Office of the Historian

793.94/8900: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, July 21, 1937—noon.
[Received July 21—10:10 a.m.]

311. My 306, July 20, 4 p.m.

1.
I received message by telephone from the Foreign Office July 21, 9 a.m., that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was too busy to receive me as I asked but that Vice Minister Hsu Mo would receive me at 10 o’clock. I informed the Vice Minister that the American Ambassador was in North China not because he minimized the importance of the situation in Nanking but because he and the Department of State believed it important that he remain in Peiping during this crisis. I said the Ambassador had entrusted to me the performance of all duties he would perform if in Nanking. I said the American Embassy had probably the largest diplomatic staff in Nanking and that all events and public documents had been promptly reported by cable to the Ambassador and Washington and that all this had been done because the American Government attached the greatest importance to maintaining full and friendly contact with the Chinese Government at this time.
2.
I asked the Vice Minister whether he thought serious hostilities would occur immediately and he replied that this depended on Japanese action. Answering questions, he said that he thought China would not declare war because in his opinion no signatory to the Kellogg Pact could declare war just as there could in theory be no neutrals. Any nation utilizing war to enforce national policy automatically ranged other signatories against it as an outlaw. The position of China if Japan attacked the 29th Army would be in theory and fact that of a sovereign power defending its own territory against invasion. He had examined the Chinese law creating the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and could find in the list of powers delegated to the Council nothing to justify the Japanese contention that in insisting upon diplomatic settlement of this dispute the Chinese Government is interfering with matters legally entrusted to the Council.
3.
Donald has just called. He said that there is a powerful group around General Chiang who may desire avoidance of war at any price. He does not know what the decision of the Chinese Government will be but he believes the Japanese military are determined to seize Hopei and more territory just as they planned and executed seizure of Manchuria and Jehol and that China’s position would be morally and legally hopeless unless China resisted such aggression. The power of General Chiang would he thinks inevitably be lost if the Government were not to oppose force to force but he is also [Page 231] convinced that if the Japanese were to negotiate at Nanking they would find the Government willing to yield a great deal to avoid war.
4.
It is reported that General Chiang attended an important meeting of the Central Political Committee this morning.

Sent to the Department and Peiping.

Peck