the border and the general Russian attitude was, of [Page 482] course, a moral support for China but while the Soviets might be furnishing some airplanes any such assistance was handicapped by lack of fuel and oil. Japanese military action was undoubtedly serving to unite China and he had indications of the Japanese directly stirring up communistic activity in China in order to point it out to the world and to Germany.
Incidentally in respect of what von Schmieden said above regarding Russian border forces, the Counsellor of the Russian Embassy spoke of this in a conversation with me saying that these forces were being maintained at their full strength and to a certain extent being built up in preparation for any eventualities but that Moscow was not giving any material assistance to China at the present time.
Von Schmieden’s general approach to the entire problem was that German concern respecting the Far East was common with that of all western powers or at least he endeavored to convince me that such was the case. He said that the eventuality least to be desired was either a decisive Japanese or Chinese victory. Of the two a Japanese victory was more to be feared as he believed that Japan in such a case would act to eliminate western interests from China and in general from the Far East. On the other hand, in the event of a Chinese victory, while the Chinese would undoubtedly take a strong general anti-foreign attitude they might sustain certain western interests as a continued offset to Japan.
He asked me what the United States would do under the Neutrality Act in relation to the situation. I replied that as the press had reported the Neutrality Act was naturally being considered in connection with all other pertinent questions but that I had no knowledge whatsoever of any specific action being contemplated. This naturally brought up the question of a possible Japanese naval blockade of China. It was felt that this would physically be easy of accomplishment but would require a declaration of war. He said that he did not believe that Japan would declare war as it would not suit her propaganda purposes. He believed, nevertheless, that Japan could create a blockade equally as effective as a declared naval blockade by an extension chiefly by the use of airplanes of such action as she was taking at Shanghai which obviously would create such a risk for shipping as to paralyze all trade. He added that this would be equally hurtful to Japan’s trade, that Japan was already suffering severe commercial losses and he speculated as to what effect this might have on Japanese policy.
In respect to Germany’s neutral or opportunistic position in regard to China there may be cited the circumstance that it appears to be understood that Kung, Chinese Finance Minister, on his recent visit to Berlin arranged for the purchase of German munitions and supplies. [Page 483] Incidentally I have been told on fairly good authority that for the most part this was second rate material which the Germans were glad to dispose of.
The Military Attaché informs me in regard to Germany’s maintenance in Nanking of a “Military Attaché’s office” said to comprise over 100 officers who have been advising Chiang Kai-shek and assisting in training his forces that the Japanese Military Attaché here recently took up with the War Ministry the question of the withdrawal or at least the reduction in number of these officers. According to statements of German General Staff officers, the War Ministry declined on the ground that it would be dishonorable in view of the long and friendly relations which had existed between the Nanking office and Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese Military Attaché is reported to have adopted “a reasonable attitude” in the face of this response.
Although the precise nature of German policy on any point is exceedingly difficult to ascertain and must be left largely to inference it would seem to be apparent in the first place that Berlin is naturally and seriously concerned over German commercial losses in China with special reference to her recent hopes of a substantial increase in profitable trade. There is, of course, the point that Germany might bargain with Japan for a special protection of her interests in return for moral or perhaps other support. I did not feel it to be opportune in my talk with Schmieden to ask a direct question on this score. His whole attitude seemed to be, however, that whatever Japan might promise at present the prospects of Germany’s being able to salvage anything out of a general Japanese success were regarded as exceedingly slender. In the second place I think it may also be felt that Germany’s maintaining a middle position is not only a policy of sustaining as friendly as possible relationships with both parties but with possibility of undertaking a profitable move as occasioned by future developments but that it is based upon a desire to come to a bargain with European or with western powers in general to take common action with them respecting all Asia in return for political and commercial concessions in Europe and commercial advantages elsewhere. On this score the German-Japanese treaty lends itself to employment as a form of blackmail.
I learn from reliable sources that the Japanese Ambassador here has been pressing the Germans hard to accord Japan strong moral support. His line has been that Germany should portray Japanese action as a struggle against communism. The Chinese Ambassador in a recent conversation informed me that he has protested to the Foreign Office against the anti-Chinese tone of the German press in particular that, for the most part, items were appearing under a Tokyo rather than a Shanghai date line. The attitude of the German [Page 484] press impressively commented upon here as an evasion of strict neutrality since the stressing of the Communist angle in China is tantamount to an attack on the Chinese position in general. It is true that to a degree this is the tone recently adopted by the German press as suggested by the leading editorial of the Angriff of August 24 entitled [“] Moscow’s Shadow over China.[”] It is construed here as a more or less decisive swing toward Japan. At present, however, I do not feel that it can be regarded as more than a phase of the German attitude which will doubtless exhibit attention of phases none of which should be interpreted as definitive.
By air mail code copies to Paris, Moscow, London, Tokyo.
- Not printed.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 153; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. i, pp. 390 ff.↩
- Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador in the United Kingdom.↩