793.94/9151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)

334. Your 521, August 3, 7 p.m., and previous. As this Government has understood the British Government’s suggestion, as conveyed in your 509, July 28, 8 p.m., and in the memorandum given the Department by the British Ambassador here on July 20, that suggestion has been that our two Governments approach the Japanese and Chinese Governments and ask them to agree (1) to suspend troop movements and (2) to receive from the American Government and the British Government proposals toward dissolving of “existing deadlock”.

In Department’s 322, July 29, 2 p.m., we asked whether the British Government could indicate to us what type of proposal it envisaged as possible under part 2 of what it had suggested. Vansittart’s statement reported in your 521, August 3, 7 p.m., does not seem to us to answer that question. It seems to us to relate merely to the subject of the possibility of offering good offices in exercise of which the offering governments should provide a neutral ground for negotiations [Page 328] between the Japanese and the Chinese and play the part of impartial advisers or go-betweens toward smoothing out difficulties which might arise during the negotiations; and Vansittart emphasizes that the British Government feels that it would be desirable that it be made clear that what is offered is in no sense intervention but is simply good offices.

As this Government views the situation, there have already been made by each of our two Governments what definitely amount to offers of good offices; the Japanese Government has clearly indicated that it is not responsively disposed toward these approaches (first by its diplomatic silence in regard thereto and second by express statements made by various of its high officials to the press and in the Diet that it will not be responsive to offers of mediation and will not tolerate interference by other countries). This Government is constrained to believe that these Japanese officials have expressed the considered determination of the Japanese Government.

However, believing that no possible course which might serve toward maintenance of peace should be overlooked or be omitted, this Government, in line with Vansittart’s opinion communicated in the concluding paragraph of your telegram, is asking of the American Ambassador in Japan his opinion and his estimate of what might be the probable reaction of the Japanese Government to such an approach if made. May we suggest that the British Government likewise obtain the opinion of their representative in Japan.

Please inform the Foreign Office of the above.

Hull