793.94/8980: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

328. 1. I have just seen the Generalissimo who asked me to convey to you the following message:

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2. He stated that the Central Government of China out of a sincere desire for peace had acceded to Japanese demands and had withdrawn its opposition to a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge incident between General Sung Che-yuan and the Japanese military along the lines of the three points covered by the settlement of July 11.

3. He then asked that the American Government watch Japanese actions carefully from now on because he believes that the Japanese Government will shortly present further demands to the Chinese Government which the Chinese Government cannot accept. He stated emphatically that the local settlement now agreed to represents the absolute limit to which the Chinese Government can and is prepared to go. He stated that if the powers and especially the United States and Great Britain accepted this settlement as concluding this affair they would discover too late that war between China and Japan was inevitable.

4. He stated his belief that the Japanese had originally intended to use the Marco Polo Bridge incident for the purpose of bringing about the complete separation of Hopei and Chahar Provinces from the control of the Central Government but that when they met the determined resistance of the Chinese they changed their tactics and resolved upon a local settlement along these [the?] lines of the July 11 truce and transferred their attention to the larger issues between themselves and the Chinese Government. He said that he anticipated that before very long the Japanese would present new demands to the Chinese Government which would include (a) a settlement of all questions relating to Manchukuo, (b) cooperative action on a national scale against communism (this, he explained, was against Russia), and (c) the withdrawal of all Central Government troops from Hopei. He stated emphatically that the Chinese Government would not accept these demands and that war would therefore be inevitable. Believed that the Japanese would attempt to compel acceptance by China. He pointed to the concentration of forces and supplies in Korea and Manchuria in addition to what has already been put into Tientsin as reason for his conviction that Japan is preparing to force China to accept new demands far beyond the present local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge affair.

5. He expressed the hope that the United States and Great Britain would continue to watch Japanese activities closely. He expressed belief that the only way in which war between China and Japan could be averted would be by cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted. He pointed out that the outbreak of a war between China and Japan would affect the interests of the United States and of Great Britain. He referred to the moral obligation which devolves upon the United States and Great Britain as signatories to the Nine [Page 258] Power Agreement, the interest of the United States in the maintenance of world peace and our general interest in the welfare of humanity as reasons why we should anticipate the outbreak of such a war (and an attempt to draw aside from such a war by means of the Neutrality Act after war had commenced) and cooperate with the British Government now and quickly in making it crystal clear to Japan that if it does not want war with China then it must not attempt to force China to make further concessions. That Japan must be made to understand that China will fight rather than make any further concessions.

6. He concluded by saying that in his opinion this was the only way that war might be averted. He stated that the United States and Great Britain were the only powers in a position to bring this home to the Japanese Government in such a way as to persuade them to desist from their designs. He urged that immediate action along these lines was necessary.

7. By way of comment I would like to say that I was much impressed with the earnestness and with the logical force with which the Generalissimo set forth his arguments.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

Johnson