793.94/9080
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
Reference, Nanking’s telegram 328, July 25, 9 p.m. (by Ambassador Johnson), and memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and the Chinese Ambassador of July 26.
[Page 279]The statements made by Chiang Kai-shek to Mr. Johnson parallel and are in accord with the statements made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Secretary.
These statements indicate that the Chinese Government is convinced that the Japanese intend to insist, even at the price of major hostilities if necessary, upon extensive concessions by the Chinese Government. Chiang Kai-shek expects Japanese demands to include: (a) a settlement of all questions relating to “Manchukuo”; (b) cooperative action on a national scale against communism; and (c) the withdrawal of all Central Government troops from Hopei. He states that the Chinese Government will not accept these demands, and that he believes that the Japanese will attempt to compel their acceptance.
Chiang expresses the belief that the only way in which war between China and Japan can be averted would be by cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain “along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted” (Ambassador Johnson’s words in report). He urges immediate action along such lines. Ambassador Johnson makes the comment that he was “much impressed with the earnestness and with the logical force with which the Generalissimo set forth his arguments.”
Comment:
The issue so far as Japan and China are concerned is whether Japan shall gain or China retain control of a valuable region which is of great strategic importance in north China. (It may be that incidentally the Japanese wish to impress on the Chinese the effectiveness of the Japanese military machine.) This is an issue which involves and which will depend upon the relative effectiveness of the combined diplomatic and military forces of the two countries which are thus in conflict.
The issue so far as the powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, are concerned is whether pursuit of national policy by force, in contravention of treaty obligations and with complete indifference to the question of peace, is or is not to be objected to by those powers to whom it seems objectionable, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, then by what process.
In the present instance, the United States and Great Britain, of course, find objectionable the prospect that Japan and China are about to enter upon serious hostilities. However, no mere words which either or both of these powers may utter by way of expostulation will prevent that eventuation as against whatever may be the deliberate intent of the Japanese or the Chinese in regard to the method of handling the issue between those two countries. Nothing short of a definite indication on the part of one or more of the great foreign powers [Page 280] that it would be prepared to throw some type of force into the equation would appreciably affect the play of force (forces) which is now taking place on the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic and military battlefield. As neither Great Britain nor this country is prepared to throw in any kind of force (other than that of moral suasion), we need not expect that action on our part (use of words) is going to be in any way decisive. We have spoken on behalf of peace, and we probably should continue to do so. We are speaking on behalf of the safety of our nationals, and we are and will be warranted in speaking on that subject. We may have to speak, as the situation unfolds, emphatically on these and perhaps on some other subjects. We should take full account of the fact that once a stage of real and serious hostilities is embarked upon all sorts of interests of ours may, from time to time and increasingly, become involved. In whatever we say, we should take great care to say only those things which may tend to pacify and to avoid saying those things which may tend to inflame the parties directly in conflict.
This Division shares the view expressed by Ambassador Grew in numbered paragraph 2 of Tokyo’s 227, July 27, 9 p.m., that “cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted” would not favorably affect developments (at this stage)—unless such action can carry some implication of a sanction.