793.94/9980
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
At the time of my handing to the British Ambassador on August 21 the Department’s reply to the British Embassy’s memorandum of August 20 in which the British Government for the second time urged on this Government that we commit this country to participation in a joint responsibility at Shanghai envisaged in a proposal which the British Government had made to the Japanese Government, at Tokyo, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador, as from the Secretary, that we could not but view with the opposite of gratification the pressing upon us by the British Government of a project which we regarded as already having been disposed of adversely by the Japanese Government, together with publicity given in London to the fact of this approach, and that we hoped that at no time would there be brought against us the charge that the project had come to [Page 465] nothing because of rejection of it by us or refusal on our part to cooperate. The Ambassador at that time said that he would bring what I had said to the attention of his Foreign Office.
The Ambassador called this morning and said that, in reference to what is reported above, he had informed his Foreign Office of what I had said on behalf of the Secretary and that he had a message in reply. The Ambassador made the observation, speaking apparently on his own authority, that in viewing each other’s actions and in connection with communications inter se, governments must take account of the difference in their respective situations. He said that the proposal which his Government had made to the Japanese Government and in connection with which it had sought a commitment from us had originated in the diplomatic group at Nanking. His Government had felt that the situation was urgent, there was great immediate danger at Shanghai and out of the Shanghai trouble there might come greater trouble, and they thought that no suggestion offering any possibility of diminishing the hazards of that situation should be disregarded. They had possibly been too optimistic. But they had not felt that the Japanese had conclusively rejected their proposal. It had not been any part of their thought to embarrass us. They regretted any embarrassment caused to us. In conclusion, and most important, they wished to assure us that there would be no attribution of blame to us; rather, they felt that if blame was placed anywhere it would be placed upon the Japanese. At that point, I made the observation that the last statement sounded to me like a diplomatic way of affirming that responsibility for failure of the project would be attributed to the Japanese. The Ambassador said that that interpretation had not occurred to him.
I then said that, with regard to the origin of the suggestion which the Ambassador had mentioned as having emanated from Nanking, it had been my understanding that the suggestion discussed by the diplomatic group at Nanking had been one envisaging and revolving around the idea of removal by the Japanese of the Japanese population at Shanghai. This, I said, was not at all what the British Government had proposed at Tokyo and submitted to us: what they had proposed had been expressly that Japanese nationals and interests at Shanghai be placed under the protection of such powers as would assume joint responsibility for such protection. The Ambassador said that he fully realized that there had been that difference.
The Ambassador then said that, as he sees the situation, his Government and this Government are in very different situations in relation to pressure from their respective publics. The British Government, he said, is under heavy pressure from its public to “do something” in regard to the Chinese-Japanese conflict; but the American Government [Page 466] not only is not being so pressed by its public but on the contrary is being urged to keep entirely away from and out of the difficulties in China. He asked whether that was a fair estimate. I replied that so far as this country is concerned, it seemed to me that what the Ambassador had said was at least approximately correct. The Ambassador then referred to the much greater British material interest immediately at stake, the necessarily great solicitude of the British Government, and the naturalness of the desire of the British Government that no possible suggestion which might ameliorate the situation be overlooked, together with their constant desire that there be cooperation between them and us. I said that, in reference to the matter under discussion last week, our impatience with them had arisen not out of the fact that they wanted action and that they sought our cooperation but out of the fact that they brought us a proposal which seemed to us already to have been “killed” before they brought it to our attention. The Ambassador said that he understood that point. However, he said, his Government still seemed to have an idea that there was a possibility of the Japanese favoring some kind of an idea about a “neutralization of Shanghai.”
I said that this last statement was very interesting. To me, it at once suggested that Foreign Offices concerned should be on the alert against a possible confusion of concepts and against discussing proposals which might be made without having made sure that implications and possibilities were exactly and reciprocally understood. I said that in 1932 there had originated from somewhere a suggestion for “neutralization of Shanghai.” If I remembered correctly, the Japanese had been very favorably disposed: they apparently envisaged a permanent “neutralization” of an area with a large radius around Shanghai. They probably would favor such a proposal at any time. But, an action of that sort would be a reverting to the old idea of making amputations of Chinese territory, the idea expressed in “leased territories,” etc.; the occidental powers have been proceeding for many years in the opposite direction; the tendency has been to give back leased territories, etc., rather than to add to their number; neither the British nor the American Governments would, in my opinion, wish to become involved in any new adventures in “special privilege” in China. The Ambassador said that he was sure that this was a correct estimate.
I then mentioned the message which we had had from Tokyo yesterday in which Mr. Grew said that the British Chargé d’Affaires had called on him and had expressed the opinion that he, the Chargé d’Affaires, had perhaps given his Government an over-optimistic report. I also mentioned the telegram which we had had from Shanghai in which Mr. Gauss informed us of the clearing up of the misunderstanding [Page 467] about the broadcast, without any previous notification, by the British Consulate of its plans for evacuation of British nationals. The Ambassador expressed gratification over being informed of both of these matters.
The Ambassador then said that he anticipated that there would continue to be situations with regard to which his Government or this Government would make suggestions and would seek cooperation; and he hoped that a cooperative attitude would prevail. I said that I agreed with him on both points.
Referring back to the opening item in this conversation, I said that I felt that I might say, in advance of informing the Secretary, that the Department appreciated and the Secretary would appreciate the courtesy of the British Government in their having offered the explanation which the Ambassador had communicated to us. The Ambassador said that he appreciated my having expressed that view.
I wished the Ambassador a safe voyage and a pleasant holiday. The Ambassador said that he would be back in October.
The conversation there ended.