794.00/116
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 6.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams Nos. 69, March 4, 2 p.m., 85, March 11, 6 p.m., 86, March 12, 7 p.m. and 90, March 13, 2 p.m., in regard to the recent appointment of Mr. Naotake Sato as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hayashi Cabinet and his policies as expressed in his public utterances, I have the honor to submit the following report on the subject.
Mr. Naotake Sato, who was until his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin [Paris], was proceeding [Page 49] to Japan on home leave when the Hayashi Cabinet was formed. It was rumored in Tokyo that he would be appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs on his arrival in Tokyo, but in interviews with newspaper correspondents en route he denied having been approached on the subject. On his arrival in Tokyo he was consulted by Mr. Obata, a retired diplomat who had himself refused to accept the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hayashi Cabinet on the grounds of ill health. Mr. Sato refused to give an immediate answer and asked for interviews with General Hayashi, the Premier, and General Sugiyama, the War Minister. The interviews with these officials apparently having been satisfactory, Mr. Sato accepted the appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 3 and was installed in office that evening. In this connection I am enclosing a memorandum57 of a conversation which I had with the Belgian Ambassador in Tokyo, which explains the circumstances under which Mr. Sato agreed to accept the post. According to the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Sato, while en route home, believed that he would be unable to accept the post even, if it were offered him, as he did not think that his views could be reconciled with those of the Minister of War. After interviewing some of the members of the Cabinet (evidently the Premier and the War Minister), however, he found to his surprise that their views could be reconciled, and consequently he accepted the post.
[Here follows report on Mr. Sato’s policies.]
Analysis and Comment.
The experience of Mr. Sato as the newly-appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan well illustrates the constant conflict taking place in Japan between the old-line, liberal diplomacy and the blustering, sabre-rattling diplomacy of the days since the Manchurian incident of 1931. It is evident, from information which has reached the Embassy, that Mr. Sato accepted the post as Minister for Foreign Affairs with the understanding that he be given a fairly free hand in diplomatic affairs. The military and chauvinistic elements in the Government, which had been foisting on the nation the aggressive diplomacy of recent years, had apparently become convinced, as a result of the dismal failures of that diplomacy during the past year, that they had best step out of the picture for a time and leave diplomacy in the hands of the group trained in international intercourse. It is also apparent, however, that they had not expected Mr. Sato to go as far as he did in re-orienting Japan’s foreign policies.
Mr. Sato, in the first place, very evidently intended to discard the aggressive, sabre-rattling diplomacy and to adopt a much more conciliatory tone than has been used for some years past. As a perusal [Page 50] of his speeches will show, he several times emphasized the advisability of treating other nations (China in particular) on a basis of equality and of giving due consideration to the other parties’ points of view. It has often been said that in dealing with the Japanese, as a nation or as individuals, the principal difficulty arises from the fact that the Japanese are never able to see the other party’s point of view. Mr. Sato, with his long experience in European diplomacy and in international conferences, understood this defect in Japanese diplomacy and proposed to correct it.
In the second place, Mr. Sato apparently desired to drop all aggressive designs on China, to fix definitely the minimum demands which Japan should make on China to protect Japanese rights and interests in that country, to proclaim these demands to the world, thereby relieving the international uneasiness in regard to Japan’s intentions in China, and to negotiate patiently with China for the acceptance of these minimum demands. It is a question, however, if the Army permitted him to include North China in the area to be covered in the negotiations. The specific mention of Central and South China and the omission of any mention of North China in Mr. Sato’s remarks about the maintenance of the principle of the Open Door in China, would appear to indicate (unless the omission was inadvertent) that the Army might have reserved North China as its sphere of operations, not to be included in diplomatic negotiations.
In the third place, Mr. Sato proposed to formulate fair and equitable foreign policies, to conduct his diplomacy on a frank and just basis and to avoid trickery and chicanery in his dealings with other countries—in other words, to “tread the righteous road steadfastly and courageously”. Although he was forced to deny it the next day, Mr. Sato in this was apparently tacitly disavowing previous Japanese acts, such as the subterfuges employed in the conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of “Manchukuo”, the setting up of the East Hopei Autonomous Government, the incitement of the Mongols in Suiyuan, and the secret conclusion of the German-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement, which had unexpected repercussions throughout the world and especially in the Soviet Union.
In the fourth place, Mr. Sato was apparently endeavoring to discredit the militaristic and chauvinistic elements in the nation and thereby to build up more support for his own policies and plans, when he denied the existence of a “crisis” except in the minds of the people, and proclaimed Japan’s ability to avoid a serious crisis (meaning war) at any time if Japan so desired. Mr. Sato, however, not being entirely familiar with political conditions in Japan, does not seem to have realized, when he denied the famous “crisis”, that he was thereby striking at the keystone of the structure of military power and prestige in Japan. What right would the Army have to demand immense appropriations [Page 51] for repletion of armaments, to demand a “semi-wartime” economic system, and to dictate the composition of the administration in Japan, if no “crisis” loomed on the horizon?
Mr. Sato’s policies, which seem reasonable and just to other nations and which Mr. Sato had undoubtedly formulated as a result of his long diplomatic experience abroad, were somewhat too liberal for the more chauvinistic elements of the Japanese nation. As the Yomiuri pointed out, the so-called “middle stratum” of the Army objected strongly to Mr. Sato’s policies as smelling of a revival of the Shidehara diplomacy, which was much too liberal for the Army. However, the chauvinists might have swallowed the Sato diplomatic policies, at least for a time, but the denial of the existence of a “crisis” was too much. Pressure was immediately brought to bear on Mr. Sato (exactly what form the pressure took is not known) and Mr. Sato was compelled to eat humble pie by qualifying his statements in the Diet, thereby again demonstrating the dominant influence of the military over the domestic and foreign policies of Japan.
The general opinion in diplomatic and other circles in Tokyo is that Mr. Sato should not have attempted to express his views so fully and frankly without having first ascertained definitely the reaction of the military to his policies. Mr. Sato has resided abroad for over 30 years, and while he undoubtedly was aware of the powerful influence wielded in Japan by the military and chauvinists, he appears to have underestimated that influence. He made a very bold and courageous attempt to persuade Japan to adopt more liberal and conciliatory foreign policies, but he seems to have failed to realize that, under present conditions in Japan, his attempt would be practically hopeless. Any change in Japanese foreign policies, if such change occurs, will have to take place slowly and gradually in accordance with gradually changing conditions. Most observers believe that Mr. Sato would have been well advised to have stopped with his first speech, and that his second, or explanatory speech, was a tactical blunder, as it opened the doors to severe criticism from the chauvinistic elements. The tendency, both in the Japanese Foreign Office and in diplomatic circles, is to blame the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi, either for badly advising Mr. Sato, or for failing to advise him of the probable results of the second speech. One newspaper stated that the younger element in the Foreign Office was taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by Mr. Sato’s errors in tactics to press for the retirement or transfer to the field of many of the heads of bureaux. Mr. Horinouchi was mentioned as one of those who would be replaced.
Although practically everyone agrees that Mr. Sato suffered a defeat and considerable humiliation when he was obliged to go before the Diet and qualify the statements which he made in his second [Page 52] speech, the more observant among the diplomats and newspaper correspondents take the stand that he did not, in his qualifying explanations, to any considerable extent weaken his original policies. It will be observed that the qualifying statements endeavored to reconcile Mr. Sato’s policies with those of the Premier and did not change the policies themselves. It was rather an attempt to save the face of the Premier than an about-face on the part of Mr. Sato.
[Here follows brief report on press comment.]
After all, Mr. Sato has so far survived the storm which he aroused by his speeches and, it is believed, has impressed several of his points upon the nation. It is impossible to predict what will happen in the future, especially when the “middle stratum” of the Army at home and the Kwantung Army are taken into consideration, but the general opinion seems to be that he has made a good impression upon the great mass of the Japanese people and that, barring unforeseen contingencies, he should be able to continue in office during the life of the Hayashi Cabinet.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩