793.94/9094: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

344. Peiping’s 327, July 29, 5 p.m.20

1.
A responsible official of the Foreign Office told a member of the Embassy last night that (1) the National Government was completely at a loss to understand Sung’s sudden departure from Peiping; (2) in regard to stories that Sung had not received support from the Government, the fact was Sung had repeatedly requested Chiang Kai-shek not to send Central Government troops into the Peiping area and the Government therefore had sent only troops such as former Kuominchun units. We learn from reliable informant that the original draft of Chiang’s statement (our 343, July 30, 2 a.m.) severely criticized Sung for his departure from Peiping and stated that the Government had not sent troops to assist him because of his specific request and that he should have been directing operations from Paoting instead of subjecting himself to Japanese and pro-Japanese pressure in Tientsin and Peiping.
2.
Donald last night informed an officer of my staff that Chiang had said to him that Sung’s departure would not alter the Government’s military plans because Chiang had considered Peiping lost in 1935 and his plans had been formulated upon this consideration. Donald repeated previous statements that the Chinese were determined to fight and said that “things were really just beginning”.
3.
I do not yet view the situation in Peiping with optimism. While a Chinese Cabinet official states that Chang Tzu-chung is reported to have issued orders to the 38th Division to cease resistance, it seems clear that in the fighting at Langfang, Tientsin and other places elements of this division were not under his control. Central News reports that Feng Chih-an instead of proceeding to Paoting with Sung is at Lukouchiao directing defense operations. The formation of a Sino-Japanese committee for maintenance of order in Peiping suggests the beginning of a regime there like the early regime in Mukden and with the temper of the Chinese as it is, calm but desperate, there are many possibilities dangerous incidents which might easily result in further Japanese military action around and in Peiping. I make these observations by way of pointing out that it is too early to assume that the situation at Peiping has definitely or permanently been freed from danger.

To Department and Tokyo, code text by mail to Shanghai.

Johnson
  1. Not printed.