793.94/9610
The Ambassador in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 305 of July 20, 11 a.m., from the Embassy, Nanking, which transmitted a translation of an address delivered to an educational conference at Ruling by Chiang Kai-shek on July 17 and published by the official Central News Agency at Nanking on July 19.
Because of the similarity between the views of General Chiang Kai-shek as expressed in this address and opinions subsequently expressed in conversations held by him with the British and American Ambassadors, the address merits study. It has added importance, also, from the fact that it was obviously intended to place before the population of the entire country and before their some times clashing leaders the views of the quasi-dictator at a grave moment in the history of China. So far as the Embassy is able to learn, the responses to the address from all factions of the Chinese people have been characterized by enthusiastic approval and determination to follow the lead of General Chiang in extreme measures, if such should become necessary to put a stop to Japanese aggression. If differing opinions are held anywhere, they probably have not been published. In any event, the Embassy believes that the whole Chinese nation has reached a more determined resolution to resist what it regards as Japanese aggression than on any previous occasion. Whether this impression is justified, time probably will show, because the indications are that the Japanese Government intends to utilize the July 7 incident near Peiping as the start of a consolidation of Japanese control over the Province of Hopei, the first area inside the Great Wall in which China’s sovereignty has been seriously challenged by Japan.
[Here follows summary of General Chiang’s address.]
As showing the extreme repugnance with which the Nanking Government regarded the prospect of major hostilities with Japan, it may be recalled that as late as July 25 there were reliable indications that the National Government would be willing to pass over as a “local settlement” the terms said to have been signed by a subordinate of General Sung Che-yuan on July 19 and subsequently approved by him, even though those terms perilously resembled a whittling away of the four “minimum conditions” just quoted.
As reported in a telegram of July 20, from the Embassy, Nanking, the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking informed this [Page 269] office that two circumstances had crystallized the North China crisis beyond the possibility of any improvement by explanations of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and one of those circumstances was the publication of the address of General Chiang Kai-shek. Observing the published responses to the address made by various Chinese leaders one finds additional evidence for the belief that the principles enunciated by General Chiang will be the criterion by which his future conduct of relations with Japan will be judged. If his handling of the present crisis falls below his own standard in resolution and heroism, his position with respect to those political opponents who have already accused him of undue submission to Japan, will be extremely vulnerable.
For example, in a release dated July 22 by the Kuo Min News Agency, an organization sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kwangsi leaders, Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who a year ago raised open revolt against General Chiang on this very score of Chinese-Japanese relations, are represented as praising General Chiang’s address in the highest terms and as swearing to lead the entire military and civil population of Kwangsi Province in support of General Chiang’s campaign of resistance to Japan “to the bitter end”, and as adding the significant words, “The future of the State depends on your decision”. A copy of this news release is enclosed.84
In addition to the unequivocal position taken by General Chiang in his address, a position from which there would appear to be no retreat, there is another factor which, in the opinion of observers in Nanking, makes the avoidance of major hostilities in North China almost impossible. This factor is found in the size of Japanese re-enforcements sent into Hopei Province and the way in which the whole incident has been dignified in Japan by special meetings of the Cabinet, et cetera. In the face of this emphasis given to the whole affair by the Japanese Government, it seems inconceivable that the decisions taken can be reversed and the reenforcements withdrawn unless the Japanese achieve in Hopei a political objective of commensurate importance. Such an objective could hardly be of such slight significance as the enforcement of the July 11 and 19 agreements, as alleged by the Japanese, or even the implementation of the Ho-Umetsu agreement of 1935. It seems equally improbable that the Japanese will be satisfied with any result within the limitations of General Chiang’s minimum conditions.
Respectfully yours,
- Not reprinted.↩