793.94/10922
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 1.]
Sir: I have the honor to report events from the clash late in the evening of July 7 between Chinese and Japanese troops in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao) to the agreement signed July 19 at Tientsin.
[Here follows review of events.]
Responsibility for the clash at Marco Polo Bridge: Legality of the Japanese maneuvers:
Presumably it will never be established whether a Japanese or a Chinese fired the shot which precipitated the fighting in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge. The Assistant Japanese Military Attaché, Major Takeo Imai, claimed in his initial statement that Chinese troops had fired suddenly on Japanese soldiers at Lungwanmiao, a point about half-a-mile north of Marco Polo Bridge, and that the challenging attitude of the Chinese necessitated Japanese measures of self-defense. The Chinese version, as given out by the Mayor of Peiping, General Ch’in Teh-ch’un, made no claim with regard to the initial firing. The Mayor stated that the Japanese military authorities had reported to the Chinese authorities that Chinese had fired on Japanese troops and that a Japanese soldier had subsequently disappeared; that the Japanese demanded entry into Wanping to discover who had done the shooting; that the demand was refused; that the missing soldier soon returned; that the Japanese persisted in their demands to enter the town; that Japanese negotiators were permitted to enter; and that, while negotiations were in progress, Japanese opened fire. (Copies of these two statements, as they appeared in the English language press, are enclosed.30)
Regardless of the accuracy of these versions, the responsibility for the outbreak rests with the Japanese for the reasons that (1) the Japanese were unnecessarily holding maneuvers at night in close proximity to a regularly stationed Chinese garrison at a time when a tense political situation existed, (2) the Japanese authorities knew [Page 433] well that the Chinese troops concerned were a part of the reputedly anti-Japanese 37th Division, and (3) the Japanese claim that they had a right to maneuver in that area under the terms of the Protocol of 1901 was ill-founded as the area lies well outside of the zone delimited in that Protocol for the movement of foreign troops. The unestablished claim of the Japanese that they had received permission from the local Chinese authorities to maneuver in that area is scarcely pertinent in view of the dangers known to attend such maneuvers.
The only legal basis for the maneuvers in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge appears to be a note which was addressed November 15, 1913, by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers at Peking.* (A copy, in translation, of this note addressed to the American Minister is enclosed31 for ready reference.) This note designated four places, including Lukouch’iao (Marco Polo Bridge) as drill grounds for the use of all foreign guards, with two provisos; namely, (1) the four places are designated “temporarily” and (2) “when foreign troops are drilling in these places ball cartridges are not to be used”. Putting aside the question whether “temporary designation” could be effective for 24 years, the company of the Japanese Embassy Guard drilling July 7 in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge definitely carried ball cartridges. The above-mentioned note is further weakened as a legal basis for Japanese argument by the fact that, between the time of its departure from Peiping and the time of its arrival in the Marco Polo Bridge area, the Japanese company concerned had been maneuvering at Fengt’ai with other units of the Kawabe Brigade, of which that company and the Embassy Guard are a part. There is no legal basis, so far as known, for Japanese troops, either of the Embassy Guard or of other units, to maneuver at Fengt’ai.
Japanese motives in enlarging the incident:
Although it was inevitable that the proximity of Japanese and Chinese troops in Hopei Province would result in some such clash as [Page 434] that of July 7, the Embassy does not believe that the clash of July 7 was deliberately planned by the Japanese military. It does believe, however, that the Japanese military decided shortly after the outbreak to make use of it as a pretext for extension of Japanese influence in North China. This belief is based on the following developments: (1) the advance on July 10 to the Wanping area of some 1,000 Japanese troops, notwithstanding the withdrawal on July 9 of a large proportion of the Japanese troops involved and the fulfillment by the Chinese, according to competent foreign eyewitnesses, of the agreement that Chinese troops in the Wanping area would withdraw to west of the Yungting River, (2) evidence that the Japanese concerned were, from at least July 10, less interested in an immediate settlement of the military problem of disposition of troops created by the incident than they were in effecting a political settlement under the guise of an agreement whereby the Chinese would promise to suppress “blue shirts”, communists, and anti-Japanese activities, and (3) the rapid increase of Japanese military strength in the Wanping-Fengt’ai area and the entry into Hopei Province of troops of the Kwantung Army, an increase in strength far exceeding Japanese needs if the incident were to be settled locally and non-politically.
Various factors presumably motivated the Japanese in their apparent decision to use the incident of July 7 as a pretext to extend their influence in North China, (a) The Japanese military perhaps believed that a reasonable settlement of the incident would be interpreted in Japan and China as an indication of weakness on the part of the Japanese military, (b) The Japanese military probably believed that they would have to use force sooner or later to achieve their designs with regard to North China, (c) The Japanese military had been frustrated in those designs, economic and political, by General Sung Che-yuan and his subordinates, notwithstanding the fact that General Sung owed his dominant position in Hopei Province to Japanese aid in 1935. For example, General Sung had been in retirement in Shantung for almost two months prior to July 7 for the primary purpose of avoiding Japanese representations, (d) Furthermore, the Japanese designs were being threatened by the increasing influence in North China of the National Government, (e) The threat to the plans of the Japanese military was enhanced by the growth of unity and nationalism in China, its increasing military and economic strength, and the growing popularity and power of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. (f) Apprehension of the Japanese military with regard to the above-mentioned developments in China was probably enhanced by the rapprochement between the National Government and the communist leaders in northern Shensi, which might be expected to popularize eventually throughout China a political ideology inimical to the extension of Japanese influence, (g) The international [Page 435] situation was presumably regarded by the Japanese military as favorable to their action in China, principally in respect to Russia, as there was evidence of internal difficulties which might be expected to deter Russia from entering into conflict with Japan, regardless of what infringement of Chinese sovereignty the Japanese military effect.
The attitude of Sung Che-yuan and his subordinates:
The withdrawal of Sung Che-yuan from the Peiping-Tientsin area was facilitated by (a) the lack of intelligence on the part of the leaders of Sung’s regime requisite to cope with the situation, (b) vacillation and uncertainty of General Sung, (c) divergent views of General Sung’s subordinates, and (d) defection of General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor of Tientsin and Commander of the 38th Division of the 29th Army.
General Sung seemingly labored under the misapprehension that he could perhaps cope with the Japanese in conversation and in military action. At the same time he labored under the apprehension that perhaps the National Government wished to see him and his army eliminated from the political scene. He was handicapped by the kind of advisers he had. On the one hand, he presumably was advised by General Feng Chih-an, Commander of the 37th Division, to use military force against the Japanese. Judging from the facts that General Chang Tzu-chung, Commander of the 38th Division, signed the agreements of July 11 and 19, General Sung was presumably advised by him to temporize. General Liu Ju-ming, Commander of the 143rd Division (in Chahar), probably sided with General Chang Tzu-chung, inasmuch as his division, so far as known, has taken no action, even in the present defense of Nank’ou Pass. The fourth and remaining divisional commander, General Chao Teng-yu, was in central Hopei Province with his 132nd Division during the early period of negotiations, although he was subsequently killed in action at Nan-yuan, and presumably was not in a position to influence the situation. General Ch’in Teh-ch’un, Mayor of Peiping, seemingly wavered between the two extremes of view, while Chinese not of the 29th Army, such as the influential Ch’en Chueh-sheng, half-Japanese Managing Director of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, who had flocked around General Sung in 1935 for the alleged purpose of personal gain, presumably advised him from the viewpoint of their mutual profit. At the same time, General Sung was subjected to advice from Japanese, whose purpose was to gain control of Hopei Province and whose advice was reinforced by great military strength.
General Sung’s relations with the National Government:
One of General Sung’s primary handicaps appears to have been his uncertainty of the intentions of the National Government. He seems to have been uncertain whether the National Government would [Page 436] not welcome his elimination and was not, in fact, working toward that end. If this is true—and it is not an impossibility—it is not surprising that General Sung attempted to carry on alone as long as possible, although he should have realized that he could not stand alone against the Japanese either in negotiation or in military conflict.
Certain Chinese claim that General Sung had been ordered prior to July 7 by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw to Paoting, the provincial capital, in case of an armed conflict between his troops and Japanese forces. He is said to have been instructed again on July 11 to withdraw to Paoting. If there were such orders, he may have disobeyed them in the belief that he could cope with the Japanese by himself and that, were he to withdraw, it would mean his elimination by the National Government and his being stigmatized as a national traitor.
On the other hand, General Sung may have expected—or hoped—that he would receive material aid from the National Government for resistance to the Japanese. In this he was disappointed. The (Kuominchun) troops which the National Government sent into Hopei Province remained remote from the Peiping-Tientsin area and were so poorly equipped as to be of doubtful value in any conflict with Japanese forces.
The results of General Sung’s vacillation will be discussed in a subsequent despatch.
Dislocation of normal life from July 8 to 19 arising out of the Marco Polo Bridge incident:
As a result of the clash in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge and delay in settlement, the dislocation of ordinary life in the Peiping-Tientsin area soon began. Martial law was put into effect in Peiping; Japanese civilians began to leave as early as July 12; intermittent suspension of train service between Peiping and Tientsin began on July 9, as well as disruption of service on the Peiping-Hankow Railway as a result of occupation of a part of it near Wanping by Japanese troops; small and unimportant armed clashes began to take place as early as July 12 outside the west and south walls of Peiping between Chinese and Japanese forces, although in some instances firing was apparently the result of nervousness in the darkness of night and took place when no enemy was in the vicinity; and trains from Shanghai began to stop as early as July 12 at Central Station at Tientsin and to proceed no further, in part because of the arrival in Tientsin of large bodies of Japanese troops from the north.
No important military clashes occurred during this period, other than the fighting at Wanping, although one Japanese plane fired July 18 on a Chinese troop train moving north in southern Hopei [Page 437] on the Pei ping-Hankow Railway. The explosion July 13 two or three miles south of Peiping of a Japanese truck loaded with munitions gave rise to false reports of heavy fighting at that time in that area. Fighting which occurred after July 19 will be described in a later despatch.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy
- Neither reprinted.↩
- The only mention of this note as the legal basis for the presence of Japanese troops in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge which has come to the notice of the Embassy was contained in a Japanese press despatch of August 2 from Tientsin, published in the Manchuria Daily News. This report read: “Investigation, however, has shown that the Japanese troops, which conducted maneuvers at Lukouchiao on the fateful night of July 6 had by virtue of both precedent and an official Chinese note to the Foreign Ministers in 1913 acted fully within their rights. Lukouchiao in that year was designated by the Chinese Government, along with three other villages, namely, Ercha, Huangtsu and Heilungtan(g), as sites for maneuvers by the foreign garrisons in North China. This decision was conveyed to the Ministers of the foreign powers in Peking by the Foreign Office. In thus notifying the foreign powers the Chinese Government had really done nothing more than recognize a situation which obtained at that time, as the foreign garrisons had in the past been in the habit of going to the four aforementioned places for maneuvers. The Japanese troops consequently had every right to be at Lukouchiao, it is said.” [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Not printed.↩