793.94/9259
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum73 entitled “The North China Incident of July 1937[”], prepared by a member of my staff. This memorandum is almost entirely factual in character, that is to say, it is largely a narrative of events based on information, obtained by the Embassy from official Japanese sources and from the Japanese press, from diplomatic colleagues, and from the reports of American Governmental representatives in China. It is intended to be a summary record of the developments of an event which, whatever its immediate outcome, is destined to be a milestone in relations between China and Japan.
Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me last night (see my telegram No. 223, July 22, 7 p.m.)74 of events which, if true, might be interpreted as a recession by the Chinese Government from the uncompromising position taken in its communication of July 19 to the Japanese Government, the situation has not, in my opinion, sufficiently unfolded to warrant final appraisal of the significance of the incident in terms of future consequences. However, I present certain thoughts which, while not conclusive, may be helpful to the Department in making an estimate of the situation.
There has been wide speculation on the question whether the incident, beginning with the fighting on July 7 at Marco Polo Bridge, was engineered by the Japanese military in North China. It is not difficult to surrender to subjective considerations, and, by drawing parallels with previous instances of fighting, where Japanese instigation has been demonstrated beyond peradventure, to conclude that in this instance also the fighting was deliberately brought about by the Japanese military. A careful examination of the information thus far available from both Japanese and Chinese sources leads to the conclusion that indifference to the dangers inherent in a situation where virtually hostile troops are in close juxtaposition, indiscretion [Page 252] in an extraordinary measure, and intolerance of the rights of the Chinese, can all be properly charged to the Japanese in fixing responsibility for the initial fighting. There is no doubt also, as pointed out by Mr. Ambassador Johnson, that the Japanese military unwarrantably profited by the fighting to aggravate the situation.
On the other hand, evidence is lacking that the Japanese brought the fighting about by design. In any objective examination of the question presented, it needs to be borne in mind that the “window-dressing” which has invariably accompanied incidents which the Japanese have instigated in the past has not been apparent in this instance. There has not been a succession of minor incidents involving Japanese “rights” over which the Japanese have affected to feel intense indignation. On the contrary, the fighting was preceded by a period of relative quiescence, and after the Marco Polo Bridge affair there was systematic effort—so palpable as to be evident even to the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo—on the part of the Japanese Government to restrain the Japanese public from viewing the situation emotionally. It is also a fact that Japanese officialdom, including the War Office, absolved the Chinese troops of any premeditation, which it probably would not have done had the Marco Polo Bridge affair been the result of Japanese calculation.
So long as definite and conclusive evidence of Japanese guilt is lacking, it seems to me that little is to be gained by public discussion of this question for the reason that to discuss it would be to digress from the basic cause of the incident. The Japanese have invoked the Boxer Protocol to justify the stationing of a large number of troops in North China and for the holding of extensive military manoeuvres, but it is a self-evident fact that the stationing of troops in large numbers and the holding of military exercises are calculated to solidify the Japanese position in North China and thus have a purpose and objective which lie entirely outside the purposes and objectives of the instrument which the Japanese invoke. It may be imagined that the Japanese Government would be glad to have an examination made of the circumstances in which the affair originated, as even the raising of that particular issue by the interested powers would, regardless of the findings, imply a certain validity in the action of the Japanese in stationing near Peiping an unnecessarily large force and in other forms of action antecedent to the fighting.
A brief reference might be made to public opinion in Japan, which, as I have stated in my telegrams, is solidly behind the Government. Several foreign correspondents and diplomatic colleagues who have discussed the situation with individual Japanese have been led to believe, by the apparent dismay with which such Japanese have [Page 253] watched the serious turn toward which events have taken, that popular support of the Government is lacking. Such a conclusion would be warranted if such support and a feverish desire for war were synonymous, as they have been in the recent past. In the present instance, the hope that war can be avoided is universal, but there has come to my knowledge no evidence that there exists any body of opinion which does not believe that, failing a modification of Chinese attitude, resort to force by Japan would not be justified.
As matters stand today, it would seem fair to say that, although the incident may not have been provoked by the Japanese military, the latter lost no time in realizing that an opportunity was presented still further to weaken the influence of the Chinese Government in North China. It was made evident to us more than a week ago by the Foreign Office that Japanese diplomatic strategy called for emphasis upon settlement of the incident as a “local matter” with local officials, so that, if a local settlement were obtained, the courses open to the Chinese Government would be to approve the settlement, or to ignore it, or to prevent by force its fulfilment. To follow either of the first two courses would be failure by the Chinese Government to resist further whittling away of its influence over North China: to follow the third would involve taking the initiative for hostilities for which it is not prepared. The indications now being received primarily from Japan sources are that the situation in North China is in process of settlement and that Japan now looks to China either to resist or to acquiesce in the reduction to a shadow of its sovereignty in North China.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Cf. the Ambassador’s memorandum of July 22, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 333.↩